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SIIRTOLAISUUS - MIGRATION

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Olavi Koivukangas

THE INSTITUTE OF MIGRATION 1974 - 1984

Olavi Koivukangas has served as Director of the Institute of Migration since its beginning. He earned his doctorate in 1972 from the Australian National University, in Canberra, with a dissertation on Scandinavian immigration to Australia. He has written numerous studies and articles on Finnish emigration. His main field of research is Finnish emigration to Australia.

Background and early stages

In the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, the migratory movements of the population - emigration and internal migration - attracted ever - increasing attention once more everywhere in Filnad as an important and large-scale social phenomenon.The unprecedentedly rapid change in the economic structure of the country from agriculture to the manufacturing industries and service trades released manpower from rural areas. Around the same time, the so-called big age classes born in the "baby-boom" years right after the war entered the labor market, often without the benefit of occupational training. There began a shift of population on the one hand to the cities and towns of Finland itself, notably the urban centers of the south, and on the other hand to neighboring Sweden, the vigorously developing industries of which needed workers. The peak year in the Finnish emigration to Sweden was 1970,

when no less than 41,000 persons moved from Finland to Sweden and the total population of this country decreased temporarily as a result of the migratory drain.

Although emigration from Finland had taken place for centuries, research into the matter had been slight and of a random nature in this country before the decade of the 1960s. Much along scholarly lines had been written about emigration, it is true, ever since the last years of the 19th century, but the scholarship was characterized by a certain haphazardness and slight collaboration among researchers. The research situation improved appreciably in 1963, when Anna-Leena Toivonen brought out her academic thesis on overseas emigration from Etelä-Pohjanmaa (South Finnish Bothnia) in 1867-1930 and the research project on emigration to distant lands from Finland got under way under the direction of Professor Vilho Niitemaa at the Department of General History of the University of Turku.

It was largely the magnitude of the Finnish emigration to Sweden that was the central reason for the setting up in 1970 by the Government of The Emigration Commission (SAN) to deal with questions relating to emigration and for the undertaking by the Ministry of Labor at the beginning of the 1970s of a comprehensive research project on emigration.

The research work sponsored by both the University of Turku and the Ministry of Labor concentrated, however, on shedding light on particular aspects of migration, namely, emigration to distant lands and emigration to Sweden.

Typical of the research project dealing with long-journey migration under the direction of Professor Niitemaa was a striving to achieve international collaboration. Accordingly, the professor endeavored to obtain research grants for his students to enable them to carry out studies in the United States and other countries where Finnish emigrants had settled.

After I had passed my final examination in general history in 1967 at the University of Turku as a part of the research project on long-journey migration, the Australian National University in Canberra awarded me in 1968 a three-years scholarship to support my research for a thesis dealing with immigration to Australia from the Nordic countries.

After my return to Turku in 1972, I had an opportunity to join the staff of the Department of General History of the University of Turku, which had attracted a number of gifted researchers interested in the subject of migration to work under the direction of Professor Niitemaa. The department had moved from its cramped old quarters on Hämeenkatu to spacious premises in the former barrack area. During

my sojourn in Australia, migration research had explosively expanded and lively collaboration was taking place with research scholars and universities abroad, especially in the United States and Canada.

The expansion of the sphere of interest and the financial difficulties attending the collection of material and the investigative work were probably central factors in the scheme whereby Professor Niitemaa endeavored to develop a more substantial organization than that represented by any special project to support migration research. The objective was some kind of research center, one that would also coordinate collaborative activity with other research institutions, such as, in particular, universities. A favorable stand toward the plan was taken by, among others, **Suomi Seura** / Finland Society, and specifically its president, Minister Rainer von Fieandt, and its executive director, Mr.Tauri Aaltio. For some reason, however, the plan could not get off the ground, partly, perhaps, on account of the cautious attitude taken by the administrators of the University of Turku. Their thinking, again, was probably guided by the scantiness of the privately run university's financial resources.

When the possibilities of expanding the organization in connection with the University of Turku appeared to have led to a dead end, we undertook to seek some other solution. We mapped out the research situation in the other Finnish universities and learned that the research dealing with migratory movements had increased greatly, which meant that the need for collaboration and coordination of activity was obvious. After this pilot mapping operation, representatives of **the University of Turku** and **Åbo Akademi** (the local Swedish institution of higher education) turned in the summer of 1973 to then Minister of Education Marjatta Väänänen. In the memorandum delivered to the ministry, it was pointed out that research into migratory movements was an ever-growing field of inquiry and measures were proposed for the establishment of an institute to promote such research.

The central task of the new institute was seen to be serving as a connecting link between bodies conducting research in different quarters and the organs of state concerned with issues involving migration. The city of Turku was recommended as the domicile of the planned institute, for migration had for a long time been a field of inquiry in the institutions of learning located there, and good and effective relations with research centers active in the same field abroad had already been established by the local researchers.

The ministry's having taken a favorable stand in the matter, we proceeded to enter discussions with Professor Niitemaa in the autumn of 1973 and with organizations interested in migration and its study, such as **Suomi-Seura, Väestöliitto** (= Population League), etc., as well

as with state authorities, Turku city officials and institutions of higher education, starting at the turn of the year. The majority of the bodies we contacted expressed willingness to join the foundation to be set up and tentatively promised to donate a suitable sum of money to the initial fund. The city of Turku joined the founding group. Joining from the Swedish side were **the Central Federation of Finnish Societies in Sweden** and the **Immigrantinstitutet**. A foundation was deemed to suit organizational requirements better than an association.

The founding meeting of the Foundation of the Institute of Migration was held in the consistory of the University of Turku on March 15, 1974. Good coordination and collaboration with the research project sponsored by the University of Turku in the field of long-journey migration are shown by the fact that when Mr Reino Kero presented his doctoral thesis the next day, quite a few of the founding members of the new institute attended the presentation.

Present at the meeting on March 15, 1974, were 34 persons representing institutions of higher education and various associations. In his opening speech, Professor Niitemaa stressed the importance of collaboration between universities and research institutes and the surrounding community to enable the powers that be to obtain the most reliable possible information in laying plans and making decisions. The speaker also emphasized the importance of the new institute in research collaboration on an international scale. Professor Jorma Pohjanpalo, vice president of **Suomi-Seura**, was elected chairman of the founding meeting and Dr. Olavi Koivukangas, secretary. The name to be given the institute was the subject of lively discussion. Among the names proposed were **Siirtolaisuuden Tutkimussäätiö** (Foundation for Emigration Research) and **Muuttoliiketutkimuskeskus** (Migration Research Center). Most support, however, was given Mr. Jaakko Itälä's proposal, **Siirtolaisuusinstituutti**, the English version of which eventually became the present "Institute of Migration." Academician Eino Jutikkala, the historian, proposed further that the bylaws would state that by **migration** is also meant migratory movements inside the country's boundaries.

The following charter of foundation was adopted:

"In order to support endeavors to study emigration and other migratory movements, to publicize the results, to coordinate and make known research activity connected with emigration and to develop international collaboration in these branches of inquiry, the undersigned have established a foundation, the name of which shall be **Siirtolaisuusinstituutti - Migrationsinstitutet / Institute of Migration.**"

The donations made by the founding members amounted to

Mk 98,000, of which subsequently the sum of Mk 50,000 was invested in the form of capital shares in the foundation and the balance was reserved as operating capital.

Finally, the founding meeting elected a provisional Council composed of representatives of 21 collective bodies under the chairmanship of Professor Jorma Pohjanpalo. TheCouncil held its first meeting immediately after its election and appointed an Administrative Board, which at its organizing session elected Professor Vilho Niitemaa as chairman and invited Dr. Olavi Koivukangas to serve as agent for the foundation and director of the institute.

At its meeting in May 1974, the board appointed to the post of bureau secretary Maija-Liisa Kalhama, B.A. After two small rooms attached to the library of the Department of General History had been set aside in the summer of 1974 for the use of the institute, it was able to begin work on August 1, 1974 - the very same day that the private University of Turku was converted into a state institution. The official opening of the institute took place on Aug. 20 of the same year.

The Starting of Operations

The work of the Institute of Migration started with the functional mapping out of the field of operations; this was done by sending a letter of inquiry to organizations and researchers in Finland aimed at forming a picture of the research situation. Also the assembling of a library collection was promptly begun, along with publishing activity in the framework of series of books. In the first year, the dissertations of Reino Kero and Olavi Koivukangas appeared in the English-language series. In the autumn, there came out the first issue of the periodical **Siirtolaisuus-Migration**, which has since then appeared four times a year. Attention was also given from the beginning to the development of international collaboration. For the purpose of making direct contacts and strengthening former relations, the director of the institute visited Immigration Research Centers in the United States and Canada in January 1975. People turned to the new institute in all kinds of matters connected with migration; for instance, inquiries were made about relatives living abroad and requests were received from descendants of emigrants for genealogical information. It was endeavored to be of assistance in every case to the extent possible.

The following year, 1975, the institute inaugurated its program of seminar and congress activity by taking part, jointly with Suomi-Seura, in the Finnish Emigrant Congress held in conjunction with the Jyväskylä Summer Festival and by arranging in Turku the first Symposium on

Internal Migration. The institute also took part in a central capacity in the work of the United States Bicentennial Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Education, as a result of which there appeared the book "Old Friends - Strong Ties" saluting the American Bicentennial. Further, an exhibition was put together featuring Finnish emigration to the United States. One set of the exhibits was sent on tour to the United States and another remained in Finland to be made available on different occasions. In the publishing sector, noteworthy was the production of the work titled " The Finnish Experience in the Great Lakes Region, " a collection of papers read at the first Finnish - American Conference on Immigration Research, held in Duluth, Minnesota, in 1974.

Central Tasks

Documentation

In pursuing its aims, the Institute of Migration has striven, during its first decade, systematically to improve the conditions necessary for the carrying out of research in the field of migration, making and promoting studies, and acting as a collaborative agency and coordinator in the migration research being done in different quarters.

Actively keeping abreast of migration studies being made in different places is the basis and most important point of departure of the institute's work. This end has been served by the inquiries sent out from time to time from the institute to institutions and individual researchers. These inquiries have laid the basis for a special research register, by drawing on which the institute in 1978 published a bibliography of Finnish emigration and internal migration comprising some 3,500 titles. About 2,000 new publication titles have been entered into the register compiled since then. The register also contains a catalogue of migration studies in progress and it offers a valuable means of advancing research and facilitating collaboration and division of labor among researchers. The production of a new bibliography is bound to come up for consideration in the next few years, along with the computerizing of the data in the register.

In addition to the institute's functioning as a documentation center, the collection of research material and the building up of the library are aimed at improving the conditions under which research work is done in the field of migration.

Noteworthy collections of research material dealing with migratory movements of different kinds have been acquired by the Institute

of Migration. Catalogues and organized collections exceed 400 in number. The material has accumulated mainly through gifts received from both domestic sources and elderly emigrants living abroad and their progeny or emigrant associations. Part of the material contained in the archives has been collected as a result of research activity engaged in by the institute itself (interviews, microfilms, etc.). The material in the archives of the institute is divided into three main categories: donated material, photograph collections and newspaper and magazine clipping collections. Measured in terms of shelf space, the material covers a total shelving length of some 200 meters. The picture collection contains more than 3,000 photographs dealing with migration, arranged by countries of destination. The library of the institute contains nearly 4,000 titles of studies and other publications dealing with emigration and internal migration and the relevant background factors. The library receives all the newspapers and periodicals published by Finnish emigrants abroad as well as a considerable number of foreign scientific periodicals. The library collection has been acquired mainly by making exchanges using the institute's own publications, including its quarterly magazine. The library is designed primarily to serve readers under its own roof, but loans are also made to outside scholars and students. In addition to literature, the institute has systematically also collected statistical material on emigration and internal migration.

The research register, collections of research material and library comprise the core of the documentation the institute is able to provide.

Information service

Another important function of the institute is disseminating information on migratory movements and the research being done on them. This takes place primarily through the publication of studies dealing with emigration and internal migration. The institute brings out series of publications in the Finnish, Swedish and English languages, in addition to which series in duplicate form are issued of short studies and reports. Many of the studies have been doctoral dissertations. To date, 25 publications have appeared in the institute's series. Since the year 1974, the institute has also published the periodical **Siirtolaisuus-Migration,** a quarterly containing, in addition to topical items and communications, short articles and book reviews.

The seminars and congresses arranged by the institute also constitute an important channel of information and provide forums for scholarly intercourse. In all, the institute has arranged, either alone or

jointly with other organizations, ten seminars, of which several have been of international scope. On the average, one scientific conference a year seems to be a suitable number. The institute has also aspired to bring about a long-term program of seminar activity; for example, it has sought since 1975 to have a symposium on migratory movements meet at five-year intervals to concentrate attention on internal shifts of population. Further, in collaborative research activity carried on with the United States and Canada, it has been aimed to hold at five-year intervals conferences like the one held for the first time in 1974 in Duluth to deal with immigration to North America - and this aim has been achieved. The second FINN FORUM met in Toronto, Canada, in 1979 and the third is convening in Turku in September 1984.

The papers read at the seminars and conferences and the results of the discussions have been published and thereby made generally available. In the future, the seminar program will receive more attention than ever in research collaboration and its significance as a vehicle of information will be underscored.

Connected with the institute's information service is its exhibition activity too, whereby it is sought to make known to the general public the vicissitudes and history of Finnish migratory movements. In 1976, in honor of the United States Bicentennial, an exhibition of photographs dealing with Finnish emigration to America was produced. Two sets were made, of which one was sent to the United States as a touring exhibition and the other was retained as a permanent exhibition on the premises of the Institute of Migration. In 1980, a large-scale exhibition was put together dealing with Finnish emigration to Sweden throughout history. The exhibition was set up in six different communities in Sweden and attracted a total of more than 100,000 visitors. A new printing of the publication issued in connection with the exhibition has come out, and it has been used in, for instance, Swedish schools and by study circles. In Finland, the exhibition has been on display also in six localities, and it is now open to the public in reduced form on the premises of the institute. The third permanent exhibition produced by the institute consists of photographs dealing with Finnish emigration to Australia; it was put together in 1982. The exhibitions have to an increasing extent attracted the attention of tourists and school groups. The development of exhibition activity has been restricted, however, by the limited space available in the already cramped headquarters of the institute. In addition to these primary exhibitions, the institute has participated in the arranging of various exhibitions concentrating on special themes in connection with, for instance, conferences.

In accordance with the original idea of scientific collaboration, attention has been concentrated on the general promotion and coordination of research work. The reason for this is that the institute has not had either the financial or other means to undertake research projects on its own. Promoting and coordinating the research dealing with migration in general have therefore dominated its activity. It came to light, however, that certain questions pertaining to emigration and internal migration were not being given attention anywhere or that social planners and decision makers needed to obtain information fast. It was at a time when the migration research project of the Ministry of Labor was about to be finished - but still needed to fill informational gaps. Related projects in the sphere of applied research were started in 1977, one example being an investigation, financed by the Finnish and Swedish Ministries of Labor, of the migration of workers to Sweden outside the jurisdiction of the employment bureaus.

The Central Bureau of Statistics took part in a broad study undertaken in 1980 on funds provided by the Academy of Finland to construct a composite picture of the internal migrant. Characteristic of the research activity of the institute has been, on the one hand, tackling timely problems and, on the other, collaboration with various quarters as well as arranging financial support for particular projects. Thus the study on the emigrants returning to Finland from Sweden in 1980-1981 was carried out in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor and the Housing Administration. In 1983, a new project, known as the Repatriated Child Project, was undertaken for the purpose of investigating the adjustment to conditions in the Finnish comprehensive school system of children who had returned from Sweden and determining how well they were doing in their studies. The study is a Finnish-Swedish co-project, with an investigator from each country participating and the costs being borne by both sides equally. Four students are also taking part, their reports being designed to be submitted for academic credit.

The scope of the research engaged in by the institute ranges from internal migratory movements to emigration to Australia and New Zealand. In 1978, a research project dealing with Scandinavian emigration to Australia and New Zealand was started jointly with the **Emigrantinstitutet** based in Växjö, Sweden with the financial support of, among others, the Nordic Cultural Foundation. As a participant in the project, I was given the opportunity to do research in Australia for three months in 1981.

The institute's future research activity will depend, on the one

hand, on the needs of the society, and, on the other, on the available resources. There are great advantages to working on a project basis, and this will continue and evidently increase also along the lines of international collaboration. Finnish emigration and along with it also the dominant research sector would appear to fall in the future as well in the Scandinavian sphere.

International Collaboration

Inasmuch as the phenomenon of emigration is international by its very nature, it goes without saying that the international point of view must be of central importance also in relevant research. Ever since it was founded, the institute has sought to establish collaboration and the exchange of information with institutions and researchers in other countries. In the sphere of international collaboration, special mention should be made of the formal agreement of collaboration concluded with the Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, in 1976. To an increasing extent, in joint action with the Ministry of Education, research facilities have been accepted and offered to foreign recipients of scholarships and research grants. What I consider to be especially important, however, is the opening up of opportunities for Finnish emigration researchers to do research work in universities and research institutes abroad. The exchange of research scholars could take place both on the basis of programs of exchange between states and by developing collaborative projects. Attention should be paid to the matter of having researchers sent to the United States and Canada, above all, with the yield of a notable endowment received from the United States, for instance, being used for this purpose.

Administration and Organization

The Institute of Migration has been established in the form of a foundation, the administrative organs of which are the Council and the Administrative Board. The institute receives its operating funds from the state as an annual discretionary grant-in aid, in addition, funds are solicited from different sources to finance different projects. Special mention should be made of the donation of $ 100,000 made in 1982 by the 90-year-old Finnish-American Kaarle Hjalmar Lehtinen to support the work of the institute. The permanent staff comprises four regular employees. Counting project workers and temporary employees, the personnel of the institute numbers annually about ten on the

average. The institute at first occupied rooms provided by the University of Turku, and since 1981 it has rented space in premises owned and renovated by the city of Turku on a historical street named Piispankatu.

The Future

For the past ten years, the Institute of Migration has taken active part in collaborative Finnish and international research work. The biggest problems confronting it are obtaining additional space for, in especial, the holding of exhibitions and the general difficulty of getting financial support for scientific research projects. On account of the increase in the quantity of data and incoming inquiries, the institute will probably be obliged to switch over to the automatic data processing system in the next few years. New challenges have to be faced by the institute as increasing numbers of requests are received for genealogical information.

Working in collaboration with its friends both at home and abroad, the Institute of Migration faces its second decade of existence with confidence.

Kalervo Siikala

THE TURNING-POINT IN FINNISH EMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1970s

Kalervo Siikala heads the Department of International Affairs in the Finnish Ministry of Education. He has served on many international committees for cultural collaboration and published many books and articles. In his official capacity, he has had an opportunity to follow closely matters involving Finnish emigrants as well as the work of the Institute of Migration and its development.

Upon the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the **Siirtolaisuusinstituutti**/Institute of Migration, these is reason to congratulate its founders upon their energetic and farsighted action. A new institute of science, but one also serving practical purposes, had been established on private initiative expeditiously. The undertaking gained wide support in both scientific circles and various branches of social life. During the first ten years of its existence, the Institute of Migration has in many ways lived up to the hopes raised by it and gained for itself a secure place in its own scientific and social sectors.

What made possible speedy action and rapid progress was a generally felt need to pay careful attention to questions relating to migration. Although Finland has for centuries been a country that has given her sons and daughters to the world as emigrants, the mass exodus of migrants in the 1960s and early 1970s, mainly to neighboring Sweden, was of an exceptional magnitude and provoked serious discussion about the demographic and economic consequences of emigration to Finland.

During the historical era, the population of Finland has decreased only in extremely hard and exceptional times, such as the period of the Finnish War between 1806 and 1810, the years of the Great Famine of 1866-1870, the period following the Civil War of 1918 and the one following the Winter War in 1940. Belonging to the series of periods during which the Finnish population underwent a decline are also the years 1969 and 1970, when it decreased by some 35,000 souls.

The government began to pay systematic attention to the matter of emigration by setting up a Emigration Commission in 1970, first under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later under the Ministry of Labor. The government also increased its efforts to maintain and strengthen cultural relations between Finnish emigrants and the Old Country. Such measures were considered to be a natural part of Finland's international cultural policy and they remained mostly the responsibility of the Ministry of Education in conjunction with civic organizations active in this sphere.

The mass migration to Sweden created a host of problems, of which the toughest proved to involve language, education and culture. On the initiative of the Nordic Council, the governments of Finland and Sweden in 1967 appointed an intergovernmental mixed body, a Finnish-Swedish Educational Commission, to deal with the educational problems of the Finnish emigrants living in Sweden. The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by the fact that in the 1982-1983 scholastic year some 37,000 Finnish-speaking children were attending classes in the Swedish comprehensive school system, in addition to which over 6,000 Finnish-speaking pupils were enrolled in upper secondary schools in Sweden. Educational and cultural questions have long loomed large in the discussions involving Finnish-Swedish collaboration.

Interest in Finnish culture has cropped up elsewhere besides the close emigrant community in Sweden. Finns by the hundreds have moved to major business centers abroad, mainly in the line of their work or through the circumstances of mixed marriages. The children from such families in most cases attend school in the countries where they reside; but the families have ever more frequently wanted their children to have instruction in Finnish too - which is mostly the mother tongue, quite literally -, in speaking, reading and writing it as well as in Finnish history, social studies and culture. The activity started in the 1970s by the Finnish Sailors' Mission Church in London toward the organization of Finnish-language study circles managed on a voluntary basis has spread to an increasing number of countries on several continents. It helps in keeping up cultural and linguistic contacts with the native land of the parents - or one of them - and the relatives living there. The State has been able to support this activity ever more signifi-

cantly with the passing years. The initiators have in most instances been Finnish societies or other organizations or, then, faculty members of foreign universities in charge of courses in the Finnish language and culture.

In certain cases, it has been considered necessary to establish abroad Finnish schools corresponding to the comprehensive school in the mother country for the children of families living in foreing countries more or less temporarily for reasons of employment. Examples of such employment can be cited from the spheres of trade and industry, project export, diplomacy, joint development endeavors, missionary work, etc. Parliament in 1981 passed a law which private schools in this category have been made eligible for Finnish State subsidies.

It is also possible for the children of Finnish families residing abroad to take the comprehensive school course, or part of it, by correspondence in situations where, on account of a shortage of pupils, no regular school instruction can be arranged. The institution in charge is the Correspondence School of the Kansanvalistusseura (= Society for the Advancement of Public Education).

In addition to these official measures, action has been taken independently in many fields by the emigrants' own associations as well as civic organizations in Finland maintaining contact with them, not least of all for the sake of fostering cultural relations. Every kind of Finnish educational endeavor, no matter how distantly removed from the national boundaries of Finland, is part of our national culture.

It is gratifying to see that Finnish emigrants are showing an interest to an ever increasing extent in the affairs of their former homeland and in keeping in touch. This interest draws strength from the wave of ethnic pride to be observed everywhere in the melting pot of nations. It is a wave that has swept over the Finnish emigrant population too.

The connections between Finns living abroad and their old homeland are now stronger than ever - and mutual relations better perhaps too. Great credit for this goes to President Urho Kekkonen, who during his very long tenure as chief executive always gave studious attention to issues involving emigrant Finns and frequently honored their functions with his presence. One high point in the development of emigrant relations was reached when, at a festival put on by Finns in Canada, President Kekkonen wound up his speech by striking up the song **Kotimaani ompi Suomi** (My homeland is Suomi) and the audience composed of first-, second- and even third-generation Canadian Finns, who filled the hall, joined lustily in the singing.

R.T. Appleyard,

TRENDS AND ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION*

Professor Appleyard worked with Borrie, Zubryzcki and Price at the Australian National University before his appointment as Professor of Economic History at the University of Western Australia in 1967. He has written several books and many articles on immigration to Australia and is presently coordinating a project on International Migration in the Third World for CICRED (Paris). Other research includes the settlement of Greek and British migrants in Australia and the impact of migration on the development of selected countries in Asia.

In recent years, international migration has become so complex in composition and direction to be hardly recognizable as the well-known phenomenon of the inter-war years. It has also been the most neglected area of population studies,[1] most demographers having directed their attention to aspects of fertility and mortality, the determinants of natural increase. While the relatively few scholars who have maintained an abiding interest in international migration would readily concur that it is by far the minor determinant of population growth in most countries, they would also argue that the qualitative aspects of recent flows have

*Much of the data included, and argument developed, in this paper were first presented to a workshop on International Migration in the third World, held at Perth, Western Australia during November 1980 under the auspices of C.I.C.R.E.D's programme of Cooperative Research in the Population Field.

had a significance for economic and social change disproportionate to the numbers involved. This contention is especially opposite to migration between developed and developing countries. Indeed, a UN-sponsored survey in 1975 showed that while all governments took an understandable interest in administrative aspects of immigration control, the main concern of most was migration's impact on the size, growth and composition of population and especially workforce. The UN Report also contended that, except for countries in East and South Asia, "a much higher proportion of countries are interested in affecting emigration and immigration trends than trends of fertility and population growth."[2]

Riad Tabbarah holds the view that major changes in the composition and direction of international migration during the last twenty years have been so great as to make the subject a new field of inquiry from the point of view of problems and policies.[3] To most scholars, the term international migration is synonymous with the flow of over sixty million Europeans to the New World during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though the United States was the main receiver of immigrants during what has been termed the "century of migration", there were also significant flows of Europeans to Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia and countries comprising Latin America.[4] Restrictions imposed by these receiving countries during the nineteenth century were not severe, but by the early years of the twentieth century the situation had changed considerably. For example, the United States recognized that internal difficulties were being exacerbated by relatively unrestricted intakes of immigrants and so passed Quota Acts in 1921 and 1924. About the same time, the United Kingdom (a major provider of emigrants during the nineteenth century) also saw the value of directing flows away from the United States (its major competitor in world trade) and towards its constituent Empire countries. The resultant "Empire Self Sufficiency" concept was an early example of economic community premised primarily upon Britain providing people and manufacturing goods to the outlying Empire countries which, in turn, provided Britain with agricultural products and raw materials.[5] Though by any reasonable criteria, the concept was not successful, policies enunciated during the 1920's consolidated British migration trends for many years thereafter, as the Quota Acts had consolidated both volume and composition of European migration to the United States.

