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## **Sisältö • Contents**

*Olavi Koivukangas*

### **Pääkirjoitus • Editorial**

*Peter Kivisto*

### **U.S. immigration policy from 1965 to the present**

*Rosaline Frith*

### **Changing landscapes: managing migration and skills. Canada's newcomer integration programs**

*James Jupp*

### **Australia's immigration policy**

*Arno Tanner*

### **Mitä voimme oppia Kanadan ja Uuden-Seelannin onnistuneista työvoiman maahanmuuttopolitiikoista?**

*Ana Kralj*

### **"Immigrant crisis" of 1999–2001 in Slovenia: Fabula, Plebs and Lex**

*Elli Heikkilä*

### **Immigration and integration – the global challenge**

### **Vierailijoita Siirtolaisuusinstituutissa**

### **Seminaari**

*Kansi:* Suomen Pakolaisapu valitsi maaliskuussa Zahra Ali Abdullan Vuoden pakolaisnaiseksi 2003. – *Kuva:* Tiina Kirkas.

*Cover:* Zahra Ali Abdulla was chosen Refugee of the year 2003 in Finland by The Finnish Refugee Council. – *Photo:* Tiina Kirkas.

# Maahanmuuttopolitiikan haasteet

Tämän vuoden viimeisen numeromme teemana on maahanmuuttopolitiikka. Kuluneena vuotena keskustelu Suomen maahanmuuttopolitiikasta ja sen kehittämisestä on kovasti vilkastunut. Yhtenä syynä ovat tulevaisuuden visiot odotettavissa olevasta työvoimatarpeesta, mikäli haluamme säilyttää taloudellisen kasvun ja palvelutason nykyisellään suurten ikäluokkien siirtyessä eläkkeelle lähivuosina. Tähän liittyy myös Euroopan Unionin laajeneminen 1.5.2004 kymmenellä uudella jäsenmaalla ja tätä kautta syntyvä uusi tilanne Euroopan maahanmuuttoasioissa. Myös Arno Tannerin maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa käsittelevä väitöskirja on vauhdittanut tätä keskustelua.

Nykyisen hallituksemme ohjelman mukaan Suomi varautuu maahanmuuttopolitiikan kehittämiseen. Tavoitteena on hallituksen maahanmuuttopoliittinen ohjelma, jonka valmistelu käynnistyy ensi vuoden alusta. On tärkeätä, että sen valmisteluun saadaan mukaan sekä viranomaiset että työnantajien ja ammattiyhdistysliikkeen kuin myös monien muidenkin alan yhteisöjen edustus. On tärkeätä myös muistaa, että maahanmuuttopolitiikka tulee nähdä osana Suomen pitkän tähtäyksen väestöpolitiikkaa. Suomi tarvitsee kokonaisvaltaisen väestöpoliittisen ohjelman, jonka osia ovat syntyvyys, kuolleisuus ja muuttoliikkeet. Tässä työssä tulisi kuunnella tutkijoiden ja tiedemaailman edustajia alusta lähtien.

Kilpailu osaavista ihmisistä on jo globaali käytäntö, eikä Suomen kannata jättäytyä sen ulkopuolelle. Syntyvyyden lasku ja väestön ikääntyminen on Suo-

messa – kuten koko läntisessä Euroopassa – käynnistänyt keskustelua aktiivisesta maahanmuuttopolitiikasta. Työministeri Tarja Filatov on korostanut, että on tärkeätä luoda ajoissa järjestelmät ja menettelyt, joilla voidaan edistää ulkomaalaisten hakeutumista ja sijoittumista suomalaiseen työelämään. (Monitori 3/2003)

Mikäli Suomi lähtee aktiivisen maahanmuuttopolitiikan tielle – kuten uskon enemmän tai myöhemmin tapahtuvan – meidän on muistettava, että emme ota vastaan vain työvoimaa, vaan monista kulttuureista tulevia ihmisiä ja perheitä, joita meidän tulee kohdella tasavertaisina lähimmäisinä.

Maahanmuuttopolitiikan on oltava myös sellaista, jonka Suomen kansan suuri enemmistö voi hyväksyä. Kuitenkin ensimmäinen erittäin tärkeä tavoite olisi kootuttaa nykyiset maahanmuuttajamme mahdollisimman hyvin, löytää heille heidän koulutustaan vastaavaa työtä sekä edistää suvaitsevaisuutta kaikin tavoin. Onnistunut maahanmuuttopolitiikka edellyttää rasismien vastaisia toimia ja monikulttuuristen arvojen korostamista erityisesti kasvatuksessa.

Maahanmuuttajat ja heidän lapsensa tulevat olemaan tulevaisuuden Suomelle merkittävä voimavara. Voimme ottaa oppia Yhdysvaltain, Kanadan, Australian ja muiden perinteisten siirtolaismaiden kokemuksesta tähän tavoitteeseen pyrkiessämme.

*Olavi Koivukangas*

# The political challenges of immigration

The theme of our last issue this year concerns the political challenges of immigration. As this year has passed, discussion about the political aspects of immigration to Finland, and its development, has gained momentum. Discussions include the vision of what can be anticipated regarding the needs of the work force and the necessity to preserve economic growth and the current level of services as a large part of the work force will reach retirement age within a few years.

This will be an important issue as the European Union expands on 1 May 2004 when ten new members join. This will give birth to new European opportunities for immigration. The thesis of Arno Tanner about immigration policies has caused this discussion to speed up.

Keeping with the current agenda of our government, Finland needs to be prepared to develop immigration policies. The objective of the government is to have a program for immigration policies ready to put into effect at the beginning of next year. It is also important that preparations begin for officials, employers, as well as professional businesses and for many groups within the public to be represented. It is also important to remember that policies affecting immigrants are seen as long-range objectives regarding immigration policies. Finland needs to have an all encompassing program for her population policies regarding birth, death and for migrant businesses. This will mean listening to researchers and scientific representatives from the very beginning.

The competition of attracting skilled people [to immigrate] is global and Finland should not be left on the

outside. With a dropping birth rate and an aging population, Finland is like the rest of western Europe, and is in the midst of very active discussion about immigration policies. The Minister of Labor, Tarja Filatov, has emphasized the fact that it is important, early on, to create a system and practices for the search of foreigners and help to them settle into Finnish work life. (Monitori March 2003).

As Finland actively goes down the road of [new] immigration policies, as is bound to happen, we must remember that we are not just gaining a work force, but rather people and families who come from many different cultures. We need to treat them as our counterparts, even as being part of our own families.

The immigration policies need to be constructed so that they will be acceptable to the majority of the Finnish people. The first very important objective is to improve the integration of our immigrants, and to help the immigrants find employment that fits their educational background. A successful immigration policy needs to not only discourage racism, but also emphasize the advantage of having a multi-cultural education.

The immigrants and their children could become a significant resource for the future of Finland. We can learn from the experience of the United States, Canada, Australia and other immigrant lands as we strive for our goals.

*Olavi Koivukangas*

# U.S. immigration policy from 1965 to the present



Peter Kivisto

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The current wave of immigration to the United States – the third major wave in the nation’s history – commenced shortly after the passage of the landmark Immigration Reform Act of 1965 (referring to its Congressional sponsors, it is also known as the Hart-Celler Act). The legislation was passed during the heady days of the Great Society, at a time of considerable social upheaval in the United States, chiefly due to the combined impact of the Viet Nam War and the civil rights movement. As a consequence, relatively little attention was paid to this piece of legislation at the time by the public at large or by policy makers. It would appear that the sponsors and supporters of the legislation did not envision the Act as a stimulus for a major migratory wave. Nor did they think that the major source of immigration would shift from Europe to the developing nations of the Third World. As Daniel Tichenor (2002: 18) notes, “Senator Edward

Kennedy, one of the bill’s principal stewards, assured skeptics that the reform ‘would not inundate America with immigrants from any one country or area or the most populated and deprived nations of Africa and Asia’.”

Tichenor (2002: 8) contends that this legislation is part the “dynamics of U.S. immigration policy,” where both major political parties have pro-immigration and anti-immigration elements. The Republicans have long been home to both free marketeers and restrictionist cultural conservatives. On the other hand, the Democrats have within their ranks both pro-immigration cosmopolitans and economic protectionists (especially labor unions). All of these elements were present at the passage of the 1965 Act, but as became clear, the free market proponents and cultural cosmopolitans got the upper hand. Perhaps the most significant feature of this Act was that it eliminated the essentially racist character of existing law, which established a rank order of preferred groups based on ethnicity, or to be more specific, national origin.

Before turning to the provisions of this Act, it is useful to

place it in historical perspective. As a classic settler nation that needed population growth for economic development to occur, the U.S. has had comparatively speaking rather liberal immigration laws for much of its history. However, the operative work is comparatively. In fact, from the period after the Civil War until the passage of the National Origins Quota Act of 1924, Congress passed a series of legislative measures that were increasingly restrictive and intended to offer preferential treatment to certain nationality groups at the expense of other groups. The first such enactment occurred in 1882, when Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act. This particular piece of legislation had a 10-year limit. After that time, new laws were passed that were even more draconian in their effort to put a halt to immigration from China.