While there is no doubt that the causes and consequences of emigration from Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been the prime concern of migration scholars, other regions of the world also experienced large population transfers during this period. For example, economic distress and recurring drought in

China was the main reason why at the end of the nineteenth century there were probably eight million Chinese living abroad. Better economic conditions outside their country also led approximately 2.8 million Indians to live abroad in 1922, mainly in Ceylon, Malaya, Mauritius and South Arfica. Japanese people also emigrated in large numbers during this period, an estimated two million being in Asiatic Russia, Havaii and continental United States.[6] Migration has clearly been an integral part of the historical process of demographic change; the salient feature of recent flows, however, has been increasing restrictions by governments on both the numbers and composition of flows.

World War II was the catalyst for a new phase in international migration; flows and composition thereafter reflecting fundamental shifts in economic and political power. In Europe at war's end there were an estimated fifteen million refugees awaiting resettlement. The majority returned to their European homelands, but over one million chose to re-settle in other continents. The United States, Canada and Australia willingly accepted the refugees because their economies required additional labour to service high rates of economic growth. The same conditions, in Australia's case, led to the emigration of thousands of British, Dutch and German migrants once the "pool" of refugees had dried up. In total, over ten million Europeans emigrated to other continents between 1945 and 1964.[7] However, the major thrust for this exodus had weakened long before 1964. As early as 1957 strong economic recovery in northern Europe, especially West Germany and the Netherlands, not only dampened the incentive to emigrate but led to these countries actively seeking workers from less prosperous countries in southern Europe and north Africa. Intra-European migration, as it became known, subsequently saw the northward movement of millions of workers even though they have not provided the easily-controlled or flexible labour pool expected at the time. They have not returned home in recession and, over the years, have brought dependants to join them on a permanent basis.[8]

Between 1945 and 1964, traditional receiving countries maintained a continuing, if sometimes fitful, interest in immigration. Despite the Quota Acts, the United States received 2.4 million Europeans during this period, Canada and Australia each received over two million and New Zealand about 250,000.[9] Australia's intake was more sustained because successive governments were committed to achieving annual targets equal to one per cent of the population, partly for defense reasons and partly because she was unable to provide a workforce large enough to satisfy labour demand. Thus when the pool of Displaced Persons dried up, Australia wrote bilateral migration agreements with many countries in Europe under which financial assistance was given to

persons who prepared to undertake the long and expensive voyage. Though Canada's policy was based on similar precepts, intakes were more sensitive to Canada's current labour demand. The United States, with its high standard of living and long tradition as a country of immigration, remained the strongest magnet for Europeans and intakes would have been much higher during the period had entry restrictions not been so severe.

Though it is not possible to specifically date the beginning of what I call the new era in international migration, forces were already at work in the mid-1960's which would change dramatically the direction and composition of flows. I have already mentioned intra-European migration as a major new development in world migration. Mention should also be made of the fact that in addition to receiving 2.4 million immigrants from Europe between 1945 and 1964, the United States admitted a further 2.3 million from non-European countries, especially countries in southern and central America. After the early 1960's, composition as well as volume of intakes by traditional receiving countries were greatly altered.by significant changes in policies concerning non-Europeans. The **United States** government changed its Quota system in 1955 to eliminate ethnic discrimination and approve selection on the basis of "needed skill" and sponsorship of close kin. Effect on composition of intake was quite dramatic. By 1971, Europe had fallen to third place behind Latin America and Asia as an area of immigrant supply. By 1974, forty-five per cent of America's immigrants came from the American continent and thirty-two per cent from Asia. **Canada** also made policy changes which greatly altered composition of intake. Inflows from Europe which had comprised eighty-four per cent of intake between 1946 and 1950 fell to fifty per cent between 1968 and 1971 while the percentage of Asians rose from one to seventeen. **Australia** also responded to the new forces by altering its long-standing preference for Europeans and admitting a small number of highly-skilled and professional immigrants of Asian descent. Though the proportion of Asians in total intake was nowhere near as significant as the proportion to the United States and Canada, the new Australian policy nonetheless represented major changes in attitude towards non-Europeans as immigrants. By the mid-1960's a highly-qualified Asian who could speak English and had a job to go to was readily admitted as an Australian resident on the same terms as a European.

The passing of new legislation in traditional receiving countries favoured the intake of highly-skilled workers whereas earlier policies had favoured workers of specific ethnic backgrounds. New policies not only reflected the receiving countries need for such workers but was also a rapid, cheap and effective method of filling labour demands.

Given characteristically wide differentials in incomes between developed and developing countries, incentive to emigrate was very high. World War II, the catalyst for fundamental shifts in economic and political power, was no less important for developing as for developed countries. Tabbarah is of the view that significant economic and legal changes in **both** sending and receiving countries after the early 1960's collectively led to the significant changes in migration flows.[10] Not only did emigration from developing to developed countries take on major proportions, but it also changed significantly the ethnic structure of migration. Highly qualified workers in developing countries, able to obtain significantly higher wages and better opportunities in developed countries, moved in such lagre numbers that the flow was dubbed a **"brain drain"**. **Illegal** migration was encouraged perhaps as much by the reckoning that in a new political climate their expulsion would be unlikely as by the demand for their labour in high economic growth countries. Flows hitherto unknown between countries in continents containing mainly developed countries began to occur. **Refugee** migration between developing countries, often as a result of major political upheavals (e.g., the 'partition' of India), and from developing to developed nations (e.g., following the conflict in Vietnam), occurred in magnitudes not before experienced.

To the economic and legal forces identified by Tabbarah as facilitating new migration flows should be added significant political forces, especially the magnitude and rapidity of independence achieved by developing countries. Prior to their independance, immigration policies were generally at the convenience of the colonial power. Residents of that power who sought entry were accorded special concessions, and once admitted invariably obtained positions of economic and political power. After independence, governments passed immigration laws which were very restrictive, confining entry for permanent residents to the dependants of residents. Foreign professional and skilled workers were generally allowed entry, but only for limited periods to assist with programmes of economic development. On the expiry of their contracts they were required to leave.

As newly-independant countries gained experience and their views were expressed in world forums; as they aligned their countries with one or another power bloc; as they argued strongly and convincingly for redistribution of world wealth in their favour; and as they formed regional alliances, so their influence on world politics gained momentum. The power and complexity of the new forces are clearly reflected in changing policies and patterns of international migration. Indeed, changes have been so rapid and complex as to leave scholars and administrators floundering for theory and methodology adequate to explain

them. Roger Böhning, for one, early expressed the view that a major effort should be made to obtain standard and acceptable procedures for data collection and definition with "satisfactory explanation" being the major goal.[11] Likewise Donald Heisel saw the measurement problem as central to success in monitoring causes and consequences of the new migration flows.[12] Difficulties in obtaining data adequate to achieve these objectives have not deterred other scholars from articulating theory to explain causes and consequences of the flows. Among the more imaginative propositions in this regard is the view of Nora Federici that explanation of contemporary and future flows would be facilitated by a methodology which accepted that a well-known phenomenon in the evolution of migratory flows is their constant transformation linked to the evolution of economic structure. Within this evolution, she has argued, are not only changes in direction but also changes in meaning. Countries that were once emigrant-sending become, in time, immigrant-receiving. The notable value of Federici's approach is that it provides adequate opportunity to study sociological, anthropological and psychological issues especially concerning decision-making processes.

Scholars now generally agree that a necessary prerequisite for devising an appropriate typology to explain realatively new and complex streams is to separate movers who express intentions to stay **permanently** from movers who express intentions to stay **temporarily**. To the extent that movers later change their minds (e.g., a person who intended staying permanently later decides to return home), so the value of statistics based upon intention is reduced. However, this problem can largely be overcome by clearly separating statistics on migrant **stocks** from those referring to **flows**. The main objective of a working typology is to classify aggregate flows according to status and intention. One typology which has gained favour amongst scholars is:

A. permanent
B. temporary workers
C. transient professionals
D. clandestine
E. refugees

Such a typology certainly goes a long way toward facilitating understanding of the magnitude, causes and consequences of the new migration.

The emigration of persons intending to settle **permanently** still comprises a significant proportion of current international migration. Economic recession for nearly a decade has nonetheless greatly reduced traditional receiving countries demand for 'economic' settlers. And because opportunities/vacancies are confined mainly to persons with

skills not readily available in the country of immigration, the skill/professional component of type A migration is high. Traditional receiving countries have also admitted many persons under 'family reunion' programmes, typically close relatives of former permanent settlers (including refugees, type E). These trends pose two major issues. The combination of relaxation of restrictions on intake on the basis of ethnicity and a demand for highly qualified vorkers has led, first to a "brain drain" of workers from developing countries and, second, to processes of socio-cultural adaption not experienced during the heyday of European migration.

The inportance attached by governments and scholars to the consequences of brain-drain migration was clearly reflected in the literature during the 1960's and 1970's. For example, Zahlan has shown that LDC's provided only twenty per cent of international migration of talent to the United States in 1952, but thereafter the rate increased "exponentially", and by the mid-1960's LDC professionals exceeded European professionals. By 1970, sixty per cent of the 60,000 foreign medical graduates working in the United States were from LDC's.[13] Europe and Canada also admitted (and lost) professional and highly skilled workers during this period. The literature emphasised causes and impacts of migration of talent on developing countries, especially that it impeded sending countries programmes for economic growth. Morality also entered the arena: whether developed countries should accept the professionals, whether the professionals should opt to stay at home and contribute to economic growth, whether any government has the right to enforce restrictions on entry, whether receiving governments should pay the education costs of professional immigrants, and so on. Set against these issues is the view, heard more often in developed than developing countries, that there is no 'drain' at all; that LDC's overproduce various categories of professionals and developed countries simply have the capacity to absorb them. The debate rather fizzled out in the 1980's when neither sending nor receiving countries were prepared to invoke policies necessary to curb the movement. In recent years, however, NIC's (newly-industrialized countries) have, by the employment opportunities they can now provide, attracted back nationals who left as brain-drain losses. It is in this regard that Federici's evolutionary theory is helpful in explaining differential flows and compositions over time.

The second main issue concerning traditional receiving countries concerns socio-cultural adaptation. At least two countries now receive more non-Europeans than Europeans; and so color has become a new dimension of adaptation. Furthermore, as studies in Australia concerning the adaptation of Greek immigrants during the 1960's and 1970's

show, the processes occurred during a period of high economic growth and low unemployment.[14] Surveys on the resettlement of Asian immigrants in Australia, and some Pacific Island migrants in New Zealand, indicate worrying levels of intolerance on the part of the host communities.

Concerning **temporary workers** (Type B), a recent **Population Report** estimated that in 1974 workers in seven countries of Western Europe from southern Europe and North Africa numbered almost six million. In Luxembourg, immigrant workers comprise one-third of the workforce.[15] As noted above, intra-European flows were the first major migrations of workers from less developed to developed countries. Another major flow, stimulated by similar conditions (high demand for labour) occurred during the early 1970's when revenue from higher oil prices stimulated large migration flows to the Middle East. By 1980 there were about 2.7 million immigrant workers in the region, about one-third having come from the Asia region. Because of their typically small population, the socio-economic impact of immigrant workers on Persian Gulf countries has been very considerable, and many receiving countries have invoked policies designed to keep workers for strictly finite periods, allow them little or not contact with local workers and rarely allow them to bring their dependants. Though these policies are designed to minimise socio-cultural dislocation, the fact that large factories and infrastructures once built do not run themselves indicates that migrant workers are destined to play permanent roles in labour forces of countries in the region. Two major labour migration flows also commenced in Africa recently. One in West Africa where, in 1975, about 2.8 million people lived outside their country of birth. Destinations, according to the **Population Report**, vary according to the prosperity and the immigration policies of richer coastal countries. The other labour flow is from sub-Saharan Africa to southern Africa where employment opportunities greatly exceed those available in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In Latin America, labour migration is also from poor to rich countries: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela attract workers from neighbouring poorer countries.

In recent years there has been much interest shown, but little research undertaken, on the impact of labour migration on sending countries. The assumed benefits include acquisition of scarce foreign exchange through remittances, relief from unemployment and underemployment, increase in national income per capita and a consequential increase in rate of savings and investment, as well as new skills acquired by workers which can be utilised upon their return.[16] While achieved benefits clearly depend upon a complex of related variables, there is no doubt concerning the beneficial impact of remittance payments.

In 1972 remittance payments to all developing countries exceeded $ 4.6 billion; by 1975 it had reached $ 8.1 billion. Impact on balance of payments hås been very significant.[17] In 1981 Pakistan earned $ 2.1 billion from this source, representing nearly nine percent of its GNP and eighty six per cent of its trade deficit.[18] However, empirical research on the likely acquisiton of "free capital" when workers return home suggests that benefits may be less substantial. One study showed that many workers returned unskilled, having held jobs which offered little opportunity for advancement and skill acquisition.[19] Guest worker migration may also exacerbate rural-urban migration and disrupt economic and social life when substantial numbers of young people leave a village.[20] Much more research needs to be done on this type os international migration, especially in view of the magnitude of contemporary flows and remittance payments.

Perhaps less is known concerning the flow and impact of transient professional migrants (Type C) than any other type of migration. This is partly because developing countries are reluctant to provide data and partly because the workers characteristically stay in a country for short periods. In the Background paper I wrote for the Asian and Pacific Population Conference in 1982 I observed that such persons were not newcomers to international migration. In the interwar years the transient professional served for a period in the Company's overseas office, plantation or mine, generally as overseer of construction and production, or perhaps as supervisor of local workers. Nowadays, independent developing countries decide the number and composition of transient professionals according to objectives for economic growth. A typical situation is for a private foreign investor to propose some development project which requires skilled workers not readily available in the developing country. If the "investment package" is acceptable, then the professionals are readily admitted. Although little is known concerning magnitude of type C migration, there is no doubt concerning its importance. The professionals not only direct their skills to development projects, but their presence clearly exposes indigenous workers to a wider spectrum of ideas and relationships.[21]

Clandestine migration (Type D) has reached enormous proportions. The **Population Report** believes that the total number may exceed ten million: up to 700,000 in the Ivory Coast, one million in western Europe, up to two million in Venezuela and up to six million in the United States, mainly Mexicans.[22] While sending countries usually encourage, or do not discourage, clandestine migration because the migrants send back remittances (an estimated $ 24 billion in 1978), the disadvantages under which they work and live hardly need to be stated. Countries having long and poorly-policed borders with poor neighbours

are unable to prevent the flow, and many actually do little to prevent it if the illegals provide services not readily available in the receiving country. However, the illegals are very vulnerable to unscrupulous employers, have no rights of social security and will be returned home when the receiving country no longer deems their presence an advantage.

Though refugee migration (type E) is not a modern phenomenon, the magnitude and persistence of flows in recent years has made it one of the world's most intractable problems. Of special concern is that current flows are **between** poor countries and unlike earlier refugees they will remain there, imposing an extended burden on already fragile infrastructures.[23] The sheer numbers of refugees (an estimated ten million in the world today), and their long-term implications for development in countries of origin and of asylum, argues Susan Goodwillie, mean that refugees have become an important issue for development. In areas where refugee populations are large, East Africa for example, they compete with local people for scarce resources and in the longer term impose strains upon already strained infrastructures. Though all refugees suffer, it is their children who probably suffer most. The sudden displacement of a family and its transfer to a squalid refugee camp, declares ICMC, can combine to disrupt the child's security, interrupt his schooling; expose him to serious health hazards, and mar his sense of confidence in his fellow man - all at a critical stage of his intellectual, moral and physical development.[24]

Though international migration has been the most neglected area of population studies, the problems and issues posed by contemporary flows have attracted scholars from all the social science disciplines. Which is just as well because modern migration, for reasons articulated in this paper, poses problems and issues requiring great effort to understand and resolve.

FOOTNOTES

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Elina Haavio-Mannila

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF FINNS IN SWEDEN

Elina Haavio-Mannila is Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Helsinki. She has studied the adjustment and mental health of immigrants in Sweden and compared the standard of living of Finnish and Yugoslavian immigrants with that native of Swedes in ciioeratuib with the Institute of Social Research. She has also surveyed the health conditions of immigrants in America of internal migrants in the U.S.A. compared with non-migrants on the basis of the material available at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University.

Perspective and Purpose of the Study

The social adjustment of Finnish immigrants in Sweden is examined from a multi-disciplinary perspective embracing macro-sociological, psychological and psychiatric theories as well as considerations of geographical location. The social relations of migrants are also discussed within a micro-sociological framework.

Personal characteristics of migrants are cited as additional factors explaining social adjustment. Psychiatric theories about stressful **life events** and **situations** [1] are applied in interpreting relations between

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migration and the genesis of problems of adjustment.

The purpose of the study is to discover the social nature of the **specific** problems which Finnish immigrants in Sweden face. In this endeavour some characteristic features of the Finnish nation, culture and society will be described. Certain differences between the Finnish and Swedish ways of life will also be analyzed. These differences are claimed to be relevant for the understanding of the processes leading to problems in adjustment.

Reactions of Swedes towards their ethnic **minorities** vary; they may partly explain the **types** of problems Finns face in Sweden. Reactions of migrants to changing living conditions are analyzed in part using the dichotomy between conformity and alienation.[2] **Conforming** to the demands posed by the new society and learning the rules of a new game is one form of adjustment of immigrants, who have to cope with the loss of games learned in the home country. Old ways of life, closely tied to the geographical territory, are no longer applicable in the new social situation. Sometimes the host environment may be so hostile that immigrants have to buy security at the price of lack of personal freedom.[3)] In their despair they may turn more 'native' than the host population.

Alienation of immigrants may take several forms: isolation, illness, alcoholism, problems in the family and other social relations, rebellousness, criminality etc. The alcohol problems of Finns in Sweden are visible and well-known, but there may be other more hidden defects in their social existence. As empirical evidence, some research results on the physical and mental health of immigrants in Sweden will be reported.

Features of Finnish and Swedish Society as Sources of Stress.

The social adjustment of any group of immigrants is related partly to **unique** differences between the countries of origin and destination and partly to more **general** factors related to the adjustment of all migrants.

Material living conditions are better in Sweden than in Finland. Most emigrants in the 1960's left Finland because they considered the standard of living and opportunities for advancement in Sweden to be more advantageous. Only five percent of emigrants leaving Finland in 1961-71 failed to mention some aspect of the higher standard of living in Sweden as having been a factor which had influenced the decision to move. The discrepancy between the standards of living in the two countries was most often mentioned as a motive of emigration

by men who had been industrial or service workers in Finland. Emigrants from Northern Finland, as well as farmers, and other agricultural or construction workers, had most typically come to Sweden because of Finland's poor employment opportunities.[4]

Better material conditions give opportunities for a rich and varied consumption of material goods. Sometimes the temptation to fall prey to material acquisitiveness is so overwhelming that other valuable aspects of life are forgotten.[5)] For example, the value of social relations, religion and cultural activities only surfaces when the immigrant realizes that rewards derived from monetary goods and services cannot satisfy all personal needs. In addition to material security, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for well-being, there are other basic human needs: for instance, companionship, love, status and self-realization.[6)]

Social relations in the family and in informal social networks may differ in Finland and Sweden. The extended family was earlier relatively widespread in Finland.[7)] Like Africans,who derive their identity from the tribal group by having multiple parent figures in childhood and by keeping contact with ancestral spirits,[8)] so many rural Finns were used to deriving support from both a wide social group and from their religious beliefs. This support fades fast in the urbanizing world. In Sweden the nuclear family of immigrants is often their only primary group. In this respect immigrants in Sweden are in a relatively advantageous position compared with foreign workers in Central Europe, because they tend to move there as whole families.

After the bady boom in 1940's and 1950's many Finnish children in remote rural communities had to spend a lot of time alone. In this way they learnt to show initiative and be spontaneous when they followed rules set by parents or others, or when they engaged independently in their own activities.[9)] Social isolation in childhood may be a good preparation for life in an agricultural society, but it can cause problems in a modern urban society, where the peer group is an important socialization agent.

Finns have fewer close friends than Swedes and other Scandinavians.[10)] This may be due to their social isolation in childhood which derives from long distances between houses in rural areas, due to general reparceling of farm land in Finland in the 18th and 19th centuries. These factors may have contributed to the well-known **uncommunicative disposition** of Finns, which makes it difficult to reveal oneself to others: "Only the dark forest and the clear sky may listen to my worries", to use the wording of a popular Finnish song.

However, according to a study comparing caregiving in Finland and in Sweden around 1980, Finns in Finland do not hide their trou-

bles more often than Swedes.[11] Also in an earlier study in the beginning of the 1970's, Finnish parents, particularly fathers, admitted having confidants more often than Swedish parents in the sample (Table 1). Finnish parents anyway preferred own activity and initiative

Table 1. Proportion of parents with school-age children having confidants[1] of own and other sex in Helsinki 1970-71 and in Västerås 1972 according to migration status and sex per-cent (N)

Sex of respondent and confidant	Helsinki Non-migrants		Migrants		Västerås Swedes		Finnish immigrants	
confidants of own sex								
husbands	66	(46)	76	(31)	50	(28)	42	(38)
wives	67	(48)	55	(30)	75	(28)	51	(37)
confidants of other sex								
husbands	38		43		29		13	
wives	27		14		21		16	

[1] Close personal friends whom one can trust and confide in Nuclear family members, parents and siblings were excluded, but other relatives were included in the concept of friendship.

Source: Unpublished data for Haavio-Mannila 1976 b. Both spouses were interviewed separately using the same questionnaire.

more than Swedish did (in a hypothetical family problem situation).[12] But compared with Norwegian men, Finnish men more often want to keep familial troubles inside the family.[13]

The uncommunicative and inhibited nature of the Finnish **culture** is sometimes combined with strong expressions of emotions.[14] According to a large comparative study Finns try to avoid uncertainty much more than Swedes and have difficulty tolerating ambiguity. Also, in Sweden the quality of life and environment are considered to be more important than achievements and economic growth.[15] Furthermore, the cultural climate in the Swedish workplace is, according to the subjective evaluations of immigrants, more liberal, egalitarian and democratic than in Finland.[16] But Swedish working life is also basically rational, effective, and sometimes even harsh: "an iron hand in a velvet glove". The diagnoses of mental hospital

patients in Sweden are 'milder' than in Finland,[17] perhaps because of stricter definitions of psychosis, or because of less need to admit patients in a country where employment and housing conditions, as well as the health status of the population[18] are better. At the same time there is a tendency to avoid or delay necessary reforms, which in practice might improve the quality of life and which have been fought for by pressure groups outside the formal system.[19] The division of household tasks in the family in Sweden is not in practice very even, though positive attitudes towards equality between the sexes are widely held.[20]

The discrepancy between manifest 'softness' of culture and its latent 'hardness' may create just that kind of ambivalence which Finns have difficulty tolerating. Outcasts from the competition in the open market system in Sweden are taken care of by the state, whose welfare and adult education policies are generous and relatively responsive to the needs of immigrants. Official immigration policy is a popular topic of research and debate. Sweden is justly proud of being the first country in the world to give voting rights to unnaturalized immigrants. There is also a compulsory free language tuition for all immigrants who want to be employed in the country.

The lack of knowledge of the **language** of the new country is a particular problem for a majority of Finnish immigrants.[21] Otherwise, Finns are in a better position than most immigrant groups in Sweden, due to the common historical heritage (Finland was part of Sweden until 1809) and the broadly similar cultural, political and economic systems. Speaking a Finno-Ugric language anyway means that Finns have a lot of linguistic problems in Sweden, at least compared with Western European and American immigrants, who speak Germanic languages.

Attitudes of Swedes and Problems of Adjustment of Finns

Immigrant labour has been necessary for the Swedish economy. However, immigrants may also pose a threat to Swedes; they occupy work-places which otherwise would be available to them. In a situation of increasing competition for work this threat may provoke hostilities against immigrants. Neo-racist reactions against immigrants have sporadically occurred in Sweden.

According to a study by Arne Trankell in 1969, Swedes considered Finnish immigrants as hard-working, but at the same time very rowdy (bråkiga). Among the ten nations studied, Finns occupied in this respect a unique position (Figure 1). In addition, Finns achieved



Figure 1. Images by Swedes of ten nationalities on dimensions Calmness – Rowdiness and Hardworkingness Laqiness in 1969. Based on Tables 52 and 54 in Trankell 1975, p. 144 and 146.

low rankings on dimensions of 'reliable-unreliable' and 'orderly-careless'. Only Yugoslavians and Greeks were thought to be more unreliable and careless than Finns. On the dimension 'open-closed' Finns were seen as the most uncommunicative, closed-minded nationality of those studied. On the 'modern - old-fashioned' scale Finns were situated in the middle.[22)]

The close-minded Finnish immigrants may, at least subconsciously, sense ambivalence in the attitudes of Swedes towards them.

They are, on the one hand, perceived by Swedes as hard working which, in our work-oriented Protestant culture, implies appreciation, on the other hand as threatening: they might endanger the work opportunities of Swedes, at least those belonging to the lower social classes.

As some kind of security measure against their hidden fears, Swedes in the above study labelled Finns as boisterous or rowdy hooligans. As a result, the closed-minded, non-communicative Finns, who cannot stand ambiguity, may feel that Swedes do not confide in them and this may weaken their self-esteem. Consequently, they may develop self-hate which is also expressed in their despise of other Finns.[23] But the double messages received may sometimes lead to even more severe psychological reactions (see later discussion).

As a counter-reaction against the threatening, rowdy Finns, Swedes may exclude them and other immigrants from their informal social networks.[24] This endangers the fullfilling of some basic needs of immigrants: the need of enjoyment of **being with** other people (company), the certainty of one's bonds with fellow people, of being **related** to them (security), and of **being of importance** to them (status).[25]

Immigrants try to cope with the ambivalence and exclusion in several ways: they may choose between **loneliness, selfsegregation** or **remaining voluntarily in a low status position** in order to avoid fear reactions by Swedes. The weak ability of Finns to countenance uncertainty, however, may also cause psychological reactions. For example, Finnish mental hospital patients, who know Swedish well, have more serious mental health problems than those who keep themselves in the proper place of an immigrant in the Swedish society (Table 2). This is a special characteristics of Finnish immigrants. In

Table 2. Problems of immigrant mental hospital patients according to ability to speak Swedish; Västmanland and Södermanland provinces in 1971.

Ability to speak Swedish	Non-Finnish immigrants	Finnish immigrants
	Severe psychosis, means (N)	
none	0.95 (16)	0.66 (34)
poor	0.78 (33)	0.98 (42)
good	0.74 (56)	0.89 (64)
	Human relations problems, %	
none	25	46
poor	36	42
good	36	49

	Problems in work or financial problems, %	
none	44	34
poor	39	40
good	30	29
	Alcohol problems, %	
none	–	37
poor	6	42
good	20	40
	Somatic symptoms, %	
none	69	60
poor	67	63
good	59	43
	Diffuse problems only, %	
none	75	37
poor	54	54
good	48	49

Source: Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1977, p. 93.

the other groups, severe psychosis is most common among immigrants who do not know Swedish. Finnish mental patients with feelings of persecution also tend to know more Swedish than those without paranoid reactions (Table 3). Paranoid patients have poor contacts

Table 3. Knowledge of Swedish, Contacts with Swedes, and Type of Work Among Patients[1] with and without Feelings of Persecution; per-cent

		Feelings of persecution	
		Yes	No
Knowledge of Swedish:	good	59	46
	poor	29	26
	none	12	28
		100	100
Contacts with Swedes:	good	18	27
	poor	41	25
	none	41	48
		100	100
Mechanical work:	yes	41	50
	uncertain	18	24
	no	41	26
		100	100
(N)		(17)	(70)

[1]Patients of the psychiatric clinic of Västerås Central Hospital in January-August 1971.

Source: Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1975, p. 91.

with Swedes, whereas the others have either good or no relations.

Knowing and understanding something, but probably not enough, about the Swedish culture and sensing its double meanings is thus connected with severity of psychiatric disorder. Our result can be compared with Lemert's findings of paranoia and the dynamics of exclusion.[26)]

Immigrants who manifest mental illness only after arrival in Sweden often had severe psychosis or disturbed social relations, especially with family or friends. Financial and work problems were more common among those with previous mental disorders.[27)] This was the case, even though their contacts with Swedes and knowledge of Swedish were quite good. Immigrants who had had problems already in Finland did not know Swedish well and had few contacts with Swedes (Table 4).

Table 4. Knowledge of Swedish and Contacts with Swedes in Relation to the Presence or Absence of Psychological Problems before Migration[1)], per cent

		Psychological problems before migration	
		Yes	No
Knowledge of Swedish:	good	43	50
	poor	36	22
	none	21	28
		100	100
Contacts with Swedes:	good	18	28
	poor	25	30
	none	57	42
		100	100
(N)		(28)	(58)

[1)]Population: see Table 3.
Source: Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1975, p. 78.

This supports my thesis that the type of psychiatric problems presented is related to the social climate of the environment, as **experienced by the newcomer**. Those who can understand it, thanks to their linguistic or occupational skills, are in danger of developing severe psychological problems. Because of their ignorance, those who cannot grasp the ambivalence of the host society may be saved from mental health problems of this kind.

According to the same small study on patients who attended the psychiatric clinic of Västerås Central Hospital in January - August 1971, a higher proportion (82%) of those immigrants who had psychological problems in Finland had been employed in their home country than had the post-immigration patients (46%). When we looked at the occupations of those employed, we found that 48% of pre-emigration and 41% of post-immigration patients had been working in 'better' occupations (i.e. technicians, skilled or service workers). Members of both patient groups had a similar educational background, with only about 15% having more than a primary education.

Poor mental health on arrival in Sweden consequently led to decline in social position: 21% of those with pre-immigration problems settled into worse jobs in Sweden than they had held in Finland; on the other hand, only 5% of those with post-immigration problems settled into a worse job in Sweden than they had had in Finland. However, one must note that 33% of Finnish de novo patients in Sweden had no occupation in Finland because they had migrated at an early age.

The timing of the emergence of psychiatric problems after the migration is shown in Figure 2. There is a bi-modal distribution among



Figure 2. **Years spent in Sweden before first mental problem among patients in the psychiatric clinic of Västerås Central Hospital in January-August 1971**

Source: Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1975, p. 76.

patients falling ill for the first time after immigration: the first peak is between one and five years, the other between thirteen and seventeen years residence in Sweden. A corresponding **time span** affect was found by Leiniö in her study on Finnish immigrants, who were followed up in 1968, 1974 and 1981. The proportion of persons reporting health problems was highest in 1974. Poor physical health - including locomotor difficulties, dental caries, poor hearing and circulatory problems - and tiredness and problems with sleep were the most commonly reported symptoms in that year, which was some five years after the start of mass immigration to Sweden. Leiniö argues that migration has a fluctuating effect over time on health: the most critical period is in the initial years following migration, with longterm effects for those persons who cannot succeed in adjusting to life in the new country.[28] The large wave of immigration in the late sixties brought to the clinic in Västerås many patients of relatively advanced age who had previous psychiatric problems in their home country. Those who first fell ill in Sweden immigrated earlier in the century, and at an earlier age.[29]

The crucial years for the personal adjustment of immigrants thus seem to be around five years after arrival. However, the personal relationships and the social status of immigrants are also important predictors in the development of those problems of adjustment which precipitate illness (or return migration[30]). This can be seen in interviews among Finnish and Swedish parents in Västerås in 1972 (Table 5)

Table 5. Expectations, social status and affiliations, health and expression of emotions of Finnish parents with school-age children according to time spent in Sweden and mother tongue, and of Swedes of comparable social and family status in Västerås 1972.

Expectations, status, affiliations, health and expression of emotions	Emigrants from Finland			Swedes
	Arrived less than five years ago	Arrived more than five years ago		
	Mother tongue			
	Finnish	Finnish	Swedish	
	1	2	3	4
EXPECTATIONS AND RESOURCES	Per cent			
Main reason for emigration				
To get a job	14	32	30	·
Better economical conditions	41	37	15	·

	1	2	3	4
Nonmaterial reasons (to look around, family, studies, dissatisfaction with Finland etc.)	45	29	55	.
	100	100	100	.
Never lived in urban area before	24	25	30	54
Speaks only Finnish	24	12	–	.
Visits Finland at least twice a year	61	41	30	..
Has planned to return to Finland	52	35	10	.
Intends to get Swedish citizenship	3	12	28	.
SOCIAL STATUS IN SWEDEN				
Objective	Average			
Medium or high social status[1)]	72	46	45	67
Monthly income, Swedish crowns	1750	1750	2700	2150
Subjective	Per cent			
Medium or high social status[2)]	22	27	44	47
Sense of being of importance:				
Only a limited number of other people would be able to do one's duties	36	18	40	24
Job requires special schooling or examination	24	25	50	44
Job requires particular personal qualities	52	70	75	81
INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS				
Having company:				
Has close personal friends[3)]	55	42	55	61
Has other good friends	69	70	80	85
Associates regularly with couples of friends	90	92	85	83
Has close family friends[4)]	31	45	45	59
Meets regularly at least five relatives	24	43	30	48
Has Swedish friends	32	43	63	100
Best friends live in Sweden	21	35	40	100
Has friends in Finland	68	54	53	–
Has Finnish immigrants as friends	96	92	84	55
Has other foreigners as friends	14	27	37	19
Most friends know each other	67	67	63	52
Has work mates of own sex as friends	62	52	60	65
Has work mates of other sex as friends	24	8	30	26
Finns and Swedes are segregated at work	70	53	25	19
Met friends more often when lived in Finland	36	42	75	.
Meets friends more often in Sweden	32	42	5	.
Security of companionships[5)]:	Scale means			
Friendships	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.6

	1	2	3	4
Work companionships	4.5	4.3	4.9	4.7
Kin relationships	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.4
Marital relationship	4.9	5.1	4.6	4.5
Other romantic relationships	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.0
Feelings about companionships:	Per cent			
Has good opportunities to make contacts (strongly agrees)	67	78	95	92
Has a strong sense of loyalty to something	69	78	70	82
ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATIONS				
Participation:				
Belongs to two or more associations	10	37	40	35
Attended an association meeting during last year	38	45	45	52
Attends sometimes religious services or occasions	35	48	65	72
- of which within two months	3	15	15	35
Mentioned a party in Sweden which furthers one's interests best	52	43	65	92
Sense of self-determination:	Per cent			
Considers own possibilities to make decisions on one's life to be great	57	72	63	50
Feels never compelled to repress one's opinion	18	40	15	19
Wants to conceal one's Finnish origin in some occasions	14	19	20	·
Morals and values:				
Believes in God for sure	45	45	45	30
Considers Bible as the most important guide in life	34	27	35	20
Thinks that spouses should in all conditions stay faithful to each other	55	62	70	68
Object of aspirations[6]:	Scale means			
– family relations	3.9	3.6	3.2	3.8
– sex appeal	8.3	7.8	7.2	8.3
– work and work relations	2.4	2.5	2.4	3.0
– success at work	3.0	3.4	3.2	2.9
HEALTH				
Physical illness: days in bed and away from work	Scale means			
	0.93	1.40	1.15	0.98
Psychosomatic illness: has some difficult illness[7]	Per cent			
	52	70	60	48
Neurotic symptoms[8]	48	60	65	46
– of which psychiatric[9]	24	35	45	31

	1	2	3	4
	Scale means			
Fears and anxietiss[10]	**2.41**	**2.43**	1.95	2.22
Longing and diffuse pains[11]	**1.28**	**1.30**	0.90	0.91
EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS				
Negative feelings[12]	4.41	4.18	4.05	4.35
Dissatisfaction[13]	**3.52**	3.23	2.70	2.35
Relative life satisfaction:				
More satisfied in Sweden	41	55	37	.
As satisfied in Sweden and Finland	38	27	**58**	.
More satisfied in Finland	**21**	**17**	5	.
	100	100	100	.
(N = husbands and wives in the interviewed families)	(29)	(40)	(19)	(54)
Average age, years	32	36	40	39

Notes to Table 5:

1) Strata 1-6 on the 9-point scale by Rauhala 1966.
2) Subjective evaluation of one's position marked in a square box in row from 9 (lowest) to 1 (highest) with text 'working class', 'middle class' and 'upper class' loosely written above the squares; scores 1-6.
3) Definition, see Table 1.
4) Close family friends whom they can turn to when they are in trouble or just need to discuss the problems of their family with someone.
5) Definitions of the first four of the five 'securities of companionships' are given in Haavio-Mannila 1976a, p. 71. 'Other romantic relationships' were measured by asking if the respondent particularly enjoyed discussing or keeping company with a certain workmate of the other sex, if he or she had during marital time become attracted or fallen in love with a workmate or other person met at work, or if he or she had during marriage become attracted or fallen in love with somebody else than the spouse or a workmate. Affirmative answers were added together for the sum scale. On the average there is about one yes- answer per respondent to the three questions.
6) The lower the mean, the more important the matter. Sum scales were composed of following items: Family relations. warm relations at home, pleasant spouse, pleasant children; **sex appeal**: Being popular among persons of the other sex; **Work and work relations**: interesting work, good employer, pleasant workmates; **Success at work**: succeeding at work, earning high income. The respondents gave ranks from 1 (most important) to 9 (least important) to each of the items; the scores were added up for sum scales. The table gives average scores on these scales.
7) As examples were given: gastric ulcer, rheumatism, back ache, psychiatric problem, or equivalent. In addition there was a check list of nine psychosomatic illnesses, but the results are not presented here.
8) Cornell Medical Index; see, for example, Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1976,

p. 65. Percentages mean having at least one symptom of the ten mentioned in the list.

9) Is constantly keyed up and jittery, 2 Thinking gets completely mixed up when on has to do things quickly 3, Wears oneself out worrying about one's health. 4, Feels usually unhappy or depressed. 5, Frightening thoughts keep coming back to one's mind. Percentages mean having at least one of these five neurotic symptoms.

10) **Fears**: Person is afraid of 1. losing his/her spouse through death, 2. foreign political situation, 3. losing his/her job, 4. infidelity of the spouse, or 5. quarrels or other difficulties at work. Replies 'often and sometimes' were added together, 'no's' were omitted. Causes of **pain and anxiety** studied were: 1. Having so few friends, 2. one's input or success at work, 3. financial situation of the family, 4. growing old, 5. being afraid that persons of the other sex may lose their interest in him/her, 6. love, 7. Swedes' treatment of him/her, and.8. thinking about the future of children. 'Yes'-replies to these 13 items were added up for the sum scale.

11) Sum scale consisting of 'yes'-answers to following items: 1. Longs for more variety in life, 2. longs for more company, and 3. feels diffuse longing or pain.

12) Sum scale of expression of negative feelings consists of items: 1. Has cried recently, 2. is often quarrelling with spouse, 3. admits envying someone, 4. has recently been aggressive, and 5. mentions difficulties in life when replying to an open-ended question. There were several alternatives in each question.

13) Sum scale of dissatisfaction is based on items: 1. Is dissatisfied with number and quality of friendships, 2. considers own marriage unhappy, 3. is not satisfied with own work (housewives: household work), and 4. is dissatisfied with life Also here there were several alternative response possibilities to each question. Thus scale means have no absolute meaning.

Source: Haavio-Mannila 1976a, p. 67-81 and unpublished results of the same study (Haavio-Mannila 1976a and b).

The new or recent immigrants, who came less than five years ago to Sweden, had left Finland in order to improve their stndard of living, or for non-material reasons. The old or early immigrants came more often because of economic necessity. Ability to speak Swedish and plans for the future differ in these group: late-comers were less equipped and more uncertain about their stay in Sweden.

The **social status,** measured by social stratum and income, of the newly-arrived immigrants is objectively relatively high. But subjectively they felt themselves somewhat inferior to the early-arrived Finnish-speaking immigrants, and considerably inferior to the comparison groups of Swedish-speaking Finns and native Swedes.

In the area of **social relations** the new immigrants had good

personal friends, whom they can trust and take into confidence, and other good friends, as often as did old immigrants and Swedes. But they lacked close family friends whom they could turn to when they were in trouble or when they just needed to discuss family problems. Newcomers were thus less inclined than earlier immigrants and Swedes to deal their family problems to friends.

The uncommunicative disposition, or closed-mindedness, of Finns is therefore manifested in the tendency to hide family problems by those Finnish-speaking immigrants, who arrived in Sweden during the mass emigration, in 1967-72. The earlier immigrants had adjusted to the Swedish ways of disclosing family troubles to friends. They had Swedish and non-Finnish immigrant friends, whereas the newcomers still retained more friendships in the home country.

Having Finnish immigrants as friends was, however, almost as common among recent and early Finnish-speaking immigrants. Nor did friendship networks open up with the length of time in Sweden: most friends knew each other in closed networks in the three immigrant groups studied more often than did the Swedish comparison group.

Another problem, which was not resolved with time, was making friends among workmates. New immigrants saw workmates of both sexes as friends more often than the old Finnish-speaking immigrants. The level of isolation from friends due to migration (or increasing age) can be seen in the percentages of those who felt they had more friends in Finland than in Sweden: it was 36 per-cent among newcomers, 42 per-cent among early arrived Finnish-speakers and 75 per-cent among Swedish-speakers. Perhaps the Swedish speaking Finns do not want to associate with the Finnish-speakers, but they are not fully accepted by the host population in informal social relations either.

Security of friendships, measured by their social supportiveness, as well as by frequency of meeting friends and the diversity of friendships networks, was weaker among recent than among early immigrants and Swedes. Newcomers also have less secure social relationships at work. Only relatives, spouses and other romantic relationships provided them with security of company. As a result, recent immigrants felt that they lacked opportunities to make contacts and to feel solidarity.

New immigrants did not attend voluntary associations or religious services as frequently as early immigrants, who had already developed ties with Swedish formal organizations. (However frequent religious participation can also be seen as a relief for psychological suffering.[31])

In the first phase of the 'immigrant career', immigrants lack a sense of self-determination. They more often than earlier immigrants

feel compelled to repress their opinions, too.

Finns with a long residence in Sweden were as inclined to hide their national background as the newcomers. Feeling ashamed of being a Finn was not widespread: 14 per-cent of newcomers and 20 per-cent of the long-term residents, "often or seometimes" found themselves in situations where they had to conceal their Finnish origin.

Religious beliefs or **values** did not vary according to length of residence in Sweden. Compared with Swedes, Finnish immigrants more often believe in God and obtain guidance in life from the Bible. Their attitudes to sexual and moral questions, however, seem to be relatively liberal: they do not demand absolute fidelity in marriage quite as often as Swedes.

Interesting work, pleasant workmates and a good employer were valued by all the immigrant groups studied. Newcomers were almost as eager to succeed in work and earn high incomes as were the Swedes. My material thus does not support the importance of 'soft' values in Sweden. However, since 1972 the attitudes may have somewhat changed.

The social and personal adjustment of immigrants, and the functionality of their value orientations, are reflected in their coping strategies for life situations at different phases of "immigrant career." As indicators of adjustment, health status and expression of emotions were examined.

The physical, psychosomatic and psychiatric **health** status of the newly-arrived immigrants was relatively good. Their way of reacting to the stresses of migration at this phase was to **express** their emotions: fears and pains, negative feelings, difficulties, and dissatisfaction with marriage, friends, work and life.

At the second stage, after five years of stay, the health of immigrants was worse, and there were still fears and pains. But open expression of negative feelings and dissatisfaction had disappeared. This may be due to the selectivity of return migration, or an increase in age. But it could also be intepreted as **a change over time in the type of reaction** to one's life situation. From diffuse expressions of emotions, Finnish immigrants move toward 'real' illness, as measured by standardised health indicators. They still, however, have as many fears and pains as the recently arrived immigrants (but not more than a comparable group of parents in Helsinki according to my interviews there). Adjustment of immigrants was therefore not completed after five years of stay in the new country. There were still stresses which could take the form of illness.

Family Relations. Among the same Finnish middle and working class couples in Västerås in 1972, low social and economic status was associated with neurotic symptoms on the Cornell Medical Index.[32] However, in the control group of Swedish families, the wife's high income and resulting high total family income were associated with neurosis. Changing gender roles, because of the wife's employment, clearly contributed to a strain on the Swedish family. On the other hand, this was not manifest among the immigrant Finnish families, since in Finland there is a long tradition of married women in employment. This cultural pattern in the home country may explain why the wife's employment and high income in the Finnish immigrant families were not associated with marital disorder and neurosis.

The great importance of marital dynamics on the mental health of the spouse was a salient feature in the Finnish group. The wives' close relationships outside the marriage seemed to give rise to psychiatric problems for husbands who felt less well-adjusted than their spouses to Swedish society. The husbands often became jealous of these social relationships, even when they were not romantic. Husbands with neurotic symptoms often reported that they felt compelled to **repress their opinions,** an indication of high pressure toward conformity in an ambivalent marital situation.

Social Status. The great immigration wave in 1967-73 brought many uneducated rural Finns to Sweden.[33] Feelings of insecurity of one's status in the labour market seem to be reflected in the mental health of immigrants more than in Swedes.

Satisfaction with work and feelings of having control in decisions concerning one's personal life correlate negatively with neurosis, especially among immigrants. The spouses of Finns suffering from neurosis felt that they were easily expendable and that nearly everybody could do their jobs without special schooling or personal qualities.[34] Alienation from work thus explains one sequence in the process of failing to adjust.

Mother Tongue. In the fist study period, in 1968, Swedish-speaking immigrants from Finland had better physical and mental health status than Finnish speakers, but worse status than the host population. In 1981, there was practically no difference in the general health status and use of health services between Swedish and Finnish-speaking Finns. In the area of mental health, 35 per cent of Finnish speakers (N=148)

and 29 per cent of Swedish speakers (N=55) had suffered from reduced mental well-being in the year preceding interview. Finnish speakers were somewhat more often 'continuously tired' (9 vs. 4 per cent) and had more disturbance of sleep (13 vs. 9 per cent). There was no difference in the proportion of the samples complaining of 'general tiredness' or 'nervous problems', including depression.[35]

The superior health status of Swedish speakers in 1968 may be a function of the basic differences between immigrants with Swedish as their first language and those who acquired it later. People speaking the language of the host country as their mother tongue have a different level of understanding of what is happening around them compared with those who have learned the language later in life. This latter group can never totally interpret all the subtle nuances of the acquired language.

The decline in the differences in health status between Finnish and Swedish-speakers between 1968 and 1981 may be due to an increase in both the objective appearance and the subjective understanding of the ambivalent reactions of Swedes to Finnish immigrants over time.

Gender. Compared with Swedish men, Finnish immigrant men have more illnesses and symptoms of stress. Differences among women are smaller (Table 6). Finnish men often felt pressure or pain in the head as well as tension and agitation;[36] this may be connected with their type of work, which exposes them, more than Swedes to auditory pollution.[37] Thus, it is not surprising that they often use pain relievers (Table 6). The relative well-being of Finnish women compared with men is related to their better integration into the Swedish society. This can be demostrated, for example, by their greater propensity to marry Swedes.[38]

Social Adjustment of Other National Groups

Swedes' perceptions of the similarity of values and familiarity of culture of various national groups is shown in Table 7. Norwegians and Danes are closest to Swedes, with whom they share a common historical background on a mutual and relatively equal basis. Finland has also enjoyed a long common historical unity with Sweden, but the relationship was less equal: Finland was in many ways dominated by Sweden. Swedes see Finns as having relatively similar values but less culturally familiar than other Scandinavians. White North Americans, the English and Germans tend to work in Sweden as specialists. The culture of

Table 6. Health status, utilisation of health services and use of pain relievers and tranquillisers among Finnish and Yugoslavian immigrant men and women, and Swedes, matched according to age and occupation in 1974 (and 1975)

Health status and utilization of health services	Sex	Finnish immi-grants	Swedes (matched group)	Yugosla-vians	Swedes (matched group)	All Swedes 15-75 years	Significance of difference Finns/Yugos-lavians
Health status							
Number of illnesses or ailments during 12 months, average	Men	7.9	4.6 *	4.0	4.5	5.3	* /–
	Women	9.6	6.6 *	7.8	6.3*	7.5	* /–
Ill in bad in 1973, %	Men	38.1	39.4	14.5	40.7*	37.0	–/–
	Women	28.0	41.9 *	32.9	44.7	39.9	*/
Registered as sick in 1974, %	Men	66.7	50.5 *	82.6	53.7 *	43.9	* / *
	Women	57.3	49.2	70.0	52.1 *	41.0	* / *
Mean number of re-gistered sickness days in 1974	Men	26.4	13.3 *	40.9	11.9 *	14.3	* / *
	Women	19.7	12.2	36.1	11.6 *	11.5	* / *
in 1975	Men	36.5	14.7 *	45.8	14.1*	15.0	* /–
	Women	20.3	15.1	66.3	14.7 *	13.4	–/*
Utilisation of health services							
Visited a physician during 12 months,%	Men	68.3	53.7	52.2	52.5	55.9	–/–
	Women	73.3	62.8	68.6	63.1	64.5	–/–
Visited a psychi-atrist during last year, %	Men	3.2	2.2	1.4	2.2	2.2	–/ -
	Women	8.0	2.6 *	8.6	2.6 *	2.7	*/*
Stayed in hospital in 1973, %	Men	9.5	8.7	8.7	7.3	11.0	–/–
	Women	20.0	13.7	15.7	15.1	13.1	–/–
Use of medicines							
Used pain relievers during two weeks, %	Men	34.9	22.0*	15.9	22.2	23.4	*/–
	Women	45.3	37.0	27.1	36.5	38.5	–/–
Used tranquillizers during two weeks, %	Men	0.0	4.4	0.0	3.8	6.2	*/*
	Women	12.0	7.6	7.1	5.8	10.4	–/–
Used sleeping pills during two weeks,%	Men	1.6	2.3	0.0	1.8	4.1	–/–
	Women	6.7	4.1	2.9	2.7	8.0	–/-

Source: Calculations based on standard of living survey in Sweden in 1974, Swedish Institute for Social Research, University of Stockholm.

* Asterix means that there is a statistically significant difference at 95 per cent level between Swedes and immigrants.

Table 7. Similarity of values and familiarity with culture of 18 ethnic groups as experienced by Swedes in 1981[1])

Classification of ethnic group	Ethnic group	Value similarity	Familiarity
Common historical background	Norwegians	94	73
	Danes	91	73
Related via domination	Finns	83	59
Major Western powers	White Americans	64	45
	Englishmen	63	46
	Germans	63	48
Distant political or historical tie	Lapps	57	35
	Estonians	46	25
	Jews	26	28
	Poles	16	19
	Latin-Americans	10	11
Remote cultures	Italians	9	20
	Yugoslavians	5	12
	Greeks	4	14
	Gypsies	3	16
	Chinese	3	4
	Turks	2	5
	Ethiopians	2	1

[1]) Proportion (%) of Swedes aged 18-70 years (N= 1202) considering that the ethnic group shares similar values (for example, about children's education) with them (scores one and two or a seven point scale) and they are familiar with its ways of life and culture (know them very or quite well – the other alternatives were somewhat and not at all).