The nation entered a major wave of new European immigration around this time, but the newcomers increasingly came from Southern and Eastern Europe rather than Western and Northern Europe, posing a threat to WASP hegemony. With the rise of a powerful anti-immigrant movement, Congress enacted a series of laws de-

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signed to stem this tide, including a series of literacy test bills that were intended to limit the flow of Southern and Eastern European immigrants. This trend to restrict immigrant flows from what were deemed to be undesirable points of origin culminated in the passage of the above-noted National Origins Quota Act. This legislation was actually a revision of a law passed three years earlier that imposed numerical limits on immigrants based on their nation of origin, calculated on the basis of the composition of the white population of the U.S. in 1910. The 1924 law recalculated the quotas based on the 1890 census, in effect further restricting the numbers of permitted immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.

The result of this law, in conjunction with the negative impact on migration of the Great Depression and World War II, was that the migratory wave ended. For the following four decades, the number of foreign born entering the nation declined significantly. During this period, a variety of laws shaped migration policies. For example, in 1943 a system of contract labor was created that allowed employers to hire Mexican workers for specified periods of time, after which they were expected to return to Mexico. Known as the Bracero Program, this was the U.S. version of what would later be called, in Western Europe, a "guest worker program." This program, which was increasingly opposed by the Mexican-American community, was finally terminated in 1964. In the wake of World War II, the flight of people from nations that had fallen under the control of

the Soviet Union prompted the passage of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. The most significant piece of legislation leading up to the 1965 Act was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act). While that Act reaffirmed the national quota system, it reclassified existing quotas (for example, it ended Japanese exclusion and instituted a small quota for the Asia-Pacific region). It also created a preferential system based on worker skills and on family reunification (Bean and Stevens 2003: 17–19).

With this background, it is evident that the 1965 Act represents a significant departure from the past by eliminating the quota system. The law established a set of criteria that would rank order selection preferences. Originally, it called for 170,000 visas per year for immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the Western Hemisphere. In the former case, a 20,000 maximum limit per country was imposed (Schuck 2003: 85).

In the first place, the premium attached to family reunification meant that spouses, minor children, and the parents of U.S. citizens were exempt from these caps, so in effect there was no limit to the number of people falling into these categories who could obtain a visa. Then, seven criteria were established, each being accorded a percentage limit of the total number of visas to be allotted. These seven criteria and the respective percentages of the total are as follows: (1) unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens (20%); (2) spouses and unmarried children of

permanent resident aliens (20%); (3) professionals, with preferences given to gifted scientists and artists (10%); (4) married children of U.S. citizens (10%); (5) brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens over the age of 21 (24%); (6) skilled and unskilled workers who are needed to meet specific labor shortages (10%); and (7) refugees (6%).

Contrary to the predictions of the bill's sponsors, the Act, when it took effect in 1968, unleashed a major wave of immigration. In fact, during the last decade of the twentieth century more newcomers entered the nation than during any other decade in the nation's history, surpassing the totals from the first decade of the twentieth century, heretofore the peak decade. The arrivals came overwhelmingly from Latin America and Asia. About 75 percent of the totals originated from these regions during the 1970s and much of the 1980s, with the percentage rising to over 80 percent thereafter. According to the 2000 Census, over 31 million legal immigrants resided in the United States, representing about 11 percent of the total population, a figure not reached since 1930 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). It should be noted that immigrants represent a smaller percentage of the overall population than they did a century ago. However, because they are heavily concentrated in six states – California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas – their impact in those localities has been profound. Perhaps one of the most significant transformations that have occurred due to the new wave of immigration is that African Americans no longer constitute the large-

est non-European origin group, having been surpassed by Latinos. This has sometimes been referred to in public discourse as the "browning of America."

The impact of immigration during the last three decades of the twentieth century is even more significant that this cursory summary would suggest, for in addition to the influx of legal immigrants, two other categories of newcomers have also contributed to the heightened diversity of American society. The first category is that of nonimmigrant entrants who, rather than becoming permanent residents are granted visas to be in the country for a specified period of time. While tourists and diplomats fall into this category, by far the two largest groups are temporary workers and students. Many workers in this category are holders of H-1B visas, which permits employers to hire foreign-born skilled workers and allows those workers to remain in the country for six years. The enabling legislation contained in the Immigration Act of 1990 allows 200,000 such workers into the country each year. By far, a substantial majority of workers possessing these visas come from Asia and work in the high tech sector. Since its implementation, the law has been liberalized in various ways, including a provision that allows workers to move from one employer to another. By the end of the twentieth century, there were 31.4 million nonimmigrant entrants, a figure roughly equivalent to the number of permanent immigrants. Peter Schuck (2003: 89) points out that with the assistance of their employers, "many will be-

come permanent residents despite the program's explicit temporary character and without having to leave the country or even interrupt their employment."

The second category consists of illegal or undocumented immigrants. This includes both persons who entered the country illegally ("EWI's" – entered without inspection – in U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service parlance) and those who entered legally but overstayed their visas (what the INS calls "visa-overstays"). While it is extremely difficult to accurately measure the size of the undocumented immigrant population, Schuck (2003: 89) writes that estimates based on the 2000 census put the figure at somewhere between 8 and 9 million, with approximately half originating from Mexico and the bulk of the remainder coming heavily from Asia and other Latin American nations.