Source: Based on Westin 1984, p. 335-337.

these major Western powers is fairly similar to that of Sweden, but less than half of Swedes feel well acquainted with their way of life and culture.

Lapps, Estonians, Jews and Poles have had distant political or historical ties with Swedes. They stand in an intermediate position in the rank orders of value similarity and cultural familiarity. The remaining eight groups, for instance Yugoslavians, Turks, Italians and Greeks, are geographically and culturally remote from Sweden.

The size of the immigrant group may have an effect on the fre-

quency of mental illness and the propensity to seek treatment. A fairly large, self-segregated immigrant group may be functional for the first-generation immigrants, who by staying in the group can avoid intergroup conflicts.[39] Murphy has pointed out that the mental hospitalisation rates for immigrants are low in regions where immigrants constitute a large proportion of the population, as in Israel and Singapore.[40] The large size of the Finnish group in Sweden therefore may be beneficial for the mental health of Finnish immigrants.

Conclusion

The exacting work ethic of Finns in the home country and in Sweden[41] may be closely related to the high rate of illness in both groups. This relationship might have some association with the special historical and political position of Finland as a buffer between Eastern and Western Europe,[42] which may create cross-pressures and double-binds. Finns try to cope by ploughing themselves into work, frequently overtaxing themselves and, as a consequence, falling ill. The closedmind and the uncommunicative disposition of Finns may serve to exacerbate this process.

The position of Finland is ambivalent in Sweden. On the one hand, it is distant from Sweden due to different language and economic development (Figure 3), on the other Swedes look at Finns as having fairly similar values and are familiar with their ways of life and culture. Finns are partly rejected by Swedes because they are not experienced as interesting newcomers, who bring colour and excitement to Swedish society. According to Westin, those Swedes who long for more variety from immigrants depreciate the adjustment problems of Finns (and Turks) compared with those of the English, Italians and Black Africans to whom they can offer more well-meaning sympathy and pity. On the other hand, Finns are accepted by those Swedes, who are afraid of loosing the Swedish customs and traditions because of immigration, and who want to preserve the Swedish community.[43]

Another kind of problem is the closed nature of social networks among Finnish immigrants, which time does not loosen. Even the Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden are isolated and their informal social relations were reduced after emigration.

A further ambivalence in the position of Finns in Sweden is the easiness of return migration, thanks to the geographical proximity to the home country. This creates indecision in relation to where to live. Immigrants from distant countries and political refugees have fewer choices.

Figure 3. Value similarity, analytical cultural similarity and familiarity of 18 ethnic groups to Swedes in 1981.1)



1) Rank order of ethnic groups according to **analytical cultural similarity** (Bittermans measure: similarity to Sweden according to following five criteria: language, religion, economic development in the home country, geographical distance between Sweden and home country, and exchange of commodities between Sweden and home country), **value similarity** and **familiarity** with way of life and culture, as experienced by Swedes in 1981 (see Table for more information of the two last-mentioned measures).

2) White (North) Americans.

3) Latin-Americans.

Source: Drawn on the basis of Westin 1984, p. 204-205.

Finns are seen by Swedes at one and the same time as hard-working and boisterous, close and distant. Finns may feel themselves trapped in a system of conflicting demands and expectations which they cannot satisfy. They may react in three ways: by **fighting back,** becoming obstreperous in various ways; by developing an inferiority complex and despising themselves and their own countrymen as a **compensatory** reaction; or **yielding** to (mental) illness, drugs, alcohol and suicide. Most of them, however, do rely on more socially constructive ways of coping, which were not discussed here.

NOTES

1. For example, Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1974, Laing 1971, Laing and Esterson 1972, Szazs 1970.
2. Hsu 1964, p. 150.
3. Szazs 1970, p. 35-36. See also Rodrigues 1983, p. 103.
4. Wiman 1974, p. 143, and Appendices IV. 1 and 3.
5. Jaakkola 1984, 43-47.
6. Allardt 1975, Hsu 1964.
7. Voionmaa 1969, Mannila 1969, Gaunt 1983.
8. For example, Kiew 1972, p. 20.
9. Carlson 1975, p. 110.
10. Jaakkola and Karisto 1976, p. 8.
11. Haavio-Mannila, Jallinoja and Strandell 1984, Table III. 10. Information is limited to male industrial worker and 'caregiver' women and should not be overgeneralized.
12. Haavio-Mannila 1976, p. 337, and unpublished data of the same study, conducted in 1970-71 in Helsinki and in 1972 in Västerås, a city of 118 000 inhabitants in Central Sweden. The interviewees were to each other married parents with school-age children. Only middle- and working-class parents were included in the samples. Thus the representativeness of the results for the Swedish and Finnish population is limited.
13. Haavio-Mannila, Jallinoja and Strandell 1984, Table III. 11. The results are based on interviews of representative national samples of urban populations 25 to 64 years of age. The data were collected in Finland in 1981 and in Norway in 1983, as part of a comparative family study coordinated by the European Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (Vienna Centre).
14. Allardt 1967, Husu 1979.
15. Kennedy 1983, citing Hofstede 1980.
16. See also Westin 1983, p. 185.
17. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1974 a, p. 4.
18. Allardt 1975, Kata 1976, Karisto 1984, Leiniö 1984, p. 136, Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1974 a, p. 3-11, see also Suominen and Sievers 1970. The statis-

tics of Finland and Sweden were not quite comparable. Results and interpretations are thus tentative.

19. For example, Finnish immigrant patients in Swedish psychiatric or old peoples institutions do not necessarily receive treatment from staff Finnish speaking nurses in the hospital. This occurs despite many studies, discussions and demands for it. As a further example, the constant demands by immigrants to have language data included in official statistics have not been met by officialdom.
20. For example Trost 1983, 21-27, Liljeström and Dahlström 1981, p. 178, Haavio-Mannila 1967 and 1983, p. 32.
21. About one fourth (70 000 persons) of the immigrants from Finland speak Swedish as their mother tongue. This proportion is higher than in Finland because of the high rate of emigration of the Swedish-speaking population.
22. Trankell 1975, p. 138-154.
23. Jaakkola 1983, p. 35-37, 111-115; 1984, 39-43; Koiranen 1966, p. 195-196, 243.
24. Jaakkola 1984, p. 31-38.
25. Hsu 1964, p. 154.
26. Lemert 1973, p. 106-115; cf. also Jaakkola 1983, p. 35-36, 47, and 1984 p. 35.
27. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1975, p. 81, 95.
28. Leiniö 1984, p. 120.
29. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1976, p. 76.
30. Information on characteristics of return migrants is available in Korkiasaari 1983.
31. Simoes 1983, p. 70-71.
32. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1976, p. 64-72.
33. Leiniö 1984, p. 24; cf. also Wiman 1975 and Haavio-Mannila and Suolinna 1974, 289-295, about the background of these emigrants.
34. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1976, p. 70.
35. Haavio-Mannila and Johansson 1974, p. 201, Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1974 b, p. 372, Leiniö 1984, p. 7, and Appendix Table 14. See also Table 5 in this article.
36. Haavio-Mannila and Stenius 1976, p. 65.
37. Leiniö 1979, p. 39-40, Leiniö 1984, p. 192. For gender differences see Haavio-Mannila 1982, p. 33.
38. Majava 1975, p. 50.
39. Kuusela 1973, p. 40.
40. Murphy 1965, p. 24.
41. Alkula 1981, Jaakkola 1983, p. 110, acknowledgement of it by Swedes, see Trankell 1975.
42. Allardt 1982, p. 143.
43. Westin 1975, p. 402.

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Tomas Hammar and Markku Peura:

SWEDISH–SPEAKING AND FINNISH–SPEAKING FINNS IN STOCKHOLM IN 1975



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Among the emigrants residing in Sweden, there are both Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking Finns. Comparing these two ethnic groups, we shall look in this article for answers to questions about the economic and social conditions in which Finnish emigrants find themselves, as well as about these Finns' evaluation of their own situation in Sweden. Up to now, researchers have not made enough use of opportunities to compare these two language groups. They may have made the same mistake as many officials and journalists, forgetting that there are a large number of Swedish-speaking persons among the Finns who have migrated to Sweden.[1]

The Swedish population register may be blamed for this oversight, for unlike the register in Finland, it contains no information about

the mother tongue of individual persons. A researcher who wants to study Finns resident in Sweden can not therefore draw a particular sample only of Finnish-speaking or only of Swedish-speaking persons. Members of both groups will always be included, and the researcher will be obliged to collect data about individual persons before he can differentiate the two groups. Public agencies that want to mail information to Finns do not for the same reason know whose mother tongue is Swedish and whose Finnish. They therefore distribute material printed in Finnish to persons in both language groups. As a result, these agencies often receive complaints from persons who feel insulted over the fact that no attention is paid to their mother tongue.[2)]

A national registration of mother tongues has been proposed several times. Associations of immigrants in Sweden, among others, argue that such registration involves a great principle and would have a practical impact on the implementation of Swedish immigration and minority policy. It is likely that a change will finally be brought about in the population register. [3)] But so far the idea of language registration has not been accepted in unilingual Sweden. The indigenous minorities, the Tornedal / Finns and the Lapps in the North, are supposed to remain in the periphery or learn Swedish fluently if they move south. Only since the large immigration waves of the 1960s and the 1970s have students of foreign origin become numerous in Swedish schools. In this new situation, the issue is not one of two national languages established on a constitutional status, as is the case in Finland, but of several languages spoken by immigrant groups of varying size. In 1982, 335 students whose mother tongue was Lappish were enrolled in the Swedish schools; and according to official statistics, 21 other languages were represented by lager numbers of students, Finnish was the mother tongue of 37 067, Spanish of 4 956 and Turkish of 1 914, etc.[4)]

Finnish is the first immigrant language not only because of its numerical importance, however. It has a long history in Sweden. From the Middle Ages to 1809, Sweden and Finland were two parts of one state, and there were always Finnish-speaking populations also in regions that belong to present-day Sweden: Stockholm Finns, Norrbotten Finns and Finns in forested provinces, where they introduced new methods of cultivating land by burning the woods. Consequently, Finnish is often given a special status among immigrant languages in the present debate on immigrants and minorities, comparisons are often made between the strong legal status of the Swedish language in Finland and the unclear position of the Finnish language in Sweden, as for instance when demands are raised by Finnish parents in Sweden

that Finnish be used as the language of instruction for Finnish students also in schools in Sweden.

At present, little is known about the Swedish-speaking Finns who live in Sweden. Finnish statistics reveal that 16 562 Swedish-speakers emigrated in the period 1970-1978, and this corresponds to 11.6 per cent of all the emigrants.5) The Swedish-speaking minority in Finland is only 6.4 per cent of the total population, however, and the proportion of Swedish-speaking emigrants was almost twice as high as the Swedish ratio of the population. They also have a greater propensity to stay in Sweden, even though many of them do also return. The end result is that about 20 per cent of the Finns in Sweden speak Swedish as their mother tongue. There is, as we have seen, no official registration by language, but according to a reasonable estimate, the Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden number about 60 000 persons, not counting children born in Sweden.6)

The volume of emigration from Finland to Sweden has by and large been decided by employment opportunities and wage differences in the two countries. In some periods, Swedish employers have actively recruited workers in Finland, but to a large extent Finns have found jobs in Sweden on their own. Young Swedish-speaking Finns have been at an advantage thanks to their fluency with the language of the land. They have enjoyed a head start over their Finnish-speaking compatriots when new employment opportunities have opened up in Sweden. The emigration of Swedish-speaking Finns has indeed grown to the extent of arousing fears that too few would be staying at home for maintaining schools, cultural activities, associations and institutions in some areas in Finland.

There are two national federations of Finnish associations in Sweden, one for the Swedish-speaking emigrants, "Finlandssvenskarnas Riksförbund i Sverige (FRIS)," and another for the Finnish-speaking ones, "Riksförbundet Finska Föreningar i Sverige (RFFS)." Both are recognized and financially supported by the Swedish state, and cooperation between them is strengthened by a number of common interests. However, the future status of the Finnish language in Sweden and, in particular, the need for Finnish classes and schools are of course the crucial issues, especially for the federation of Finnish-speaking associations (RFFS).

Emigration from Finland to Sweden should be seen as part of the great waves of international migration that have been taking place in this century; but in many respects it also resembles the internal migration taking place within a single country. Swedish-speaking Finns from Österbotten move to Sweden in the way Swedes from the North of Sweden go south inside the boundaries of Sweden. The same kind

of economic situations determine these migratory flows, and as no language barriers exist and no passports or permits are required, thanks to the Nordic agreement recognizing the free circulation of workers in a common Nordic labour market, the difference between international and internal migration is in fact very small.

In research on migration, comparisons should therefore be made between these two forms of migration to a much greater extent than has been done so far. Emigration from Finland, immigration to Sweden, return to Finland, re-emigration to Sweden, etc., all these movements are seldom final in the same way as migration from Mediterranean countries or countries outside Europe often is. The Swedish- and Finnish-speaking Finns who move to Sweden and return to Finland should be studied as interesting cases on the borderline between internal and international migration. So far, attempts to compare these two groups have been made only in a few Swedish immigration projects. In this article, we shall present some results from one attempt of this kind.

Survey of political resocialisation of immigrants in 1975-1976

During the years 1975-1976, a large survey was made in the city of Stockholm, covering samples of immigrants born in Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia and Turkey as well as a sample of native Swedes. Altogether, more than 2 500 interviews were done, and 940 of them were interviews with persons born in Finland.[9] The reason for this enlarged sample of Finns was the language division within the group. We needed a sample large enough to secure a few hundred Swedish-speaking Finns, but we could not know in advance who belonged to this group or what would be the proportion of Swedish-speaking immigrants living in Stockholm. We assumed that the proportion would be above average, and this was correct: 32 per cent of all the Finns in the city of Stockholm reported that Swedish was their mother tongue.

Table 1. Mother tongue as reported by respondents

	Finnish	Swedish	Russian	Lappish	Uncertain	Total
Number	630	302	1	1	4	941
Per cent	67.0	32.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	100

In a pilot study of Finns in the industrial municipality of Södertälje, some twenty miles south of Stockholm, we found in 1973 a number of interesting differences between Swedish- and Finnish-speaking Finns.[10] The proportion of Swedish-speaking Finns was lower in Södertälje than in Stockholm, about 22 per cent, which probably is close to the average for Sweden. Some findings from Södertälje in 1973 will be used in the following presentation of results from Stockholm in 1975.

We asked all the Finns in Stockholm: "What is your mother tongue?" As the respondents were all born in Finland, we have reason to believe that those who answered "Swedish," had spoken Swedish already in Finland. Only in exceptional cases may persons have identified themselves as Swedish-speaking although their first language had actually been Finnish; this presupposes that they had arrived in Sweden at a very early age and then quickly switched languages.

Many of those who had stayed a long time in Sweden did not want to give an interview, explaining that they were no longer immigrants. We had to tell them that we were studying long-term consequences and wanted to share the experience of all those who had once moved to Sweden. This explanation was usually accepted, and only 7 per cent of the sample categorically refused to take part. When analysing the results, however, we should remember that many of those interviewed had lived for quite long periods in Sweden. It is an empirical question whether or not they considered themselves "immigrants" or to what extent.

Language fluency

Many Swedish-speaking Finns are of course also proficient in the Finnish language. In Finland, it is even more common that those whose mother tongue is Swedish also know Finnish. According to a survey made in 1950, 46 per cent of the Swedish-speaking population in Finland said that they knew Finnish too, while only 8 per cent of those who were Finnish-speaking knew Swedish.[11] This is what we might expect to find in a society where one language dominates strongly. These figures are very old, however, and the proportion of bilingual people has probably increased somewhat in both language groups as a result of a higher level of education and because of the two-way migration between Finland and Sweden. Several hundred thousands of Finns now living in Finland have during one period or an other worked in Sweden, and then at least to some extent been exposed to the Swedish tongue.

We asked the Finns in Stockholm: "What languages do you speak yourself?" and we gave them seven response alternatives, as can be seen in table 2.

High proportions of Swedish-speaking persons, of course, answered, "Swedish," and high proportions of Finnish-speaking persons answered, "Finnish". Much more interesting is the widespread bilingual proficiency. Among Swedish-speakers, 13 per cent said that they were quite bilingual and another 24 per cent said that their Finnish was rather good. Among Finnish speakers, there were even more bilinguals. Thirty-six per cent knew Swedish as least as well as Finnish. Another 40 per cent said that their Swedish was not very bad. Only one out of four had no or very little knowledge of Swedish. Compared with the survey made in Finland in 1950, the Finnish-speaking emigrants in Stockholm interviewed in 1975 were to a much greater extent able to speak Swedish. This is, of course, what should be expected, as many of them had lived in Sweden for years.

Table 2. Self-declared language proficiency

Language proficiency	Persons whose mother tongue was Swedish (Swedish-speaking persons)	Persons whose mother tongue was Finnish (Finnish-speaking persons)
Only Finnish	0%	4%
Finnish and some Swedish	0%	21%
Finnish and rather good Swedish	1%	40%
Both languages equally well	12%	32%
Swedish and rather good Finnish	24%	3%
Swedish and some Finnish	30%	1%
Only Swedish	34%	0%
Total	100%	100%

Table 2 also says something about the language proficiency in general in Stockholm at the time of the interviews. It should be expected that an improvement would have taken place since then, mainly because of the reduction in new immigration to Sweden. But as early as 1975, the following summary could be made in Stockholm: Three out of

every ten persons born in Finland spoke Swedish as their mother tongue. Among the seven whose mother tongue was Finnish, five had a good or at least a fair knowledge of Swedish. Nevertheless, the Swedish language was a problem for not less than 25 per cent of all those whose mother tongue was Finnish.

This summary also indicates a better situation in Stockholm in 1975 than in Södertälje in 1973. In response to the same question, 46 per cent of those born in Finland who were living in Södertälje said that they spoke only Finnish or in addition also a little Swedish.[12] We can hardly explain this improvement in language proficiency as a result of formal or informal education. The results are better in Stockholm thanks to a higher proportion of Finns with Swedish as their mother tongue and thanks to a higher general level of education among the Finns resident in Stockholm. We can study these differences more in detail as we now make an attempt to classify the Stockholm sample by social class.

Social class

The Stockholm labour market is much more differentiated than it is on average in Sweden. The proportion of workers is lower in general, but probably also among immigrants in the city, even if it is true that there are always many workers among immigrants. It is easier for Swedish-speaking Finns to obtain white-collar employment where good command of Swedish is required, and bilingual persons are in some cases even preferred, especially in jobs related to immigrants (language teachers, hospital and childcare personnel, etc.). We have divided the Finns interviewed into two groups, where all those with occupations organized by the National Federation of Trade Unions (the Landsorganisation or LO) are called "workers," while all others are labelled "middle class."The term "middle class" is not used here in a theoretical sense; it is instead a category in which quite different occupations have been included, ranging from employers and higher civil servants, doctors and architects to hospital personnel and teachers, etc.[13]

Seventy-four per cent of all the Finns in Stockholm were workers, with only a few per cent more among the Finnish speakers than among the Swedish speakers. Thirty-two per cent of the Swedish speaking Finns were classified as "middle class," while the figure for Finnish-speaking persons was 23 per cent. There is a class difference, but it is small. Most surprisingly, perhaps, we find a relatively high proportion

of Finnish speakers in Stockholm in occupations that often require a high language proficiency. Compared with the findings in Södertälje, there are about twice as many "middle-class" Finnish speaking Finns in Stockholm.[14)]

Table 3. Class-division

Mother tongue	"Middle class" Number/ % of language group	"Middle class" % of class	Workers Number/ % of language group	Workers % of class	Total Number/ % of language group	Total % of class
Swedish	90 40.9%	31.7%	194 30.6%	68.3%	284 33.3%	100.0%
Finnish	130 59.1%	22.8%	440 69.4%	77.2%	570 66.7%	100.0%
Combined	220 100.0%	25.8%	634 100.0%	74.2%	854 100.0%	100.0%

N = 854. Data are missing for 87 persons with no occupation or failing to give information about occupation. The same applies also to table 4-11.

Table 3 may also be read in another way. While Swedish is the mother tongue of one-third of the total sample, this is true of 31 per cent of the workers and 41 per cent of the members of the "middle class." We obtain a table with four boxes through this cross-tabulation of social class and mother tongue. This is the table that we shall use in the following presentation of some of the Stockholm findings. The classical issue of the role of class, on the one hand, and language and ethnic group, on the other, may thus be said to be the general theme of our discussion.

Intention to stay in Sweden and to become naturalized

We have found a higher propensity to stay in Sweden among Swedish-speaking Finns. According to our interviews, they had also arrived at an earlier date and consequently lived a longer time in Sweden (table 4).

Table 4. Year of arrival in Sweden

Year of arrival	Swedish-speaking persons		Finnish-speaking persons	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Before 1960	138	45%	157	25%
1960-1966	83	28%	160	25%
1967-1975	83	27%	317	50%
Combined	304	100%	634	100%

Half of the Swedish-speaking persons had lived more than 15 years in the country. The same proportion of the Finnish speakers had spent less than 8 years in Sweden. The difference is significant. During the years 1968-1970, when emigration from Finland reached its peak, 27 per cent of the Finnish-speaking immigrants arrived but only 16 per cent of their Swedish-speaking compatriots.

Table 5. Proportion of women

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	54%	55%	56%
Finnish	72%	63%	65%
Combined	65%	60%	62%

There are many more women than men among the Finns in Sweden, owing to a high immigration rate among young women, many marriages with Swedish men, and a higher male rate of return migration. According to table 5, two-thirds (or 65%) of the Finnish speaking Finns in Stockholm were women. The over-representation of women was even more marked among the Finnish-speaking middle class (72%). Unfortunately, we cannot discuss here whether this is a result of age structure, marriage pattern or level of education, although these are questions of considerable interest.

Table 6. Intention to stay

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	73%	76%	75%
Finnish	70%	61%	63%
Combined	71%	66%	67%

The interviewees were asked whether they intended to return "within one year," "within one to five years," or "some day," or if they intended to remain permanently in Sweden. Only about one per cent answered "within year," and about five said within one to five years," while one out of four gave the vague and noncommitting answer "some day." Quite a high proportion said that they intended to stay on in Sweden. In other words, the Finns in Stockholm were a population of whom two-thirds had settled permanently, and this was true irrespective of social class or mother tongue, except that Swedish speakers were slightly more inclined to stay than Finnish speakers.

Table 7. Proportion of Swedish citizens

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	40%	29%	32%
Finnish	18%	15%	15%
Combined	27%	19%	21%

The somewhat greater permanence of settlement among the Swedish-speaking Finns becomes even more evident from the percentage, resorded in table 7,that had acquired Swedish citizenship. Of the Finns living in Stockholm in 1975, 21 per cent had Swedish passports. Since then, the number of naturalizations has gone up, and the proportion has probably increased considerably. In 1975, however, there were twice as many naturalized Swedes among Swedish-speaking persons than among Finnish speakers. At the same time, there was also a clear difference between social classes. Fewer workers had changed citizenship, and the highest proportion of naturalized immigrants was found among the Swedish-speaking middle class (40%), the lowest among the Finnish-speaking workers (15%).

The Finns' evaluation of their emigration to Stockholm

Finns have moved to Stockholm mainly for economic reasons. As we have seen, this migration took place many years ago. We asked those interviewed to evaluate their emigration, comparing their life in Stockholm with their previous life in Finland.

The question was: "Compared with your life in Finland, what are your opportunities here to earn much money, to find good housing,

to feel good at work, to find satisfaction in general, to do something actively to improve your lot, to speak out freely, and to gain respect from other people?" Three alternative responses were offered for each one of the items: Life could be "worse," "the same" or "better." In table 8, the proportion that answered "better" is recorded, beginning from the top with items having the highest percentage of positive answers.

Table 8. Emigration evaluation

"Life is better in Sweden with respect to..."	Swedish-speaking emigrants	Finnish-speaking emigrants
Income	83%	82%
Housing	63%	78%
Work satisfaction	42%	35%
General satisfaction	38%	30%
Political participation	30%	16%
Freedom of expression	24%	28%
Leisure time	27%	25%
Respect from others	14%	14%

An overwhelming majority responded that they have obtained higher income and better housing. Between 30 and 40 per cent are more satisfied with their work in Stockholm, and also express greater satisfaction in general. Although this is not shown in table 8, we should also mention that less than 10 per cent say that they are worse off in Sweden than in Finland, in reply to these first four questions.

Swedish-speaking Finns feel that with respect to their opportunity to take part in politics, life is better in Sweden, while the opposite is true for the Finnish-speaking persons. Here we do not know to what extent language plays a role as regards their political participation. But in answer to the question about freedom of expression, Swedish- and Finnish-speaking persons reply almost in the same way. Between 25 and 28 per cent feel that the situation is better for them in Sweden, three per cent of the Swedish speakers and nine per cent of the Finnish speakers say that it is worse, while according to the large majority there are no differences. Possibly, language proficiency plays a minor role with respect to the legal differences in question.

Finally, the last two questions in table 8 deal with leisure time and with the respect shown by other people. In response, about 25 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, found that life in Sweden was better, and about the same percentage gave the opposite answer, that life in Sweden was worse. Emigration to Sweden had meant neither improvement nor deterioration for the large majority.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Finns in Sweden have become more conscious of the value of the Finnish language and culture. When our interviews were made, the so-called "ethnic revival" was not yet a strong movement in Sweden. It is interesting to note that, nevertheless, both Swedish- and Finnish-speaking Finns in Stockholm took a relatively strong positive attitude to Finnish culture.

Table 9. Proportion with a positive attitude to the study of Finnish in Swedish schools

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	61%	68%	66%
Finnish	76%	82%	81%
Combined	70%	78%	76%

Those interviewed were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Finnish children should study the Finnish language at school, even if this takes time away from other subjects." All those who agreed fully and those who agreed on the whole are recorded in table 9, which shows that as early as 1975 between two-thirds and three-fourths of the Finns in Stockholm wanted Finnish children to study Finnish in school. The proportion is, of course, somewhat higher among the Finnish-speaking respondents, but it is high also among the Swedish speakers, who evidently often have a sympathetic view of active bilingualism. No major difference exists between the social classes, but the workers showed a slightly more positive attitude. The highest percentage in table 9 is found in the box representing Finnish-speaking workers.

We shall conclude by comparing the responses to the following statement: "For Finns, it is more important to preserve their own culture than to adapt to the Swedish culture." Also this time, only those who agreed are recorded in the table (table 10).

Table 10. Proportion with a positive attitude to preservation of Finnish culture

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	38%	45%	40%
Finnish	52%	54%	53%
Combined	46%	51%	50%

This statement was more complex than the previous one. First of all, it may be hard to know what is meant by Finnish and Swedish culture. About half of the interviewees gave their support to the fostering of Finnish culture in Sweden. Just as in the answers to the school question, a higher proportion of positive answers came from the Finnish-speaking Finns and a somewhat higher proportion from the workers.

Mention should also be made of another question relative to the attitudes of Swedes. We asked those interviewed whether they were in agreement with a statement that "Swedes consider themselves to be better than Finns living in Sweden." We expected to find a much higher proportion of Finnish-speaking Finns to be in agreement much higher proportion of Finnish-speaking Finns to be in agreement with this, as they might be more exposed to negative attitudes in Sweden. But, as is seen in table 11, there was no major difference between the two groups. About two-thirds of the members of both language groups said that Swedes were cocky.

Table 11. Proportion in agreement with the statement that Swedes consider themselves better than Finns

Mother tongue	"Middle class"	Workers	Total
Swedish	64%	67%	66%
Finnish	67%	70%	70%
Combined	66%	69%	68%

remarks

Comparing Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking immigrants, we have obtained a number of more or less expected results. The interviews were done in Stockholm in 1975, however, a period when Swedish immigration policy was explicitly given a partly new direction, one accepted by all parties, pointing towards a multicultural Sweden. The data presented here are not however, solely of historical interest. They give us some preliminary knowledge about a Finnish population relatively permanently settled in Stockholm, of which one-third spoke Swedish as their mother tongue and two-thirds, Finnish.

Many tables have indicated that Swedish-speaking Finns have enjoyed some, although not very large, advantages compared with theFinnish-speaking Finns. In some respects, class differences have been larger than language-group differences. We must bear in mind, however, that we have not applied controls for several other relevant

variables in our analysis here. The Swedish-speaking Finns had lived many more years in Sweden than the Finnish-speaking immigrants. There was a higher over-representation of women in the latter group. Some of our results may depend also on these and other factors that have not been discussed here. We shall have to apply controls of this kind, and also make comparisons with the results of interviews done with native Swedes. But there is one simple conclusion to be drawn immediately: In the study of Finnish immigrants in Sweden, a clear distinction must be made between the two language groups, the Swedish and the Finnish.

NOTES

1. In Finland as well as in Sweden, the Swedish-speaking Finns are called "Finland-Swedes." The Finnish-speaking Finns living in Sweden call themselves "Sweden-Finns." These terms cannot be rendered smoothly into English, so they are not used here.
2. See, for example, "Rösträttsprojektet, en slutrapport" ("The Voting Right Project, a Final Report") from the Swedish Immigration Board, 1980.
3. Language registration has been discussed by the Swedish Commission on Immigration Policy in its report "Invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken," SOU 1984:58 (Immigration and Minority Policy). The Swedish Commission on Immigration Research is undertaking some pilot studies.
4. Immigrants in Sweden, SCB (Central Bureau of Statistics), Stockholm 1983, p. 41.
5. Report No. 5 by the Finnish Commission on Emigration, "The Principles of Finlands Policy on Emigration," Helsinki 1980, p. 22.
6. Allardt, E and Starck, C, Språkgränser och samhällsstruktur, Finlandssvenskarna i ett jämförande perspektiv (Language Borders and Social Structure, Comparative Perspectives on the Swedish-speaking population of Finland), Lund 1981, p. 101.
7. Report No. 5 by Finnish Commission on Emigration, p. 24.
8. Jaakkola, M, Sverigefinländernas etniska organisationer, (Ethnic Associations of Finns in Sweden), EIFO nr 22, Stockholm 1983.
9. Tung, R K–C, Exit-Voice Catastrophes, Dilemma between Migration and Participation. Diss. Stockholm 1981, Chapter 11.
10. Hammar, T och Tung, R K-C, Finländare i Södertälje (Finns in Södertälje), Södertälje 1975, p. 19 f.
11. Allardt, E och Starck, C, op. cit. p. 146.
12. Hammar, T och Tung, R K-C, op. cit. p. 21.
13. Hammar, T, Det första invandrarvalet (The First Immigrant Election), Stockholm 1979, p. 150.
14. Op. cit. p. 23.
15. Hammar, T. och Tung, R K-C, op. cit. p. 18.
16. Majava, A, Migration between Finland and Sweden from 1946 to 1974, Demographic analysis, preliminary report, mimeo. 1975, p. 28.

Robert F. Harney

ENTWINED FORTUNES: MULTICULTURALISM AND ETHNIC STUDIES IN CANADA



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To understand the historiography, institutional career and funding patterns of ethnic studies and preservation work in Canada, one must start with the rise of multiculturalism. That policy was conceived in the 1960s, announced **ex cathedra** by Prime Minister Trudeau in October of 1971 and incised - ever so faintly since it lacked enforcement clauses and any reference to language or political rights for other than the French and British founding races - in the new Canadian constitution of Spring 1982. Article 27 simply advises the "The charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada." That article is the "way the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper," a whimper which is the culmination of ten years of flashy rhetoric, patterned funding of

ethnocultural institutions and projects of patronage, funds doled out according to size and clout to each descent group. It is also the beginning of the end for work done honestly, if not always wisely, by a number of idealists, public servants, academics, and ethnic intellectuals who believe deeply that pluralism should have a place in our heritage, our future research and institutions of culture and learning.

My purpose is less to establish villains in this piece and more to suggest that ethnic and immigration studies in Canada like the nation's ethnic groups themselves came to rely too much on the state, to believe too much in the wedding of interest between what is ethnoculturally or academically good and what is politically attractive. As a result both the ethnic groups and their students may discover that they have been victims of underdevelopment, encouraged to depend on the state, unused to paying the price for their otherness but rather accustomed to being lavishly nurtured in it; they prove incapable of sustaining themselves in the harsher world of assimilationist, or at least homogenizing, public institutions and meaner times upon us now.

Although most Canadians, according to a government commissioned survey, **Multicultural and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada**,[1] believe rather smugly that we practice something other than and superior to the American melting pot, there is no evidence that the majority of either the so-called French and British founding peoples support the policy of multiculturalism. In that 1976 survey, less than 20% of the population could describe the federal government's policy and only 27.5 % had ever heard of it. There is little reason to assume that awareness of the policy has increased much since the Prime Minister has not given a major parliamentary speech on the policy since he enunciated it in 1971.

Attitudes towards multiculturalism as public policy coincide with or entwine with attitudes towards the role of ethnic and immigration studies and the importance of collecting ethnic library and archival material. Just as the majority of the nation does not know about the public policy, multiculturalism, the majority who guard the entrances or sit in the directing offices of the nation's libraries, universities, and archives is either ignorant of the policy's import for learning and collecting or object to it as faddish and as lessening Canada's ties to its British colonial heritage or, in the Quebec case, as underemphasizing the struggle of a single ethnic group to survive. Even those institutions which accept the logic and fairness of recording our pluralism of origin, and understand that such a departure does not surrender us to a pluralism of destiny, do seem to worry excessively about the balkanization of services and efforts, or at least the threat of enthusiastic and well-financed successor states breaking free from their empires.

In a recent issue of the **Journal of Canadian Studies**[2] dedicated to multiculturalism, Evelyn Kallen points out that the term multiculturalism has had to carry much freight in Canada. It is used to describe at least three different phenomena which have or haven't happened in Canada during the last two decades. First, Multiculturalism has been used to refer to the "Multiethnic composition of the population of Canada;" second, to define the federal government policy and third, to describe the ideology, or ethos of cultural pluralism which either prompted the adoption of the policy or is supposed to be fostered by it. Kallen would have been more helpful had she gone farther and suggested the adoption of the American usages **cultural or democratic pluralism** to describe the ethos or ideology and poly-ethnicity to denote a society in which people of a number of different origins, especially immigrants, live in ways that are visibly, culturally, psychically, and in many instances linguistically diverse but in which they do not necessarily share a pluralist ethos. That would have left the term multiculturalism free to describe the policies of the federal government and the province of Ontario.

The speech-making of those politicians who have advocated multiculturalism or flexed the muscles of the "third force" as if they were their own, has from the beginning, and usually purposely, confused the poly-ethnic reality with the presence of an ethos of pluralism. The best example of the rhetorical conflation came in a speech by the Honourable Joyn Yaremko, Ontario's Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citizenship at Heritage Ontario, given preparatory to a congress held in June of 1972.[2]

> No other part of the globe, no other country can claim more culturally diversified society than we have here in this province... But does everyone really grasp that Ontario has more Canadians of German origin than Bonn, more of Italian origin than Florence, more Canadians of Greek origin than Sparta. That we have in our midsts, 54 ethnocultural groups, speaking a total of 72 languages ... Just a 100 years ago the Canadian identity was moulded in the crucible of nationalism, it is now being tempered, tempered by the dynamics of multiculturalism.
>
> One effect of the post war boom in third element immigration has been to bolster ethnocultural groups, some of which have been here through four generations. The government has welcomed and encouraged this

> immigration. We have recognized and helped foster all our constituent cultural communities. It is then any wonder that these communities have heightened expectations in many areas.

Certainly Canada, and more especially Ontario, have changed drastically in their ethnic and demographic compositions since World War II. Between 1945 and 1961, over two million legal immigrants have entered Canada, a nation of fewer than 20,000,000 before then. Less than a third of those who arrived in that period came from the British Isles, and since the early 1970s, perhaps as many as a third of those entering Canada have been non-white, however most of them have come from areas once part of the British Empire. That fact has produced a visibly poly-ethnic society without increasing effectively the numbers of those who might resist anglo-conformity.

After 1958 more people came annually from Italy than from the United Kingdom. In fact, the number of immigrants from Britain to this former British colony has not been a third of the annual total for almost three decades. In Ontario, where in 1950 three out of every four people could trace their ancestry to the British Isle, only three out of every six could do so by the 1980s. The new diversity was magnified, indeed distorted, by the workings of the Canadian census which requires everyone to list ethnic groups in the paternal line. This official ethnic group membership, imposed by the state originally at the insistance of the French Canadians is misused by ethnic leaders as a proof of the ethnic consiousness or as a proof of ethnic persistence and maintenance over generations. It is in fact a mischievious statistical artifact, by itself merely a token of some of the less pleasant statist aspects of Canada's former dualism. Nonetheless the new diversity is real! The ethnocultural, especially linguistic, needs of hundreds of thousands of newcomers are pressing. That they and their children and the surrounding anglophone society can or wish to make the leap from the poly-ethnic facts to a new societal ethos of pluralism to replace the old anglo-conformist instincts of a former British colony however, has yet, despite declared public policy, to be demonstrated.

The results of the 1976 survey suggest that some things have changed in anglophone attitudes since R.B. Bennett expressed the anglo-conformist view succinctly in the 1930s.[4]

> "The people (continental Europeans) have made excellent settlers... but it cannot be that we must draw

> upon them to shape our civilization. We must still maintain that measure of British civilization which will enable us to assimilate these people to British institutions, rather than assimilate our civilization to theirs..."

The change towards tolerance of forms of diversity, may not be so qualitatively great. In fact, it may only entail the acceptance of the celebration occasionally of "quaint ways." For, while 81 % of those surveyed would encourage folk festivals, only 60 % supported the idea that histories needed to be written about the major groups other than the British and the French, and less than a third were willing to see heritage language taught during regular school hours or government support for "foreign-language" broadcasting. J.S. Frideres has made the point tellingly.

> "Those of 'English' group membership adhere to the policy of multiculturalism but only to the extent that the 'different' ethnic groups nominally display their ethnicity. This means that these... groups should speak English in public and accept the anglo way of life in all respects when in public. However, in the private confines of one's house and on holidays, these groups can speak their native language, wear their 'traditional' clothes, and paint their Easter eggs."[5]

For Quebeckers of course, multicultural policy rarely seems more than a continuation by other means of the anglophone struggle to reduce French claims to a unique status and to make of the French-speaking population, especially outside of Quebec, the first of the minorities rather than an **deuxième nation** or a co-equal founding people. Guy Rocher, one of the few Quebeckers in attendance at the biennial Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism in 1978 gave the view of most French Canadians.

> However... while multiculturalism is a sociologically valid concept on Canada, it has no meaning politically. In my view it is clear that, from a political standpoint, Canada is a country defined by twofold culture, anglophone and francophone, and it is the interplay of political forces between these two great 'societies,' to use the

> expression in the preliminary report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, that will determine the future of this country.[6]

Quebeckers, especially nationalists,see multiculturalism as either a devise to neutralize special claims for the French language and the province of Quebec, or because they understand nationality to depend so much on language survival, they believe the policy must either lead to multilingualism which they would find repugnant or become a farce.

Those in English Canada who object to multiculturalism as divisive, as Liberal party politicking, as the victorious impertinence of newcomers who "should be grateful and conform" or "should go through what we went through" can rarely see back beyond the myopia of their hostility to the origins of the policy. There is however among them a diffuse sense that something went wrong, that the post colonial search for Canadian identity was waylaid by Quebec separatism, western regionalism, and the unreasonable demands of immigrants. So multiculturalism as now practiced satisfies no one except some cultural bureaucrats; thoughtful Euro-ethnic group leadership tends to find the policy cosmetic or insincere. They also now face agencies, once sensitive to their demands for help in cultural maintenance, now preoccupied with the immigrant and racial problems of newer groups. Moreover the confusion among the cultural bureaucrats about whether they should encourage the evolving ethnoculture in Canada or dismiss it and import the literary culture of the immigrant's mother countries leads to further unease about the policy's purposes. Anglophone Canadians, both Anglo-Celts and those of other backgrounds who have acculturated, fear the policy's potential to balkanize and are irked by the more ostentations and lavish public spectacle of funding for maintenance of other cultures Those who have worked long and well in the anglophone institutions see in the demand for change or in the demand for the creation of parallel institutions as well as the calls for special heritage programs, language rights, a place in the nation's textbooks, ethnocultural chairs of study in the universities– an evidence that Canada is not making the transition safely from British colony to nation state. Many among them think that a pandora's box has been opened thoughtlessly by venal politicians.

Hostility to a multicultural policy comes from a number of directions and ranges from the viscerally xenophobic to a well reasoned cosmopolitan liberalism. It is important to note that a significant group of intelligent Canadians, not just of British or French descent,

and a number of thoughtful social scientists, following the approach of the pre-eminent among them, John Porter, see the policy as a dangerous new tribalism, undercutting a society based on individual merit, as a new devise to justify hierarchy in the form of ethclass niching.[7] This criticism of the policy usually finds an echo in partisan politics. For some the entire multicultural policy is no more than a Liberal policy devise to shift from a declining power base in Quebec, beset by separatism, to dependance on the ethnic vote in the big cities of central Canada. Freda Hawkins, Canada's leading student of the politics of immigration policy, has written "It is clear that in the Canadian Consultive Council on Multiculturalism and the whole apparatus of multiculturalism in Canada, the Liberals have created a governmentcontrolled interest group..."[8] Put more colourfully by a Toronto political commentator, the son of immigrants from eastern Europe:

> In fact, multiculturalism was and is a Trudeau boondoggle to get the ethnics to stay grateful and vote Liberal. Multiculturalism, which was supposedly out to make Diefenbaker and me the racial equals of Walter Gordon and Piere Trudeau, was a bastard child of political patronage, born in the Neanderthal ooze and slime of ethnicking. Multiculturalism encourages double loyalties, ghetto political machines that would shame a Tammany Hall, and daily give the fledgling Canadian Identity, already frail and wan, near fatal kicks in its most sensitive organs.
>
> Multiculturalism encourages the reverse of what it's supposed to do. Instead of making ethnic groups equal to the two founding peoples, it segregates ethnic peoples, centres them out, ghettoizes them and then inevitably makes them feel inferior. If you're in third place officially you're a third-class citizen in fact.[9]

Perhaps the most cogent criticism of the policy has come from a younger generation of social scientists, many of them raised within ethnic communities in that eternal "nation in exile" which their parents, often displaced persons, fostered. These young scholars have come to see that far from saving "the ethnics and their culture from extinguishing themselves in, God forbid, a future American type melting pot," direct government funding through the multicultural policy has

tamed ethnic group organizations and ethnocultures, making their survival dependent on public funding. As Daiva Stasiulis points out

> The fact that government agencies are becoming incorporated into the interorganizational networks of ethnic community organizations and are joining so in such a way as to be preeminent in their relationship with the funded organizations, is crucial to an understanding of these organization's structures and activities.[10]

Those who control the taps can decide which plants to water and can slowly cause those who have come to depend too much on watering to whither. More and more, at the federal and provincial levels, the public policy of multiculturalism now ten years old and tired finds itself reduced in priority, tied administratively to sports, tourism, lotteries, leisure, even occasionally the mainstream culture. No doubt the needs of ethnic dance groups parallel the needs of amateur hockey teams, and the former are to a public ethos of democratic pluralism about as relevant as the latter are to health as an ideal for the whole populace.

There is one further problem of the multicultural policy which needs exposition. The word multiculturalism itself seems to hold out two different but apparently compatible, even complementary, promises. On the one hand, it suggests pluralism in the form of cross-cultural exchange and rapport, somewhat in the manner of the International House movement in the United States. On the other hand, it seems to imply, not just tolerance for, but positive support in the form of grants and government intervention, on behalf of the maintenance of each group's identity, its otherness, and its efforts to build institutions for passing on and maintaining its ethnoculture through generations in Canada. Although it may be that the two promises are philosophically consistent, the reality in the form of the pattern of distribution of government funds in support of culture and social activities can tip a delicate balance. If there is too much money for the individual ethnic groups and their strategies of survival and the Canadian context of multiculturalism is threatened, if there is too little, then the policy can be seen as a veiled form of the "melting pot," emphasis on multicultural centres, on being immigrant or ethnic together, on sharing one's cultural riches with the dominant anglophone culture at the expense of the coherence of the group itself.

In February of 1977, the Ukrainian Canadian Commitee made public its dissent with federal policy on exactly this point.[10a]

> Any attempt to develope and maintain the various cultures simultaneously as distinct yet intermixed together in a multicultural centre is a contradiction, as it leads to one blend or mass...

The UCC feared that the direction of government funding, especially grants for multicultural centres, would undermine "the essential role that Churches, parish centres, community centres and their related organizations have and continue to play in the socialization and cultural maintenance processes of the Ukrainian Canadian community." If such cultural activities were shifted to government-sponsored multicultural hall, it would "destroy the very heart of the community and the individual ethnic cultures." Thus the Ukrainian Canadian leadership believed that they had detected a scenario in which the funding modes of multiculturalism as policy were used to destroy ethnocultures and the ethnic institutional base.

I paint this mean general picture for a precise purpose. It needs to be understood that ethnic and immigration studies in our universities, new library and archival retrieval projects dealing with ethnic materials, and attempts to teach pluralism, or multiculturalism in the public school system, since they are correctly read as attempts to give substance to the new public policy of multiculturalism are often subject to the same hostility or worse yet, to the condescending patience of trivializing which the policy itself is.

It is worth remarking that the reaction to multiculturalism and to the effort to bring a pluralist sentiment to the writing and collecting of Canada's national history seems as often to be born of disoriented idiocy as of malice. Ethnic studies pays the price of appearing disruptive and foreign to educators, public servants, and social engineers who were in full throat baying after the trail which would lead to the new post colonial identity when they were thrown off the spoor by multiculturalism. Since the pre-declaration of the policy they have not really been able to recover their bearings as witness the report of the Commission on Canada Studies issued 7 years after the multicultural policy was in place and at a time when one third of the population were of neither French nor British stock. That report, the Symons Report, entitled "To Know Ourselves" contained in its published form only one reference to any ethnic group.

> The remarkable Celtic contribution to the life of this country for example has received little attention. The

British or Anglo-Canadian heritage is in danger of being ignored by scholars who fail to percieve that it, too, is part of the Canadian mosaic.[11]

This amazing exercise in Anglocentrism was perpetrated at a time when no Canadian university offered a course in the history of immigration and ethnicity, although many had a historian of Great Britain for every century since William the Conqueror. That is why one cannot blame Canadian ethnic intelligensia and scholars of ethnicity for being unable to see that part of the report as the pathetic wee defense of ethnocentrism it was. Rather it was seen as another proof that ethnic studies and the serious attempt to insert the real record of the many people who have taken part in Canadian history would remain in limbo between the filio-pietit writings of the ethnic community and the Canadian academic establishment. It was scant consolation that limbo, at least at first, was a warm and nurturing place, replete with new well-funded parallel institutions for gathering ethnic material, grants for ethnic studies research, and, above all, the **Generations** Series an ambitious flagship effort by the Minister of State for Multiculturalism to create a foot long shelf of national ethnic histories, a volume each for the twenty most significant peoples of Canada.

It was clear though that, if ethnic scholarship was--until the creation of the so-called "ethnic chairs"--to be denied the beatific visions of academic respectability at least there would be lush funding, and national publication. Unfortunately in that space between heaven and earth, ethnic studies continued to be dismissed by those who had attained through accident of birth or training salvation in the nation's history departments. Ethnic studies was a thing of schools of education, of sociology departments, of cultural bureaucrats. Money from the multiculturalism directorate condemned men and their work to limbo or hell, while Canada Council money continued to be laundered by some divine consensus so that those who received it, did so as if it were grace and not government funds.

To understand how this extraordinary state of affairs came into being one needs to know the history and impact of one publication. That is book IV, **The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups** of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism published in 1969.[12] That volume came about almost as an afterthought to the great commission initiated by Lester Pearson in 1963 to establish a post colonial Canadian identity based on biculturalism and bilingualism, an effort to recast the nation's sometimes troublesome dualism into a unity which respected the cultural rights of the two

founding races. The commissioner and intellectuals who, in three thoughtful volumes of reports, worked towards a new ethos, did so on vanished premises. On the one hand, a new Quebecois identity--based on a geographically, demographically, and politically compact and self contained nation in the province of Quebec was rising to challenge the diffuse legal linguistic ideal of a Francophone and Anglophone partnership stretching from sea to sea. Moreover, the concept of two founding peoples was challenged by those who saw themselves as spokesmen for the third of the nation of neither British nor French descent. Some like the prairie Ukrainians may have been offended not to be included as a founding nation, most saw some recognition of pluralism as the only policy that could save them from the twin anglophone and francophone melting pots which the commission seemed to be condoning. Book IV was written for them. The Handlinesque ring of its title, the contribution of the "other ethnic groups," implying as it did the frame of mind of the scholars who created the volume, did not represent the views of the nation at large and was belied by the book's contents. Only the non-British and non-French and those intellectuals who felt it would be healthier if all Canadians but the native people realized that they were immigrants actually saw Canada as a nation of immigrants rather than as a nation of two founding peoples and then the immigrants. Book IV was however the first modern public recognition of the possibility of the cultural rights for minorities and of limits to Anglo-conformity and gallicization respectively. The volume also clearly sets the limits for diversity as well.

In fact, Book IV was unequivocal about its mandate. It envisaged study and celebration of pluralism of origin, and it seemed willing to tolerate, even to encourage, the maintenance of ethnocultures, especially for immigrants and their children. However it promised neither political nor linguistic pluralism of destiny and was cautious about cultural pluralism itself.

> 1. The terms of reference instructed the Commission "to recommend what steps should be taken to develope the Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution."
>
> It will be noted immediately that while the terms of

> reference deal with questions of those of ethnic origin other than British or French, they do so in relation to the basic problem of bilingualism and biculturalism, from which they are inseparable, and in the context of the coexistence of the Francophone and Anglophone communities. Also, the terms of reference do not call for an exhaustive study of the position of those of non-British, non-French origin, but rather an examination of the way they have taken their place within the two societies that have provided Canada's social structures and institutions.[13]

Article 12 of thè Book IV of the report went even farther. In fact so far that the Ukrainian Canadian Commissioner from the West felt forced to dissent formally. That article remarked that " acculturation is inevitable in a multi-ethnic country like Canada and the two main societies themselves are open to its influences. The integration of immigrants into the life of the country, with the help of its institutions is surely the road to their self-fulfillment."[14]

One of the volume's chief architects, writing five years after its appearance, comprehended nicely the difference between its purpose and its uses by those who dreamed a dream of Canada as a new kind of policy which would be truly a nation of many nations.

> "Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework can work, if it is interpreted as it is intended - that is, as encouraging those members of ethnic groups who want to do so to maintain a proud sense of the contribution of their own group to Canadian society. Interpreted in this way, it becomes something very North American: voluntary marginal differentiation among peoples who are equal participants in the society. If it is interpreted in a second way - as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and languages as living wholes into a new place and time - multiculturalism is doomed."[15]

Although its leit-motif was an admirable concern for cultural free choice and the easing of the burdens of adjustment, Book IV dealt with the semantics of ethnicity and diversity, especially with such shibboleths as assimilation, integration, acculturation, and adaptation, in a

manner that might remind the reader of the true roots of the word sophisticated. This was especially so since the Canadian collective wisdom, if it distinguished at all between a melting pot and anglo-conformity, saw both as peculiarly American nationalist forms of cultural repression and sought to employ a language which did not conjure up these forms.

> 11. The process of integration goes hand in hand with what anthropologists call "acculturation." Anyone who choses Canada as his adopted country adopts a new style of life, a particular kind of existence. This phenomenon is easily visable in the immigrant's experience in the work world, in his social contacts with other people in the schools, where children acquire a major part of their preparation for life, and in all his contact with other citizens and public institutions. In office and factory, train and plane, in court and in Parliament, the process of acculturation can be seen, despite the obstacles facing an individual as he becomes acquainted with his new environment, in which he is exposed to so many influences. Acculturation is the process of adaptation to the environment in which an individual is compelled to live as he adjusts his behaviour to that of the community.[16]

In contrast, the actual recommendations of Book IV, among them those about ethnic studies, were clear and to the point. That may account for their adoption with little skewing in the federal policy which emerged two years later. For example, one recommendation was that Canadian Universities expand their studies in the fields of the humanities and social sciences relating to particular areas other than those related to the English and French languages and the final one recommended that the National Museum of Man, not one should note, the Public Archives of Canada, should be given adequate space and facilities and provided with sufficient funds to carry out its projects regarding the history, social organizations, and folk arts of cultural groups other than British and French. A postscript to Book IV spoke directly to the matter of ethnic studies. Its intent and tone can be captured by quoting the topic sentence of each of its six paragraphs.

> 650. A striking fact which emerged from our research

into the cultural groups other than the British and French in Canadian society is that so little is known about the subject.

651. As far as a sociology of ethnic relations exists, it is mainly American. Although much can be learnt from research carried out in the United States, the conclusions reached are frequently not applicable to Canada.

652. Throughout this Book we have called attention to areas where further research is needed... Some of the research needed could be done under the auspices of the cultural and research organizations of particular groups.

653. However the research that is most vital should focus on relations between cultural groups.

654. We urge Canadian scholars and learned societies to give high priority to research concerning immigration and ethnic relations and their effects on our social, economic, political and cultural life.

655. In the past, research concerning immigration and ethnic relations was possibly of greater interest to Anglophone than Francophone scholars. Today it is the vital concern of both societies...[17]

Book IV then not only brought the question of the cultural persistence of the non-British and non-French to the fore, it also firmly identified ethnic and immigration studies as the new civic or moral science which would serve as the legitimating instrument, or handmaiden, for whatever public policy was adopted. When the recommendations of Book IV were made public policy by Prime Minister Trudeau in October 1971, the writing of ethnic history and the need to raise the multicultural consciousness of government cultural agencies or create new multicultural institutions was at the heart of both his parliamentary speech and the accompanying implementation proposals. That speech, richer in sentiment than in definition, not only made multiculturalism public policy but also began the extraordinary flowering, or underdeveloping, of ethnic studies and ethnocultural institutions in Canada. The Prime Minister's speech placed multiculturalism squarely in the context of the search for a national integrating principle.

Volume IV ecamined the whole question of cultural and ethnic pluralism in this country and the status of our

various cultures and languages, an area of study given all too little attention in the past by scholars.

It was the view of the Royal Commission, shared by the Government and, I am sure, all Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen group or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly.

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the Government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all.

In the past, substantial public support has been given largely to the arts and cultural institutions of English-speaking Canada. More recently, and largely with the help of the Royal Commission's earlier recommendations in Volume I to III, there has been a conscious effort on the Government's part to correct any bias against the French language and culture. In the past few months the Government has taken steps to provide funds to support culturaleducational centres for native people. The policy I am anouncing today accepts the contention of the other cultural communities that they, too, are essential elements in Canada and deserve Government assistance in order to contribute to regional and national life in ways that derive from their heritage yet are distinctively Canadian.[18]

Implementation of the new policies was to be carried out by the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State and latter by a Multiculturalism Directorate within that same ministry. Six programs for carrying out the policy were announced; they included 1. multicultural grants, 2. cultural development program 3. ethnic histories, 4. Canadian Ethnic studies, 5. teaching of official languages, and 6. programs of the federal agencies. Most of the programs showed as much concern for the fostering of inter-ethnic activities and for multicultural encounter in the true sense as they did for the "demands of individual cultural groups for language retention and cultural development." Here we can only concern ourselves with the three that affect ethnic studies and material preservation--the ethnic histories program, the creation of a Canadian Ethnic Studies advisory body to the government, and the attempt through the programs of the Federal Cultural Agencies to "multiculturalize" such bodies as the National Library, the PAC and the National Museum of Man. The implementation paper stated that "a clear need exists for the writing of objective, analytical, and readable histories of the ethnic groups in Canada." and proposed the 20 volume **Generations** series. Program IV called for the development of a federal ethnic studies program, a Centre or a series of centres. It was pointed out that the National Library had long been multicultural in quality since the law mandated that a copy of any item printed in Canada should be deposited with the Library. Monies were set aside for the PAC which had "relatively few holdings relating to Canada's various cultural groups or their activities." "The Public Archives will be given funds to acquire the **records and papers of all the various ethnic organizations and associations which are significant documents of Canadian history.**[19] From that last proposal emerged both the National Ethnic Archives program of the PAC and most of the confusion about just how inclusive the collecting mandate was to be.

Not surprisingly then, the federal government had made a choice about implementation in favour of centralization and of "Multiculturalizing" existent institutions rather than creating parallel ones. Where new institutions were to exist, they would be called programs, nestled in the bosom of government or existing organizations. It would simply be a question of whether the new programs could sensitize the old anglocentric sinners before the latter could neutralize, corrupt, drain, and bureaucratize the enthusiasms of the new policy. Given the powers of inertia and of apparatchiks in government and in cultural agencies, this was a natural enough approach. Morever, it gained legitimacy by seeming to promise the "mainstreaming" of the other groups, their history, and their recods. Parallel institutions for the non-British, non-French of the kind represented by the power of the Bibliotheque Na-

tionale and the Archives Nationales in Quebec was beyond the imagination. Moreover, much funding was at stake and men who had never thought about any ethnic group other than those from the British Isles and perhaps Germany learned quickly about others when there were grants and competing institutions involved.

A number of now obscure skirmishes between cultural bureaucrats and academics, between political pork-barreling and an honest cultural effort, between creating new institutions or forcing forms of civic pluralism on the existing cultural agencies took place between 1970 and 1973.[20] Until some of the many participants in those negotiations write frankly, we will not know the full story of how multiculturalism was moved from Book IV and an ethos of cultural volition to a Liberal government policy and specific funded programs for the study and preservation of the historical records of Canada's many peoples. For example, did the decision to fund various ethnocultural research and writing projects come in a context which freed the Canada Council, the nation's mainstream grantor for culture and scholarship, to concentrate its funds on the British and the French? Was the new Canadian Ethnic Studies Advisory Commitee (CESAC), created to advise the Multiculturalism Directorate and composed of a small group of academics "as broadly representative as possible in terms of discipline, ethnocultural background and geography," a sop for those who had agitated either for a great National Institute for Canadian Ethnic studies proximate to the Archives and Library and able to shape their preservation work (the last a thought inimicable to both institutions) or for a number of regional ethnic research and records centres, either independent or associated with specific universities. At any rate, although the work of CESAC has been useful and has enhanced ethnic studies in Canada, it has not had the role of an independent national institute might have had.

Among the implementation plans tabled with the Prime Minister's speech in October of 1971 was this

> **Program III: Ethnic Histories** — A clear need exists for the writing of objective, analytical, and readable histories of the ethnic groups in Canada, and for the distribution of these works to as wide a readership as possible. The Citizenship Branch will commission 20 histories specifically directed to the background contributions and problems of various cultural groups in Canada. The program will offer visible, effective and valuable recognition of the contribution of our diverse ethnic groups to Canada. It will promote knowledge and respect for the

> cultural heritage of the groups concerned as well as providing invaluable resource material for students, writers, and government agencies.[23]

So the histories were to offer "recognition of the contribution" of each group. At the same time, they were to be "objective, analytical and readable." And of course that "respect for cultural heritage" for each group was intended as a celebration of our pluralism of origin, not as a prologue to a continuing separate ethnic identity in Canada outside of either the anglophone or francophone dominant culture. There were problems from the outset within the formula. For although reference to "contribution" seemed to be calling for something akin to the writing of government-sponsored filio-piety, the promise of objectivity and analysis conjured up a series which would be serious social and cultural history rather than simply a search for illustrious ancestorsand pioneers.

The Minister of State for Multiculturalism sends out a letter with complimentary copies of the new volumes of the **Generations** series--that is the name of the publishing project which grew out of Program III--. The letter describes the series as producing "a greater awareness of the pluralistic aspect of Canadian society and the contributions made by the various ethnocultural groups to the building of that society." The general introduction to each of the nine volumes which have appeared so far repeats the phrase of the original mandate that the volumes are intended to be "objective, analytical, and readable."[24] It adds that they are "directed towards the general reading public, as well as students at the senior high school level and the college and university levels, and teachers in the elementary school." It is a tall order. In effect, the Multiculturalism Directorate is attempting through the series, if it attempting anything beyond the currying of political favour with the ethnic groups, to create a historical literature which can honestly and adequately inform people in general about our pluralism of origin, satisfy the **amour propre** of every group which requires a Canadian pedigree in order to feel comfortable within the mosaic, and finally to inspire further study by scholars and be taken seriously as the basis of a historiography in the new **genre** of Canadian ethnic and immigration history.

> The roles of the French and British communities have dominated the written histories of Canada. Contributions by Canadians of other cultural origins have received little attention. As a result most history books present an incomplete record of Canada's past.

These words in a handout of the government called **Multicultural Update** (October, 1978) seem to promise or threaten instant redress and a reworking of the textbooks. No doubt for those uneasy with the concept of "contribution" and unhappy with the apparent attempt to push aside the charter groups to make room for others, such assertions by a branch of the federal government are similar to the efforts of the Chicago School Board in the 1920s, made under the influence of German and Irish American politicians to create a new history of the American Revolution for schoolchildren which "must not be pro-British statistically or psychologically."
As one wag wrote

> Every people and race
> In Chicago will trace
> Its hand in the ousting of Britain
> We shall learn 'twas our town
> That pulled George the III down
> When the real revolution is written[25]

It is within such an atmosphere which posits the view that the record of the past is infinitely malleable and there to serve the cause of the civic good or the therapeutic needs of those depressed by their status in the land that the **Generations** series, but even more the other publications supported by the Multicultural Directorate wither or thrive. Of course, true to our national traditions, no one wants to lynch George III, only to share his role in the making of Canada, or the long drawnout unmaking of British North America. Despite excellent academic editors, a degree of freedom which at least insulates the series from too much need for vetting by politicos and ethnic group spokesmen, the **Generations** series cannot escape its ordained role. The government has seen the series since the late 1960s as a linchpin of the effort to justify and make popular a federal multicultural policy. It is a very heavy civic burden to place on twenty books and their authors. Especially since, as every child of immigrants knows, it is not enough to do as well as the old stock, one must do better to stay even. The series would have to represent the state of the art of history writing in Canada to have the desired impact. The anglocentric and filiopietist biographies about Canada's great men of the founding races which flow from all our universities are naturally enough safe from the kind of harsh intellectual scrutiny reserved for books which take a new direction, accompanied by much tax payer's money and much political hoopla.

Generations seems to have stumbled into the mistakes made by an earlier American experiment on which it may well have been modelled, Louis Adamic's great dream of a multi-volume series to be called variously the **Nation of Nations** series or **From Plymouth Rock to Ellis Island** project. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Adamic envisaged such a series with a volume dedicated to each of the people's who made America.[26] When he began his work, Adamic understood that for many groups "the vital American background is not the glorified Mayflower but the as of yet unglorified immigrant steerage;" the editors of the **Generations** series realized that, for some of the displaced peoples and new immigrants who came to Canada since the 1950s, attempts to describe their history in Canada before the Second World War had little point. As a result, some of the better volumes in the series approach the group's place in Canada more sociologically than historically. In other cases, good historians have known better than involve themselves with doubtful heritage-mongering. It has not unfortunately been the case with all the publications, though none of them reach the levels of official filio-pietism of the government's **Canadian Family Tree** volume.

Over time, Adamic came to believe that the old stock in the United States reinforced its elite social status by "resting on its sense of priority in the land." Though the United States had no legal or cultural formula as repugnant to egalitarian pluralism as the concept of the "founding races" or "charter groups" as in Canada, he believed that most immigrants and their children felt themselves to be, in the words of H. L. Mencken, "assistant Americans," suffering from a form of **atimia**, or ethnic self-disesteem. This thought led him to believe that one of the purposes of writing ethnic history was to demonstrate to the old stock elite and to the ethnic young the longevity and glorious role of each people in the nation's past. Apparently this had to be done, so that the former would feel obliged to move over and make room for the other peoples longer in the land than they had assumed, and the latter would acquire personal dignity and a new surefootedness in society from realizing that they were not alien or the children of aliens. Thus history writing becomes at once therapy and civics. When it is funded by the government, it may seem also to be suggesting that one's place in the new pluralist society somehow depends on proving by some sort of inverted nativist standard the right to that place through discovering longevity in the land.

This idea carried to its extreme destroyed much of the value of Adamic's project by leading to something best described as "mayflowerism," the search to prove priority of presence in the land as if that affected status in the present. In Canada, it might best be described as "explorerism." This phenomenon and accompanying exaggerations and

myths about numbers of settlers and contribution undercut the emergence of ethnic and immigration history as a serious **genre** or subdiscipline. Charles Francis Adams warned his fellow Yankee Palfrey that "in the treatment of doubtful historical points there are fewer things which need to be more carefully guarded against than patriotism or filial piety." The editors of the **Generations** seem to have struggled mightily to avoid the excesses of "patriotism or filio-piety." but they have had little help. It is natural enough that the authors, concerned about their reception in the ethnocommunities they study, and the cultural bureaucrats of the Multicultural Directorate, for whom the ethnic groups are clientele and history a tool of public policy, appease the heritage-mongering and filiopietism of some communities rather than thwart them. For these reasons "explorerism" and its negative impact on the development of the field--does rear its head a bit in the series.

In the 1930s, Italian and French Canadians skirmished in the streets of Montreal over the question of whether Cartier or Cabot discovered Canada. (A recent effort of a Senator of Italian descent to change toponyms throughout the country, honouring that explorer, from Cabot to Caboto, produced a spate of hate mail.) The Portuguese volume in the **Generations** series takes no sides in that issue but points out that, if Cabot did discover Canada, he was most likely acting on geographical information provided by the Portuguese Joao Fernandes who had already been to Labrador. Such Johnny-come-latelys may fight it out aimlessly in the pages of the Series, for the Norwegian volume asserts that Paul Knutson and eight Goths and 22 Norsemen navigated Lake Winnipeg in the 1350s. That happened only two and a half centuries after two Scots, according to the Scottish volume, joined the crew of Thorfinn Karlsevni's expedition to Nova Scotia. Compared to such antiquity in the land, the Greek volume's reminder that Juan de Fuca who explored Puget Sound in the 16th century was really a Greek seaman named Yannis Phokas, has the ring of modernity and authenticity.[27] And then there are the DeMeuron and Watteville regiments, two units of disbanded mercenaries and British prisoners of war from the Napoleonic period which seem able to disgorge into our history and endless stream of early German, Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, and other adams who multiply like loaves and fishes as our history is rewritten. Such nonsense is not good for the field; it is difficult to believe that it has value for the ethnic group or Canada either.

To the problem of approach which follows from the **Generations** volumes being defined in terms of the chronology of Canadian history and by the anxiety of the ethnic groups to have their careers in the land coincide with or intersect the great events and eras of the nation, we

must add the problems born of the assumption that Canada--the whole territory--is the space within which each of these ethnic histories takes place. That assumption does not hold true for many immigrant and ethnic groups in either geographical or cognitive terms. And the series' attempt to provide "national" coverage of each ethnic group induces a more subtle, but equally unfortunate skewing than that of "explorerism."

It would have been too much to ask federal politicians and bureaucrats to comprehend the essentially local, or old country and diaspora-wide, nature of the cognitive maps held by immigrants and ethnics. Even if the federal government could have shown the subtlety to commission volumes on specific bloc settlements or urban ethnic enclaves, such study, which would have been far more in keeping with the modes of North American historical scholarship today, could not have had the political impact or the same value for advocacy of the policy of multiculturalism that the **Generations** volumes do. "The people don't want to read monographs about the 'Deviation among Zaporozhian Cossacks in Oshawa Ontario'," one bureaucrat commented dismissing the idea of a monograph series. Instead the authors of the **Generations** volumes must do their best to fill the national space, to find a Chinese presence in the Maritimes, or an Italian one on the Saskatchewan pairies. The editors of the series and their academic editorial board do not advocate this madness but somehow the urge to please the ethnic group leadership, cultural bureaucrats and politicians--indeed to satisfy the "nation making" purpose of the entire multicultural policy--insinuates itself and contributes to the underdeveloping of the field.

There is a risk that in all of this the immigrant group's own psychic space and cognitive maps, its evolving sense of identity are violated by the very series that purports to rescue them from historical obscurity. The framework of the series presumes them to be Canadians in the making, and their other loyalties and identities are underestimated. Their understanding of where they are or were, their sense of sojourning or settling, their sense of being part of a North American diaspora of their people, of being unique in their own local enclave is lost. It is assumed that the ethnic group sees itself within the national frame, has a national cohering tendency that is not in contradiction with but rather part of acculturing to Canada, that national spokesmen are indeed representative of the group. This may be so, but until studies free of the national frame are undertaken such a view of the ethnic group is a learned form of civics not based on historical scholarship. The **Generations** series itself then is not just government-sponsored learning but a major instrument in the building of a Canadian identity within each ethnic group. An Italian in Niagra Falls Ontario will be made to realize through the pages of the new multicultural Canadian history books that

he shares little history with his cousin in Niagra Falls New York, that he adheres rather to the separate history-regardless of the reality of networks and shared Italian North American culture--of Italian Canadians. Thus the multicultural policy and its efforts to encourage history writing within a national frame contributes to the post colonial nation-making, creates parallelism of origin and destiny between the ethnic in Canada and the founding races, and for Ontario, at any rate, makes certain that the immigrant will think like a Canadian vis-a-vis the threat of continentalism and encroaching American culture. Only time will show whether the remaining volumes in the **Generations** series are able to contribute as much to the historiography of ethnic and immigration studies as they do the justification and purposes of the national policy.

The most significant publication program indirectly enhancing the policy has been the development of the journal "Canadian Ethnic Studies," the publication of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association.[28] That journal, based in Calgary, grew out of an earlier publication called "Slavs in Canada," and, under able editors, it has steadily upgraded its own issues and discourse in the field generally. It has tried to maintain a balance between history, sociology, political science and anthropology, between a western Canadian, often rural focus, and the inter-ethnic concerns of the more urban parts of Central Canada. No equivalent journal, no such responsible focus for all aspects of the field, has emerged in the United States. To the extent that it is a product of the federal policy, or at least has benifited from it, CESA and its journal CES prove that political funding of scholarly programs in the field does not always lead to underdeveloping.

At the very time when multiculturalism as a policy has been included in the Canadian constitution, the definition of the policy, or at least the priorities of the state machinery which administer the policy, seems to be changing, and changing in a direction which many Euro-ethnic group leaders find threatening. The fears expressed earlier by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee that multiculturalism as a form of integration into Canadian life was not necessarily compatible with the maintenance of healthy separate ethnocultural institutions, combined with the warning from some observers that Canadian ethnic groups had come too much to depend on government grants rather than intra-group commitment and intensity to maintain their ethnoculture now seem less Cassandra-like and ungrateful. For those educators, "caretakers," and Anglo-Canadians who had always viewed the policy, not as the invitation to any group to persist in its otherness, but as a humane--apparently opposed to the inhumane American melting pot experience--means of weaning immigrants, and especially their children, from their dependence on old world culture, the new direction of the policy makes

sense. It emphasizes the need to fight discrimination, suggests the limits of cultural retention, and suggests a government agenda in which the primary urge is to ease the settlement of newcomers. If a policy aimed at supporting the folkloric national life and associational structure of the white European ethnics, especially the displaced peoples, provided an effective means to ease settlement of the mass migration of the 1950s and 1960s, a different strategy seems appropriate for dealing with the integration of the "new immigration" composed in large part of Asians and West Indians.

Many of these newcomers speak English and are, upon arrival in this country, less concerned with maintaining their cultural identity and more with overcoming those tendencies based on prejudice and discrimination in Canada which force them constantly to feel their otherness. Integration, equality, and recognition as Canadians matter to them more than the right to ethnocultural persistence, or government funds to back up that right. There are certainly grounds upon which the older Euro-ethnic groups and the new immigrants could come together to share and shape Canada's multicultural policy. All immigrants have to one degree or another been "visible" and encountered bigotry. Moreover, Bengalis and Jamaicans are as much carriers of culture in process as Italians, Finns, and Ukrainians were as immigrants before them, and the "new immigrants" short change themselves if they do not use the policy to nurture their ethnoculture rather than just as a tool for policing racism in the host society.

Although it does not seem likely that there are forces which actually try to pit the two clienteles of the Multiculturalism Directorate, so called white ethnic groups and visible minorities, against one another, it is true that the emphasis on solving the immediate problems of the latter, obviously a civic priority for all Canadians of goodwill, does coincide more closely with the thought of those in multicultural education and administration who always saw the policy as a tool of integration. For educators especially, the themes of immigrant contribution, the colourful variety of our peoples--trivialized in festivals and "pizza and pysanky days"--were always seen as themes of integration into a new Canada, one that was diverse in origin but united in spirit, one in which heritage language retention was possible, but progress lay in the quality of English and French learned.

Multiculturalism then is not to rise or fall, according to the will and power of Canada's ethnic groups, but rather it will be defined, and its ebb and flow as taught ethos will be controled by those who man the financial, political, and educational levers of the country. It is not clear what role ethnic politics or successful ethnic Canadian politicians will have in the process over the next generation. There are clear indi-

cators though that some of the cost of overdependence on the goodwill and funds of the government now must be paid as the goals of the policy change. And while these goals seem eminently proper in terms of national integration and civic justice, the role government and educators except of ethnocultural organizations in carrying out the new directions suggests the degree to which natural post-immigration polyethnicity in Canada has been tamed by multiculturalism. For example, the Report of the Nottawasaga Thinkers' Conference of 1983, funded by the Multiculturalism Directorate, entitled "Mainstreaming Multiculturalism in Canada: Challenges and Opportunities" had as one of its proposals the following caution which seemed to confirm the Ukrainian Canadian fear that multicultural policy would gladly go its way without an underpinning of separate ethnocultures.

> "Such ethno-cultural organizations as Ukrainian, German and Italian Clubs and Native Friendship centres must accept the responsibility of facilitate multicultural understanding among their memberships. All too often such organizations plan extensively for the enrichment and enhancement of their own images and unique purpose without appropriate or adequate acknowledgment of all other groups who share equally valuable and unique Canadian identities."[29]

By some process of the inequality of power between immigrants and the guardians of the host society, multiculturalism may very well become an instrument for Canadianization rather than a defence of cultural diversity.

NOTES

1. John W. Berry, Rudolph Kalin, Donald Taylor, **Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada** (Ministry of State for Multiculturalism, 1977), p. 143.
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23. **Multiculturalism and the Government of Canada,** pp. 52-53. The government, through the Centennial Commission, had been involved in an earlier ethnic history series for the nation's 1967 Centennial. That series was called **Canadian Ethnica** and was published under the auspices of the Centennial Commission and Canadian Ethnic Press Association.
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25. Edward R. Lewis, **America. Nation of Confusion: A Study of Our Immigration Problems** (New York, 1928), pp. 342-45.
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27. This is not the place to review each volume in the series. Nine out of the twenty have appeared. They are of varying quality and value. It is the nature of the auspices and political and therapeutic purposes of the series which occasionally defeats thexcellent editors and many serious authors. Symptomatically, the history of the larger groups-Italians, Jews, Irish, Germans, Dutch-have not yet appeared. Volumes on the Scots and the Ukrainians have been published, but as collections of essays not as finished narratives or syntheses.
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Olli Kultalahti

MIGRATION AND PERIODS OF RAPID INDUSTRIAL DEVELOP– MENT IN FINLAND

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There have been at least three important phases in the industrial development of Finland. The first was a period of awakening industrialization from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War. Industrialization commenced after the mid-1800s, but development was still slow up to the first decades of this century. The second phase might be called a leap into the industrial world, and this period covers about thirty years after the Second World War. The industrial structure of our country changed during those thirty years as much as during a hundred years in Norway and seventy years in Sweden. One reason for this extremely rapid industrialization was the payment of war reparations, which was possible only with the expansion of existing industries and the creation of new fields and products. The third phase started in the 70s entailing transformation of a mainly industrial and service society into an information society. Today the new technol-

ogy with its all microprocessors is coming into every sphere of life and the most marked change is still to come.

All these periods can be clearly discerned in the course of time and development. Figures 1-5 indicate changes of industries since the nineteenth century and Tables 1-3 describe migration streams. After the slow industrial development up to the 1940s both the manufactural and service industries increased very strongly. The year 1960 is a kind of turning-point, the proportion of manufactural and service industries then reaching that of the primary industry. Each of these sectors accounted for a third of the country's total labour force. The curves also indicate an interesting feature, namely that manufacturing industry never exceeded the two other curves. This means that in a sense Finland skipped directly from an agricultural society over the manufactural phase into the service. Most clearly this can be seen in the less developed parts of the country, i.e. in northern and eastern Finland an Ahvenanmaa, and not at all in southern Finland. Of course, this is partly only a manner of speaking, because in fact the manufactural industry was of greatest importance for the development of the society.

In the 1960s the courses of the curves diverged. The proportion of the service industries continued growing, reaching almost sixty per cent in 1983. Around the year 1970 this increase was due to the powerful growth of the public sector, but the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 80s can be associated rather with the rapid development of new technology. In other words we stepped into a phase of the information society.

Each period is characterized by some particular features of migration streams. Tables 1-5 indicate that already in the nineteenth century urban communities gained many more migrants than they lost. The process went on in the twentieth century. The 60s was a period of strong migration, as was also the beginning of the 70s. This period has been nicknamed the mad years of migration in Finland. It can also be seen as the closing period of the leap into a real industrial society. In the mid-seventies the situation changed. The urban communities were on the average no longer the winners; the rural communities gained more movers than they lost (for regional variations see Table 2). The phenomenon is universal, sometimes called a counter-urbanization process indicating an increasing attraction to areas outside big centres. It should perhaps be mentioned that sparsely populated areas are still losers, though not as badly as earlier. The following figures describe the continuation of the concentration process: the proportion of people living in conurbations was 55.9 per cent in 1960, 64.1 per cent ten years later and 72.1 per cent in 1980.

In the following the three periods will be studied in greater detail.

Figure 1.



Figure 2.



Figure 3. Economically Active Population in mid–Finland by Industry 1890–1983 Provinces of Vaasa, Keski–Suomi, Kuopio and Mikkeli



Figure 4.

Economically Active Population in Northern and Eastern Finland by Industry 1890–1983 Provinces of Lapland, Oulu and Pohjois–Karjala



Figure 5. Economically Active Population in Province of Ahvenanmaa by Industry, 1920–1983



Table 1. Internal migration in Finland 1881-1980 (annual average per 1000)[1]

Years	Migration to community		Migration from community		Net migration	
	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
1881-90	52	16	31	19	+21	-2
1891-00	57	20	35	22	+22	-2
1901-10	57	20	37	23	+19	-3
1911-20	47	22	35	24	+11	-2
1921-30	42	20	26	23	+15	-3
1931-40	64	35	47	39	+17	-4
1941-50	53	41	42	44	+10	-3
1951-60	51	34	38	41	+13	-7
1961-70	60	39	49	49	+11	-9
1971-75	58	40	51	48	+6	-7
1976-80	41	38	42	37	-1	+1

[1]The figures do not include movements from the areas ceded to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Since 1951 small country towns are included in urban communes; previously they belonged in statistical terms to the rural communes. The figures for the 30s are so high because they partly reflect the tightening of penalties if movements were not promtly registered by the migrant; thus some who had moved in the 20s registered themselves in the 30s.

Table 2. Internal net migration in Finland 1955 - 1980 by province

	Uusimaa		Turku-Pori		Ahvenanmaa		Häme		Kymi		Mikkeli	
	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
1955-60	+15	+19	+13	-10	+40	-7	+14	-8	+12	-11	+11	-16
1961-65	+18	+16	+13	-11	+24	-10	+8	-9	+8	-9	+18	-20
1966-70	+11	+22	+11	-9	+23	+13	+10	-4	+5	-3	+9	-20
1971-75	+9	+17	+9	-5	+16	+4	+9	-1	+5	-10	+8	-19
1976-80	+2	+10	-2	+1	+4	+10	-2	+2	-4	+1	+3	-2

	North Karelia		Kuopio		Central Finland		Vaasa		Oulu		Lapland	
	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
1955-60	+11	-21	+9	-16	+22	-8	+12	-10	+18	-11	+14	-3
1961-65	+13	-25	+15	-21	+20	-15	+16	-12	+24	-15	+12	-9
1966-70	+12	-25	+6	-20	+10	-13	+7	-9	+8	-16	+3	-5
1971-75	+10	-27	+7	-21	+4	-12	+3	-10	+3	-15	+3	-16
1976-80	-1	-5	+2	-2	-4	-3	+2	+2	-3	-1	0	-3

Table 3. Emigration from Finland to North America 1880-1981
(Source: Institute of Migration 1984)

1880-1899	83 048	emigrants
1900-1919	231 007	"
1920-1939	64 373	"
1940-1959	21 358	"
1960-1981	9 413	"

The nineteenth century brought process which started an accelerating migration in Finland. The natural growth of the landless worker population was rapid already in the early 1800s. This is partly due to legislation and a general custom to leave the form to only one heir. In the middle of the century awakening industrialization involved changes causing increasing pressure towards a greater regional mobility. First, laws were passed lifting bans on migration, occupational mobility and industrial activity. Second, the existing system protecting the landless population without permanent employment was abolished. Up till then anybody without permanent work had to be under protection of an economically independent person. In other words the dependant was obliged to work for somebody in order to earn his living. The system guaranteed a necessary but low level of living conditions and at the same time tied the person in question to a certain place. Now everybody was free to move, but the incibient industrialization brought with it obstacles for the landless population to make a living in the countryside. Industrialization increased the demand for wood, resulting in higher prices of this rawmaterial. As a consequence landowners were not willing to let cottages with a right to use timber to the landless population. At the same time wages were gradually going up, while on the other hand the number of machines increased, decreasing the demand for workers on the farms. Manufactured products were also worsening the earning possibilities of craftsmen.

As a result of these and other processes the amount of the so-called relative overpopulation - defined as a population without land or permanent work - started to move from the countryside to towns and cities and abroad, this especially in the late 1800s. The two biggest southern cities, Viipuri and Helsinki, gained movers mainly from eastern parts of Finland, while the emigration streams to North America came mainly from werstern and northern parts of the country.

Rural areas lost 400 000 of their population in the period 1881 - 1939 - only the rural areas of the province of Viipuri gained more migrants than they lost. The real losers were the rural areas of the provinces of Kuopio, Turku-Pori (including Ahvenanmaa), Vaasa, Häme and Kymi (in this order). At the same time (1894-1930) about 250 000 emigrants left the provinces of Vaasa, Turku-Pori and Oulu (incl. Lapland) mainly for the United States - most of them from rural areas. Altogether during this period the number of emigrants was more than 320 000, only 43 000 returning to Finland (Virtanen 1979, 66). The provinces of Vaasa and Turku-Pori, i.e. the provinces on

the western coast, lost population more than the other areas in Finland both as internal outmigration and emigration. For example in some communities of the province of Vaasa the annual percentage of emigrants was even more than 1.5 percent out of the whole population (Kero 1974).

An interesting question is why so many people emigrated to North America and especially from the western coast, the province of Vaasa, and northern Finland. A good explanation is given by Anna-Leena Toivonen (1963) concerning the emigration from southern Ostrobothnia (Etelä-Pohjanmaa). In the late 1800s the chanelling of water routes and construction of the railway network transferred the main economic activity from west to south, from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Gulf of Finland. The river valleys of Bothnia, which used to be in an excellent economic position during the old period of agriculture and manufacture, were left outside the main economic development and had to watch from the periphery the establishment of new industrial centres and the increasing prosperity of those inland who were able to use their timber. In Ostrobothnia tar production had reduced the forests and with them opportunities to take advantage of the expanding timberindustry. Tar production, shipbuilding and shipping had rendered the people of Ostrobothnia vital, ready for initiative and cooperation. When they now heard of the country in the West with all its opportunities to make money, they were, under these frustrating circumstances, more than ready to go. This element of frustation is especially emphasized by Ylikangas (1981, 225-237), who points out that because of tar production and the shipping industry a strong enterprising spirit was already created in the area before the period of industrialization. The level of prosperity was also above the average of the country. In these circumstances the collapse of economic opportunity did indeed bring intense frustration, and it was this, together with the traditional readiness to act if needed, which made so many move far away over the sea.

Leap into a real industrial society

The reparations payable after the Second World War set industrial activity moving very quickly. Expansion of existing industries was needed, as well as the creation of new fields and products. The change in industrial structure was already indicated in Figures 1-5. However, not only the industrial structure underwent marked changes; also the whole society developed rapidly, emerging as a service society in

the 60s (see Figures 1-5). This development involved a kind of innovation wave resulting in many important renewals such as the reform of the school system, university degree courses, housing programs, the health care system, regional planning and policy.

Along with these innovative reforms other material changes were under way. Mass communication became more effective - for example TV sets were spread all over the country, the transportation network developed rapidly, general prosperity increased etc.

Both innovative and material aspects of development were concentrated in urban centres. A surfaced road network leading to these centres was in fact constructed in a very short period. The rural areas of the country were now faced with the threat of attraction to industrial and urban society. In these circumstances they were not able to compete with the urban areas in supplying jobs, education and other means of promoting economic and social living conditions. A mass movement from the countryside, especially from sparsely populated parts, to urban centres commenced. In some communities even more than half of people living outside the densely populated areas moved away. For example in the municipality of Rautavaara in eastern Finland the number of such people decreased from 4673 in 1960 to 2248 in 1980. It is also significant that while the total population of this municipality declined by two thousand (from 5457 to 3481) in these twenty years, the agglomeration increased its population by four hundred people, in other words by fifty per cent.

Suprisingly enough the migration streams led not only to urban centres in Finland but also abroad, mainly to Sweden. Altogether since the Second World War about 600 000 persons have emigrated, some half of them returned. About eighty per cent of these emigrants moved to Sweden, respectively seventy per cent of those who came back were from Sweden. Three phases can be seen in this emigration after the Second World War: 1) emigration increased steadily with only little return (till the year 1951), 2) emigration varied according to economic fluctuations in the 1950s, accelerating in the 60s, and the number of those returning was steady, and 3) the level of emigration evened out in the 70s, and at the beginning of the decade the number of those coming back exceeded the number of emigrants (Majava 1979). The peak of emigration was 1969 - 1970, about 80 000 Finns migrating to Sweden and only some 17 000 returning. How bad the situation really was is well described by the following figures: during these two years six per cent of the population in the province of Lapland emigrated to Sweden, four per cent from the other northern province, that of Oulu, and two per cent of the whole population in Finland. However, better years were to come in the early 70s, when

the number of returnees exceeded that of emigrants. The situation soon changed, but again at the beginning of the 80s there were more returning than leaving the country. Figures 6 and 7 indicate that the peak of emigration fell on the year 1970, that of internal migration respectively on 1974.

Figure 6.



Figure 7. Migration between Finland and Sweden 1946 - 1982 (according to Swedish statistics, source: Korkiasaari 1983)

In the mid-seventies the proportion of tertiary industries involved over fifty per cent of the economically active population in the country. That of secondary industries started to decline and primary industries reached their minimum level, somewhat above ten per cent. We came to the stage of an information society with rapid growth of sectors concerned in one way or another with producing and mediating information. Knowhow became a keyword, meaning an ability to make use of the new technology. From the point of view of migration the crucial question was - and still is - how the new technology affects the distribution of jobs between different regions.

There are some perspectives as to future prospects (VNK 1983). The growth of production has been predicted to slow down somewhat in all sectors in the 80s. The same tendency seems to apply to productivity, but the use of new technology, as well as increasing investments in machines and other technical facilities, will have the opposite effect. The increased productivity and decreased demand for labour caused by these technological changes are expected to manifest themselves more markedly in the 90s. It is also estimated that the new technology will remove about 100 000 jobs in manufacturing in the 80s but at the same time create at least 70 000 new jobs. A balance between this demand for and supply of labour can be reached only by training and education and/or by migration.

Though the number of jobs in developing areas have increased in recent years, the unemployment rate has gone up due to the increased supply of young labour. The situation will be further worsened by the fact that labour-intensive industries will not move as much as earlier to developing areas. This is likely to add to the pressure towards outmigration. Other trends seem to be working in the same direction. Among the most important of these are perhaps development trends in the service industries and in working time. As we saw in Figures 1-5, service industries grew quickly in developing areas (northern, eastern and central parts of Finland). However, the 'traditional' service industries are not expected to continue their growth at the same rate. The most rapid growth is anticipated in more modern industries such as information communication, financing and insurance activity and in sectors serving commercial activity, especially Automatic Data Processing. These industries tend to concentrate in urban centres.

The shortening of working time is one possible means of alleviating unemployment. However, its regional influences depend on the nature and diversity of the industrial structure. The eventual increase

in employment would fall mainly in the manufacturing and service industries, especially the public sector (VNK 1983). The supplementation of shorter working time by increasing productivity could be most effectively achieved in industrialized areas. From the regional point of view the demand for labour would grow most in urban centres and in the agglomerations of municipalities, as well as in the province of Uusimaa (southern Finland) and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. In these areas the labour available would not be able to meet a greater demand. A solution would be a more intensive migration to these areas.

The new technology makes it possible to process and transfer information quite independently of the location of jobs, and offices can be decentralized into smaller unities connected with each other by information transfer linkages. In principle a regional deconcentration of jobs should be possible. The level of education and the ability to accept innovations are fairly high in the developing areas of the country, even from an international point of view. The proportion of young labour is relatively high, transportation and communication linkages are good throughout the country, as is the technical and social infrastructure. In the developing areas there are many small and medium size enterprises which are flexible in adopting new means of production and new products. On the negative side, however, there are also many difficulties such as poor resources for education and retraining, a certain inflexibility of the education system, retraining problems in the case of older members of the labour force, organizational difficulties to make the most of the new technology, outdated technical facilities of enterprises, insufficient research work, poor financial opportunities (especially scarce risky money) and so on.

All these and many other things bring questions of future migration down to the following points:

1) will migration streams go on at the same low level as they have done in recent years,
2) will migration to urban centres and the southern parts of the country accelerate again as a consequence of development and use of the new technology, and
3) will migration accelerate in the future but mainly in the form of increased occupational and regional mobility of more educated workers and professionals, not only to centres and the south but also in reciprocal circles. This alternative could be seen among other things in the growing number of return migrants and re-migrants in general.

There follow some empirical results concerning migration in Finland in 1981 (For internal migration 1977-78 see e.g. Söderling

1983). The empirical data comprise in that year intermunicipal migrants (193 847) immigration (15 768) and emigration (10 041). The data were collected by the Central Statistical Office of Finland. There are also data on the same persons as to their migrating or not migrating in the following year. On this basis it is possible to study return migrants and other re-migrants during these two years. The years 1981 and 1982 can be regarded as an example period of the initial phase in the transfer to the era of information technology.

In absolute terms the main migration streams are between urban centres, but if compared with the proportions of the total population living in rural and urban areas the trend is not so obvious (see Table 4). Most clearly this can be seen in urban-rural streams, which are stronger than those in the opposite direction. Emigration to the Nordic countries was greatest from urban centres.

The figures indicating the proportions of 1982 return migrants out of 1981 migrants are of most interest (Table 4). As to internal

Table 4. Internal migration 1981, emigration and immigration 1981 and proportion of 1982 return migrants and other re-migrants[1]

Migration 1981	1981 migrants		of whom 1982	
		(%)	return migrants (%)	other re-migrants (%)
rural - rural	(26 350)	12.0	4.0	9.2
rural - urban	(48 098)	21.9	4.3	7.4
rural - Nordic countries	(2 406)	1.1	14.0	6.0
rural - other countries	(434)	0.2	2.6	6.3
urban - rural	(49 334)	22.4	4.6	6.6
urban - urban	(70 065)	31.9	4.8	7.2
urban - Nordic countries	(5 046)	2.3	15.6	4.7
urban - other countries	(2 158)	1.0	7.1	3.8
foreign countries - rural	(6 107)	2.8	7.4	10.5
foreign countries - urban	(9 661)	4.4	9.7	10.7
total	(219 656)	100.0	5.3	7.5
			(11 689)	(16 573)

[1]Return migrants are defined as those who returned in 1982 to the commune of origin 1981. Other re-migrants are those who re-migrated somewhere else in 1982.

migration, urban migrants were most likely to return to their commune of origin in 1982, the precentages being 4.8 (urban - urban) and 4.6 (urban - rural). However, the differences between all internal figures are not so great. In emigration, on the other hand, the situation is different.About fifteen per cent of theemigrants to the Nordic countries (mainly to Sweden) came back during the next year. This percentage is higher than that of internal migrants. On the average one out of twenty out-migrants (internal migrants, immigrants and emigrants) returned to their former home commune or country after a short stay.

Table 4 affords an opportunity to construct the migration patterns of returnees. In relative terms the hierarchy of popularity is as follows:

Internal return migration patterns:

	origin 1981		Commune of arrival 1981		return 1982	
1.	'urban	-	rural	-	urban'	(Returnees 4.8 per cent of the migrants in this group)
2.	'rural	-	urban	-	rural'	(4.6 per cent)
3.	'rural	-	urban	-	rural'	(4.3 per cent)
4.	'rural	-	rural	-	rural'	(4.0 per cent)

More marked differences are however seen in the international migration chains:

	Commune of origin 1981		Country of of arrival 1981		Commune of return 1982	
1.	'rural	-	Nordic countries	-	rural'	(Returnees 14.0 per cent of the emigrants in this group)
2.	'rural	-	other countries	-	rural'	(2.6 per cent)
3.	'urban	-	Nordic countries	-	urban'	(15.6 per cent)
4.	'urban	-	other countries	-	urban'	(7.1 per cent)

These two lists indicate that emigration in 1981 was much more a matter of 'visiting' than was internal migration. The figures are very similar to those describing return migrants from Sweden (e.g. Heikkinen 1974; Korkiasaari 1983). According to Heikkinen 23 per cent of returnees had stayed less than a year in Sweden in 1980, the corresponding percentage in 1981 being 17.

As to internal migration Table 4 indicates that in terms of total re-migration rural migrants were as active as urban. Although they

did not come to their former home commune as often, they did migrate further in 1982, especially those moving between rural communes. The average re-migration percentage was about thirteen.

Table 5. Average commune percentage of 1982 return migrants (internal and international) by province and type of commune

Province	Type of commune		
	urban	rural	total
Uusimaa	4.1	4.5	4.4
Turku-Pori	4.4	4.4	4.4
Ahvenanmaa	6.2	5.0	5.0
Häme	5.1	3.9	4.2
Kymi	4.9	3.5	3.9
Mikkeli	4.4	3.1	3.3
North Karelia	5.6	5.2	5.3
Kuopio	4.2	4.9	4.8
Central Finland	3.9	5.3	5.1
Vaasa	5.3	5.7	5.6
Oulu	6.1	5.3	5.4
Lapland	7.2	7.1	7.2
Total	4.9	4.8	4.8

All return migration (internal and international) was most lively to the provinces of Lapland (7.2 per cent of out-migrants as a commune average), Vaasa (5.6), Oulu (5.4), North Karelia (5.3) and Ahvenanmaa (5.0) (Table 5). All the provinces are traditional areas of out-migration as also of emigration (excl. North Karelia). Both urban centres and rural areas have been attractive in these provinces. Map 1 shows the level of return migration by commune. The most attractive communes seem to be concentrated in certain areas, indicating some kind of larger fields of attraction.

Tables 6 and 7 reflect the duration of unemployment a year before migrating (1980) and the socioeconomic status of the migrant population. As a general feature particularly return migrants have suffered most from unemployment. In the migration chain 'rural - rural - rural -' the situation has been worst, as many as 17.5 per cent of all return migrants in the group being unemployed for at lest one month in 1980, five per cent even more than half a year. The unemployment rate among all migrants was about ten per cent, being higher than that among all re-migrants. It should be noticed that Tables 6 and 7 include also economically inactive migrants. If they were excluded

Map 1. Percentages of 1982 return migrants out of all 1981 migrants by commune



Table 6. Migrants' socioeconomic status and duration of unemployment by migration pattern

Migrants' socioeconomic status	Migration from rural commune: to rural in 1981	of whom: return migrants in 1982	of whom: other re-migrants in 1982	to urban in 1981	of whom: return migrants in 1982	of whom: other re-migrants in 1982
	(26 350)	(1043)	(2514)	(48 098)	(2083)	(3557)
Employers, farmer	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
" , other	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.5
Own-account workers, agriculture	1.7	1.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.8
" , other	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.0
Upper-level employees						
Senior officials and upper management	2.1	0.7	2.1	1.8	1.2	1.9
Senior officials and employees in research and planning	1.7	0.4	1.3	1.9	0.9	2.7
Senior officials and employees in education and training	3.1	3.0	5.1	2.3	1.3	3.1
Other	3.1	1.0	3.1	2.9	2.3	2.9
Lower-level employees						
Supervisers	4.6	1.8	4.1	3.6	2.2	3.2
Clerical and sales workers working independently	5.1	4.4	5.0	5.8	5.5	5.2
Clerical and sales workers in routine work	2.0	1.2	1.5	2.7	1.8	2.3
Other	6.3	6.6	5.4	5.2	4.5	5.5
Manual workers						
Workers in agriculture etc.	4.2	7.1	4.8	1.5	2.6	1.8
Manufacturing workers	14.4	17.5	13.9	12.8	15.9	10.5
Other industrial workers	4.6	6.3	4.4	4.8	6.2	4.4
Workers in delivery	4.6	6.4	4.4	4.8	6.3	4.4
and services	6.1	5.9	6.6	6.6	9.3	6.4
Pensioners	4.8	3.6	2.7	5.3	4.8	2.8
Students and pupils	11.2	19.0	18.1	17.2	22.8	25.3
Miscellaneous	22.3	16.9	18.3	22.4	15.7	19.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Duration of unemployment in 1980						
Not unemployed	90.1	82.1	86.3	89.5	85.6	86.8
Unemployed, 1-2 months	3.0	6.2	4.5	3.6	4.5	4.9
" , 3-4 "	2.5	3.3	3.4	2.6	3.7	3.0
" , 5-6 "	1.5	2.7	2.2	1.6	2.1	2.3
" , 7-12 "	2.6	5.2	3.3	2.4	3.9	2.8
Unknown	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 7. Migrants' socioeconomic status and duration of unemployment by migration pattern

Migrants' socioeconomic status	Migration from urban commune					
	to rural in 1981	of whom		to urban in 1981	of whom	
		return migrants in 1982	other re-migrants in 1982		return migrants in 1982	other re-migrants in 1982
	(49 334)	(2270)	(3275)	(70 065)	(3363)	(5059)
Employers, farmer	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
" , other	1.0	1.0	1.3	0.6	0.2	0.7
Own-account workers, agriculture	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
" , other	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.1
Upper-level employees						
Senior officials and upper management	2.3	1.1	2.0	4.3	2.9	2.5
Senior officials and employees in research and planning	2.6	1.4	1.5	4.5	2.2	3.6
Senior officials and employees in education and training	2.1	2.3	1.9	2.2	1.1	2.3
Other	3.1	2.1	3.7	5.3	4.2	5.0
Lower-level employees						
Supervisers	5.3	3.4	4.5	4.5	3.4	4.4
Clerical and sales workers working independently	7.6	7.6	7.0	8.9	9.3	8.8
Clerical and sales workers in routine work	3.0	2.7	2.2	4.1	4.0	3.3
Other	6.3	5.0	6.8	5.8	6.0	7.0
Manual workers						
Workers in agriculture etc.	1.0	1.0	1.6	0.3	0.9	0.5
Manufacturing workers	16.4	15.8	13.8	8.5	10.2	8.4
Other industrial workers	6.0	7.2	4.5	4.2	6.0	4.5
Workers in delivery and services	8.9	11.2	7.5	7.5	10.3	7.8
Pensioners	4.2	4.1	2.9	3.7	2.9	2.0
Students and pupils	7.7	13.3	14.2	12.3	16.8	18.8
Miscellaneous	20.6	18.6	23.1	22.2	18.5	19.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Duration of unemployment in 1980						
Not unemployed	92.6	87.5	87.8	92.8	87.9	90.3
Unemployed, 1-2 months	2.5	4.0	4.2	2.7	4.6	4.1
" , 3-4 "	1.7	2.7	3.0	1.3	2.8	2.3
" , 5-6 "	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.1	1.9	1.2
" , 7-12 "	1.8	3.6	2.8	1.5	2.4	1.8
Unknown	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

the unemployment rate would be much higher. Thus unemployment can be to a great extent seen as an impulse to migration, especially to re-migration. Earlier empirical results concerning effects of economic difficulties on return migration seem also to be confirmed (cf. e.g. Lee 1969).

Transfer from a rapidly industrializing phase to a postindustrial society leads to changes in migration streams, as was shown earlier in this paper. The greatest change may probably be seen in the direction of urban-rural; the main migration streams are no longer from rural to urban. Thinking of future prospects structural changes in migration streams are of greatest importance. Tables 6-7 shed light on a few aspects of the question. The following trends can be clearly discerned:

1. Upper-level employees with administrative, managerial, professional and other occupations are fairly mobile if their proportion among migrants is compared with that in the total population. Especially this can be seen among the migrants from urban to rural communes. Only a minor proportion of these returned the next year to their former home commune but there are more of them among other re-migrants.
2. Lower-level employees with administrative and clerical occupations are well represented among the migrants from urban communes.
3. Manual workers are, more than others, return migrants. This applies to all migrant groups. They, together with students and pupils, constitute more than half of all returnees, the migrants between urban communes being the only exceptions. The manual workers form a larger group than students and pupils.

Table 8. Selected 'innovative' occupations[1] and industries[2] 1980, and education by migration pattern 1981.

	Migration from rural commune to rural (17 681)	Migration from rural commune to urban (31 504)	Migration from urban commune to rural (34 928)	Migration from urban commune to urban (48 205)	Whole economically active population 1980 (2 222 139)
'Innovative' occupation (percentage of all migrants with known occupation)	18.9	19.6	20.1	28.2	15.0
'Innovative' industries (percentage of all migrants with known occupation)	4.6	6.8	7.9	12.5	7.0
Education in technology and natural sciences (percentage of all migrants with known education)	(12 622)	(22 546)	(25 155)	(39 306)	
lower level of upper secondary education	24.2	26.5	25.7	16.1	13.5
upper level of upper secondary education	4.3	4.8	5.4	4.9	2.6
higher education	4.0	5.9	5.5	9.0	2.5

1 Planning, adminstrative and research work in the technical fields; supervision and executive work in the technical field; chemical, physical and biological work; pedagogic work; artistic and literary work and entertainment; other technical, physical science, social science, humanistic and artistic work; administration of private enterprises and organizations; ADP operators

2 Communication, financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services

In Table 8 there are percentages indicating the proportion of selected occupations and industries which can be characterized as innovative. The term 'innovative' refers to the new effects which people in a certain occupation or industry may develop in the social and economic life of an area. The selected occupations and industries should be seen only as examples.

It is interesting to see that rural areas are gaining these innovative elements rather than losing them (see Table 8). The percentages of migrants from urban to rural communes are higher than those of the migrants in the opposite direction. The proportion of more educated migrants is also fairly high in this migrant group. Probably the migrants from urban to rural communes are often heading to neighbouring conurbation areas rather than to a real periphery. However, the figures indicate some spreading effects of development. If compared with the percentages of the whole economically active population of the country, the migrants are relatively often working in innovative occupations and industries, and are well educated.

Thinking of future prospects the tables presented above afford some encouraging hints. Labour with occupations calling for more innovative activity is mobile, and what is important is that this part of labour seems to be prepared to migrate in many directions. From the point of view of regional policy this is essential because use of the new technology demands a high level of skill. If this skill can not be achieved by training labour in less developed areas the only way is to promote spatial mobility of those already possessing such skill. Although it may not be possible to induce these persons to settle down permanently in less developed areas it might be worth considering regional policy measures to support them for a shorter stay. This type of 'period use of labour' might be most suitable for young persons entering work life after their schooling. This way enterprises might be able more easily to recruit workers having skill or at least an ability to obtain it in a short time. The migration process would also involve spreading innovative resources spatially.

The results presented in the tables above are only preliminary but the data afford an opportunity to study the question in greater detail. The migrating patterns of certain strategic professional and educational groups with regard to the structure and location of the communes of origin and arrival are one of the most important questions to be studied.

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Rudolph J. Vecoli

RETURN TO THE MELTING POT: ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE EIGHTIES[c]

Rudolph J. Vecoli is Professor of History at the University of Minnesota (since 1967) and Director of the Immigration History Research Center, St. Paul, Minnesota. Born and raised in an immigrant family, speaking Italian as his first language, he has always been interested in ethnicity. He has authored books and numerous articles in this area. He has also been a Visiting Professor at Uppsala University in Sweden and Senior Fulbright-Hays Research Scholar in Italy.

In 1986, we, Americans, will be observing the centennial of the Statue of Liberty and beyond that, in 1992, the centennial of Ellis Island. Both of these national monuments are intimately associated with the story of immigration. To the immigrants arriving in New York harbor, "Liberty Enlightening the World" appeared to be welcoming them with her torch raised in greeting. If the Statue of Liberty seemed to symbolize the "Promise of America," Ellis Island represented a harsher reality. Its establishment as an immigrant receiving station signified the tightening of federal controls over immigration. For immigrants arriving in steerage (those in first and second class were processed on board ship), Ellis Island was a purgatory. Would they be admitted to the Promised Land? Fear, anxiety, bewilderment were their emotions as they made their way through the bureaucratic maze. Only a small percentage were

denied admission, but for them and their families it was a tragedy. Some 3,000 committed suicide on Ellis Island over the years. No wonder it was known in many tongues as the "Isle of Tears."[1]

President Ronald Reagan appointed the Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Centennial Commission in May 1982 to raise funds for the restoration of both monuments which had been allowed to deteriorate shamefully. The Commission is composed of business leaders and celebrities with Lee A. Iacocca, chairman of the Chrysler Corporation, as chairman. We can expect the centennial observances to have a celebratory, triumphal quality with little attention to the chiaroscuro of the immigrant experience. Undoubtedly the fanfare and media hype connected with these events will focus public attention on our immigrant roots as a nation. Ironically this comes at a time when immigration and its consequences have once again become issues of intense debate among Americans.

Since the enactment of the Immigration Law of 1965, the influx of newcomers has not only increased substantially, but has also changed dramatically in character. Whereas in the fifties the number of immigrants averaged about 250,000 per year, in the 1970s the arrivals sharply increased, culminating in 1980 with over 800,000. In addition to the regular immigration, the latter figure reflected a wave of refugees from Cuba and southeast Asia. It did not, however, include the "illegal" or undocumented immigrants whose numbers were estimated to be 600,000 or more each year. Alarm, particularly regarding the flow of illegal aliens, resulted in the creation by the Congress in 1978 of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refuge Policy. After detailed study, rivaling that of the Dillingham Commission of the early twentieth century, the Select Commission submitted its report and recommendations in March 1981. The particular reforms proposed by the commission tended to be on the whole reasonable and liberal. Efforts to translate these recommendations into legislation, however, have been frustrated by the political volatility of the immigration issue.[2]

Certainly immigration for the United States is an issue which must be addressed in public discussion and policy. However, if one listens closely to the debates in the Congress, the press, and on the streets, one hears disturbing overtones of the nativism of yesteryear. Immigrants are accused of taking jobs away from American workers; they are said to constitute a burden on the country's social services; they are charged with contributing to criminality and immorality. Less explicit is the aversion to the "new" immigrants because of their racial and cultural differences. Since the late sixties, the predominant sources of the newcomers have been Mexico, the Phillipines, Cuba, Korea, and China/Tai-

wan. Dark-skinned and black-haired, the Latinos and Asians have transformed the racial character of cities such as Los Angeles, New York, and Miami. Their visibility has triggered deepseated prejudices.[3]

Once again American society is confronted with the need to incorporate immigrants who appear to be exotic and alien. In the 1960s the Melting Pot, judged to be an obsolete symbol of a coercive and unsuccessful Americanization policy, was relegated to the junkheap of history. Now in the eighties, it has been retrieved and refurbished. The need to assimilate the "new" immigrants as well as doubts about their capacity to be assimilated have become common themes in public discussions. The Hispanic population (comprised of such diverse ethnic groups as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans) because of its dense concentration and strong attachment to its language has been identified as a particular threat to the "cultural unity" of the United States. The issue of bilingualism in public education has become something of a lightning rod for highly charged rhetoric about the dangers of immigration from Latin America. Critics evoke fantasies of a Spanish-speaking "Quebec" or a Belgium-like linguistic conflict, culminating in separatist movements and even civil war. A movement is afoot led by former U.S. Senator S. I. Hayakawa to enact a constitutional amendment which would make English the official language of the United States. These reactions, verging at times on the hysterical, are, in my judgment, expressive of a neo-nativist mentality.[4]

As so often in the past, immigration is the touchstone of the climate of opinion in the United States. The neo-nativism of the eighties is indicative of a resurgence of nationalism and conservatism. This can best be understood within the frameworkof John Higham's brilliant analysis of the cycles of American nativism.[5] Sentiment toward immigrants has fluctuated, according to Higham, depending on how Americans have felt about their country and the future. In times of confidence they tended to be optimistic about the capacity of the United States to absorb newcomers; in times of doubt, anti-immigrant feelings flourished. During the 1970s, the United States suffered several humiliating reversals which cast a shadow over its professed leadership of the "free world." Defeat in Vietnam, the Iranian hostage incident, the futile boycott of the 1980 Olympic games, all attested to limits on American power. Meanwhile, Japan's economic ascendancy shook American belief in the preeminence of our industry and technology. High unemployment rates, inflation, and economic uncertainty eroded the psychological and material bases of Americans' sense of well-being. A crisis of confidence in their institutions and values assailed Americans. Ronald Reagan's flagwaving patriotism, hardline anti-Communism, and moral conservatism represent a "counterreformation," a reassertion of

"traditional" values. Meanwhile, the "Moral Majority" has rallied behind such issues as opposition to abortion, gay rights, gun control, and the Equal Rights Amendment. The revival of a Cold War mentality abroad and a crusading moralism at home have combined to create pressures for conformity to prevailing ideas and mores. Only in this perspective can one understand the sudden **voltafaccia** from the ethnic revival of the seventies to the return to the melting pot of the eighties.

The balance of this essay will sketch major developments at both the intellectual and societal levels which embodied changing attitudes toward ethnic diversity during the past two decades. The "rediscovery of ethnicity" in the sixties followed hard upon a period of intense pressures for national unity engendered by World War II and the "Cold War." Pearl Harbor had blighted a budding movement for cultural democracy. Inspired by the populist ideology of the New Deal, writers, artists, educators, and scholars had discovered the country's essential diversity, regional, racial, and ethnic, as a source of beauty and strength. Louis Adamic, himself an immigrant from Slovenia, was the most eloquent advocate of this vision of America as a "nation of nations." During the thirties, Marcus Lee Hansen, Theodore Blegen, Carl Wittke, and George Stephenson produced the first substantial works in American immigrant history. Meanwhile, Caroline Ware and Oscar Handlin made groundbreaking contributions to the writing of the history of urban, industrial America from an ethnic perspective.[6]

The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 radically altered the cultural politics of the nation. Differences were now to be subordinated to the common purpose of defeating the Axis powers and then to containing the threat of Soviet Communism. Cultural as well as political deviations from the American norm were suspect as possibly subversive and Communist-inspired. Unqualified loyalty to the United States was once again made the criterion of Americanism. The postwar economic boom and its flood of consumer goods appeared to insure the triumph of a homogeneous, middle-class society. The dominant interpretations of American history in the fifties emphasized consensus as the genius of the American political tradition. Americans, it was said, had generally agreed on basic values; differences of class, race, and ethnicity had not been the source of fundamental conflicts. In an expansion of Turner's frontier thesis, David Potter found the key to the American national character in the material abundance enjoyed by this "people of plenty." Will Herberg advanced a "triple melting pot" model, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, but one within which all, regardless of religious persuasion, embraced a common belief in the American way of life. **The uprooted** by Oscar Handlin celebrated the terrible but ultimately bening power of the American environment to divest immi-

grants of their Old World cultures and to transform them into "new men". In the fifties, the melting pot went unchallenged.[7]

As a graduate student at the time I shared with my peers a claustrophobic sense of the conservative orthodoxy which dominated historical studies. It was with a sense of liberation that we greeted John Higham's essay, "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic," in which he called upon the historian to deal with questions of good and evil, and to participate sympathetically in the value conflicts of the past.[8] None of us anticipated how quickly we would be swept up in the maelstrom of conflict and turmoil which was to characterize the sixties in the United States. Society suddenly seemed to fragment along fault lines of race, generation, class, ethnicity, and gender. Wars in Vietnam and the urban ghettos, student movements and youth culture, feminism and gay rights, pitted American against American in violent confrontations. How could belief in the homogeneity, goodness, and wisdom of the United States survive the traumas of that bloody decade? With loss of faith in the American Creed and loss of confidence in the Anglo-American establishment, the essential pluralism of the society manifested itself. The lid was off, and all those groups which felt oppressed, stifled, excluded from power and history asserted themselves Liberation movements among blacks, Chicanos, Indians, women, gays, and white ethnic groups proclaimed their identities and demanded their distinctive histories.[9]

In the journalistic idiom of the day, "lower middle class ethnics" were the sons and daughters of the last great wave of immigrants, particularly those from southern and eastern Europe. Largely still blue-collar workers, they nourished historic resentments against a dominant culture which stigmatized their parents as "inferior breeds," and still largely relegated them to the status of "assistant Americans". In the sixties, these feelings were exacerbated by social policies which favored blacks and other racial minorities over the Euro-American ethnics. To the "white ethnics" it appeared that black demands were directed at "their" schools, "their" jobs, "their" neighborhoods, and that they were being forced to compensate blacks for a history of oppression in which they had had no part. Because of this "backlash", they were denounced as "fascist pigs" and racists. By the 1970s,"white ethnicity" had been rediscovered by foundations, government agencies, and universities as a problem to be addressed.[10]

Michael Novak's **The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics** became the manifesto of the white ethnic movement.[11] Novak, a third-generation Slovak American, viewed the persistence of ethnicity as a vital and creative force in American life. He juxtaposed the emotional, familycentered character of ethnic Catholics to the sterile individualism

and nationalism of the WASPS. The real antagonists of the white ethnics were the Anglo-Americans who dominated the cultural and economic life of the country. More polemic than history or sociology, Novak's book was highly controversial, but for many second and third generation ethnics reading it it was a liberating experience. Novak told them it was ok to be ethnic. Critics of the white ethnic movement who dismissed it as a pipedream concocted by "romantic intellectuals" misread one of the major social phenomena of the decade. It is true that white ethnicity never became in itself an autonomous political force. The liberal strategy put forward by the American Jewish Committee, among others, which envisioned a populist coalition of urban working-class blacks and white ethnics based on their common interests largely failed. The social issues of the seventies pertaining to family, sexual mores, drugs, and race proved more potent among the traditional-minded Euro-ethnics. In 1972 and again in 1980, such issues split large segments of white ethnic voters from their historic allegiance to the Democratic Party. The New Deal coalition crumbled under the impact of these highly emotional moral conflicts.[12]

Regardless of political outcomes, there was no doubt about the heightened ethnic consciousness among Americans in the 1970s. The "Black Pride" movement legitimated the affirmation of particular identities, and soon buttons and bumper stickers proclaimed ""Kiss Me, I'm Finnish", "Ukrainian is Beautiful", and "Slovak Power". The new pluralism did not so much create a new consciousness as sanction the expression of group identities which had been long repressed. The "ethnic revival" manifested itself in manifold ways: the revival of traditional festivals; a resurgence of old organizations and the proliferation of new ones, an increased interest in ancestral history, culture, and language. Alex Haley's **Roots** gave a tremendous impetus to the family history movement which was already well underway. Genealogy which had been largely the domain of socialclimbers in search of coats-of-arms, became a quest for real forebears, whether noble or ignoble. The American tourist's itinerary now frequently included a pilgrimmage to the native village in Ireland, Galicia, or Sicily. The bicentennial observances of American independence in 1976 more often than not took the form of celebrations of immigrant heritages.[13]

Beginning with Black Studies programs, the movement for ethnic studies in the schools made headway in the seventies. In 1972, the Congress established the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program declaring that its purpose was to "afford students opportunities to learn about the nature of their own cultural heritage, and to study the contributions of the cultural heritages of the other ethnic groups of the Nation." Although appropriations for the program during the seventies were

modest and ceased entirely under the Reagan administration, its symbolic importance ought not to be underestimated. For the first time, the federal government recognized that America was a multiethnic society and the positive value of understanding "about the differing and unique contributions to the national heritage made by each ethnic group." Despite the cutbacks in funding, teaching about American history and society from a multicultural perspective continues in many classrooms.[14]

Buoyed by this popular tide of interest, ethnic and immigration history flourished in the past decade. This academic scholarship, however, was not simply a reflection of the social movements. In fact, its origins anticipated the emergence of white ethnicity as a public phenomenon. In 1963, Nathan Glazer, who had been writing insightful pieces about American pluralism in the fifties, coauthored with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a comparative study of ethnic groups in New York City entitled **Beyond the Melting Pot.**[15] Citing the persistence of these collectivities, they declared: "The point about the melting pot is that it did not happen." Contrary to expectations, ethnicity continued to be a major force in the life of the metropolis. The following year, Milton Gordon's **Assimilation in American Life** sought to explain this persistence by offering a more complex theory of assimilation, making a basic distinction between cultural assimilation and structural assimilation. Also in 1964, my critique of **The Uprooted** maintained that immigrant cultures were more enduring and influentiel than had been supposed; hence the need to study the variety of patterns of accommodation particular to different immigrant groups. Joshua Fishman's **Language loyalty in the United States** was a major contribution to a new paradigm for American history.[16] Rather than passively accepting assimilation, immigrant communities had struggled vigorously and with some success to maintain their mother tongues and cultures. By the mid-sixties, a reevaluation of the significance of immigration was clearly underway. Yet as late as 1969, it could be argued that ethnicity was a neglected dimension of American history and that "the study of immigration has been and remains an underdeveloped field of historical inquiry."[17]

A variety of influences contributed to the burgeoning of ethnic and immigration history in the seventies, including the "new social history." Inspired by ideologies of the New Left and liberation movements, a younger generation of historians set out to document the experiences of the inarticulate, the powerless, the subaltern elements in American history. To understand the consciousness of workers, immigrants, women, blacks; to perceive the world through their eyes; to interpret their behavior through their values. Such "history from the

bottom up" required new sources and research techniques; oral history and quantitative analysis were employed to create data for those who had left few records. But it was also discovered that the documentation for the non-elite populations was much richer than had been dreamed. The success of the Immigration History Research Center of the University of Minnesota in collecting published and archival materials for the southern and eastern European immigrant groups inspired other institutions to emulate its example. Meanwhile, the number of practitioners in the field increased dramatically; founded by a handful of scholars in 1965, the Immigration History Society grew to over five hundred members. In 1981, the Society founded the **Journal of American Ethnic History**. Old ethnic historical societies like the Polish American Italian Historical Association were created. One of the qualities of the "new ehtnic history" was its engaged and empathic character. Many historians turned to the study of their own immigrant backgrounds, and while for the most part avoiding the pitfalls of filiopiety, approached their subjects with emphathy and insight. The rapproachement between ethnic academics and ethnic publics has been not the least accomplishment of pluralist history.[18]

The internationalization of migration history has been one of the most significant developments in the field. While American sholars were turning with renewed passion to ethnic topics, their colleagues in countries of emigration were discovering the importance of mass exodus for their own histories. The latter phenomenon can be dated from Frank Thistlethwaite's seminal paper, "Migration From Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," presented at the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm in 1960. In the years which followed, projects in Uppsala, Turku, Cracow, Zagreb, Rome, and elsewhere produced an extensive literature on the causes and backgrounds of the trans-Atlantic migrations. The resulting interaction between American and European scholars has provided a strong stimulus to ethnic and immigration history. Finnish-American collaboration is a prime example of this fruitful relationship. The series of joint symposia on Finnish migration to North America, the exhange of publications and primary sources, the compilation of guides and bibliographies to materials, and the expanded research opportunities for scholars, have contributed to an enrichment of scholarship in both countries.[19]

In retrospect, two decades of work in ethnic and immigration history has resulted in an impressive record of solid achievement. Simply in terms of volume, more doctoral dissertations were written in this field during the seventies than in alla preceding decades com-

bined. Literally hundreds of monographs have been published on a vast array of topics, while the articles number in the thousands. The latter have appeared in such leading journals as the **American Historical Review** as well as in specialized publications. Whereas fifteen years ago, one was fortunate to find even a few volumes on any particular ethnic group, say the Finnish Americans, now there are shelves and even libraries of writings. This recent scholarship has been summed up in two comprehensive works: **The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups** and **They chose Minnesota.**[20] Regarding the quality of this scholaship, one is impressed by how much of it is free of pieties and orthodoxies, by its sophistication of theory and methodology, and by its sensitivity to the particularities of ethnic group experiences. Unfortunately not all scholars have had the requisite linguistic and cultural skills, but the best work is steeped in a deep understanding of pre-migration history in the Old World. Most fundamentally, the concept of ehtnicity has become on of the basic categories for historical analysis. In short, pluralism is generally accepted as the paradigm for the American past.

Despite its indisputable accomplishments, pluralist history has of late received harsh criticism from unexpected quarters. Critics, sometimes confusing the scholarship of ethnicity with ethnicity as a social movement, have charged that the latter was largely the creation of the former. The attacks have come basically from two sources: one Marxist; the other nationalist. The former contend that the emphasis on ethnic identity is a smokescreen for racism and other reactionary politics and obscures the realities of social class, while the latter accuse the pluralists of exaggerating the importance of ethnicity, fomenting disunity and denying the existence of a common American nationality. Such critics agree in dismissing the "ethnic revival" of the seventies as largely factitious, a media event contrived by ethnic ideologues. From the late seventies on, a growing chorus of criticism has challenged the pluralist paradigm. Among these critics are some who were pioneers in the field of ethnic studies. Nathan Glazer, disenchanted by the politics of ethnicity, has speculated whether the assimilation model does not after all have much to recommend it. Alineated by the "excesses" of the new ethnicity, Arthur Mann argued that the common culture of Americans has been much more important than the ethnic differences among them.[21] John Higham, one of the founders of the "new ehtnic history," has become increasingly uncomfortable with the divisive tendencies of ethnicity. In 1982, he cheerfully proclaimed that "the ethnic revival is over, and an era in ethnic studies has come to an end." In a recent paper, he urged historians to go "beyond pluralism" and address the "grand theme" of the making of a people in America.[22]

While not discounting the validity of certain criticisms of the new ethnic history, yet these attacks on pluralist scholarship appear to originate more in anxiety over the political consequences of ethnic diversity rather than objections regarding the validity of pluralism as a framework for interpreting American history. They are symptomatic of the growing fear of cultural and racial conflict posed by the "new" immigration and militant ethnicity. As one who has been involved both as a scholar and advocate in the ethnic movements of the past two decades, I must admit to a certain degree of disillusionment with the outcome. Our aspirations to create a pluralistic society with a greater degree of freedom and equality have not been fully realized. Ethnic communities have remained excessively self-centered, preoccupied with their own agendas, and unwilling to cooperate for the common good. Too often, their traditional values have been enlisted in the service of reactionary politics. In sum, the new ethnicity did not become the basis for a new progressive coalition which some of us had hoped for.

Notwithstanding such political disappointment, there is no question in my mind but that the ethnic movement has been on the whole a salutary influence in American society. The power of Anglo-American conformity has been broken, and will not, I think, be restored. We are all more comfortable with our varied origins today than was true in the 1950s. Certainly ethnic pride is healthier than ethnic shame. This is not to say that prejudice and bigotry have been wiped out in the United States. Still, while the growing mood of neo-nativism is distressing, one should still recognize that the "new" immigrants often receive a more hospitable welcome and ready acceptance than was true of immigrants at the turn of the century. In a country as large and complex as ours, it is not surprising that there are contradictory tendencies at work.

Regardless of how one might feel about the idea of a pluralistic society, I do not think it can be gainsaid that ethnicity is still a powerful force in the America of the eighties. In response to a question regarding their ancestry posed by the 1980 census, 83 percent of Americans reported at least one specific nationality or country of origin of their forebears. Only 6 percent replied simply "American."[23] While the significance of these responses is unclear, they do at a minimum indicate an awareness of Old World antecendents. The findings of social science research of the past decade also point to the continuing saliency of ethnic identities and affiliations for many Americans.[24]

If politics in a democratic society are a barometer of popular feelings, then the current presidential campaign further attests to the potency of ethnic appeals. The candidacy of the Reverend Jesse Jackson is its most dramatic expression. However, the black-Jewish controversy swirling about the statements and positions of Jackson is a further

indication of powerful ethnic feelings. The manner in which the candidates have tried to outdo each other in their pro-Israel stands attests to the political clout of American Jews. In Texas, New York, California, and Florida, where they form important ethnic bocs, Hispanics have been courted by presidential aspirants. President Reagan's much-publicized journey to the village from which his greatgrandfather left for America is not unrelated to the fact that there are an estimated 40 million Irish Americans. Many of the social issues which will be debated in the presidential campaign such as abortion, prayer in the schools, and the equal rights amendment, touch on moral values which are embedded in ethnic cultures.

Beyond politics, the search for identity goes on in American society. There is an undiminished interest in family history, ethnic festivals, and heritage projects. Unlike Canada and Australia, the United States has not officially espoused a policy of multiculturalism. Rather, after a brief flirtation with pluralism, Washington appears to have returned to the melting pot. However, in the private sector ethnic diversity continues to flourish. The "return to the melting pot," another shift in the political and ideological climate of the United States, ought not to be mistaken with the underlying social reality. For good or for ill, ethnicity in its changing modes has proven itself not to be a transitory phenomenon, but a persisting dimension of American society. In the years ahead, I anticipate no waning of interest in the study of ethnic and immigration history. Rather, the saliency of immigration and ethnic diversity as pressing issues of public policy, against the backdrop of the centennial observances of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island, will sustain a high level of involvement and ferment in this field of historical study.

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LEVELS AND RATES OF U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1870-1979







*Decennial net migration as a percentage of population growth equals total decennial population increase minus natural population increase (births and deaths) divided by total population increase.

**Emigration exceeded immigration by 85,000.

SOURCE: Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, **U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest** (Washington, D.C., 1981).

Percent Distribution of European (Excluding Spaniard) Ancestry Groups With 1,000,000 or More Persons by Region: 1980

Ancestry group	Number (1,000)	Percent distribution				
		Total	North-east	North Central	South	West
English	49 598	100	16	23	40	21
German	49 224	100	19	41	22	18
Irish	40 166	100	24	26	32	18
French[1]	12 892	100	26	27	27	19
Italian	12 184	100	57	16	13	14
Scottish	10 049	100	19	23	35	24
Polish	8 228	100	41	38	11	10
Dutch	6 304	100	18	35	26	20
Swedish	4 345	100	15	43	12	31
Norwegian	3 454	100	7	55	7	31
Russian n.e.c.[2]	2 781	100	48	17	16	19
Czech	1 892	100	18	49	18	15
Hungarian	1 777	100	39	33	13	14
Welsh	1 665	100	25	27	22	27
Danish	1 518	100	9	38	10	43
Portuguese	1 024	100	50	3	6	41

NOTE: Includes persons who reported single and multiple ancestry group(s). Persons who reported a multiple ancestry group may be included in more than one category.

[1]Excludes French Basque.

[2]Includes persons who reported as "Russian," "Great Russian," "Georgian," and other related European or Asian groups; see "Definitions and Explanations" for more details.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, **1980 Census of Population: Supplementary Report, Ancestry of the Population by State: 1980** (Washington, D.C., 1983).



Diagram 2 American immigration 1820–1970

SOURCE: Philip Taylor, **The Distant Magnet: European Immigration to the U.S.A.** (New York, 1971), 103.

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