Legislation enacted since 1965 has sought to address two distinct concerns. The first focuses on refugee policy, while the second is intended to both control the flow of labor migrants in general and to deal with the problem of undocumented migrants. Refugee policy was influenced by the exigencies of Cold War politics. Thus, the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966 was in fact a continuation of refugee policies that U.S. administrations had implemented since the Castro takeover in Cuba. The presence of a Marxist government 90 miles off the shore of Florida proved to be a powerful symbol of competing ideologies in the struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the U.S. government

received these political exiles warmly. The 1975 Indochina Refugee Act was in response to the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent exodus of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians who had sided with the Americans. This Act, in effect, began a resettlement program for these exiles. Two years later, the Act was refined to specify that 174,988 Indochinese refugees would be admitted.

The Refugee Act of 1980 was not targeted to specific groups, but rather sought to provide a more coherent set of criteria that could be used universally. The Act adopted the definition of "refugee" that the United Nations had developed. In addition, the Act expanded the annual number of asylum seekers admitted to the country and established procedures by which the Attorney General could facilitate a shift in status from temporary refugee to permanent resident. Despite the effort to standardize and rationalize the system, critics contended that during the Reagan presidency refugee policies were employed in a discriminatory manner, as asylum seekers from communist-controlled nations – such as Nicaragua – had a relatively easy time of being accepted while those fleeing right-wing dictatorships – such as exiles from El Salvador and Guatemala – were frequently denied admission.

Turning to the other type of post-1965 immigration legislation, the first significant initiative was a series of amendments to Hart-Celler, passed in 1976, that established 20,000 as a per country cap on immigrants, applicable to both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. This was intended to limit

the flow of immigrants from some of the major migrant-exporting nations. Undocumented immigrants became a focus of attention in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The key provision of this Act was to offer a general amnesty for 3 million undocumented residents under certain conditions. The amnesty made it possible for these individuals to obtain legal permanent resident status. The product of intense negotiating between pro-immigration and anti-immigration camps, the legislation sought to offer something for both sides. On the one hand, it included a provision that imposes sanctions against employers who hire illegal workers (these sanctions proved to be very weak). It also included the creation of a special program for agricultural workers, and it required the establishment of an office within the Justice Department that was designed to deal with charges of discrimination against immigrants. The Act also contained a provision intended to expand the diversity of the immigrant pool by creating the NP-5 program for residents of nations that had favorable quotas prior to 1965. The three major beneficiaries of this program were Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Criticism of the Eurocentric character of this program led to a comparable program for other nations

in 1988, called the OP-1 program. In both cases, visa recipients were chosen by lottery.

The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the immigration cap to 675,000. Family reunification immigrants continued to receive preferential treatment under the terms of the Act. In addition, it contained refined employment-based criteria, including expanding the number of skilled immigrants entering the country. Finally, it also had a "diversity" lottery system, known as the AA-1 visa, which replaced both the NP-5 and OP-1 programs.

Anti-immigration sentiment grew during the 1990s. The passage of Proposition 187 in California signaled this change, for the referendum called for denying undocumented immigrants various social services including educational benefits for their children. The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 followed suit by limiting the access of immigrants – legal and illegal – to public welfare benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, Medicaid, and Supplemental Social Security (Bean and Stevens 2003: 66–67). In the same year, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act. It was intended to increase border security and to streamline the process for deportation. Employer sanctions

were increased (though again in practice these proved to be relatively weak and were perceived by many employers as simply a cost of doing business).

Nearly four decades after the legislation that enabled mass immigration to resume, the U.S. continues to receive substantial numbers of newcomers, as permanent residents, under the provisions of various employment and student visas, and as undocumented immigrants. This is the case despite the opposition of a majority of the public to the rate of immigration. In part this is because of a shift in the alliances that have shaped American immigration policy for more than a century. Labor, once a voice of immigration restriction, has increasingly been sympathetic to immigrants, whom they see as potential new recruits rather than as enemies of organized labor. This means that they are on the same side of this issue as major industrial and agricultural employer groups who want easy access to immigrant labor. Thus, at least for the immediate future, we can expect immigration to continue, with the various efforts aimed at containing, controlling, and structuring the flow of immigrants amounting to tinkering with a structure that in fundamental ways is not being seriously challenged.

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# Changing landscapes: managing migration and skills

## Canada's newcomer integration programs

Rosaline Frith

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### Introduction

I would like to start by stressing the significant role that integration plays in Canada. It is key to social cohesion in a country built on multiple identities. In most countries, social cohesion arises from a shared identity, a long history of shared ethnic or community kinship. However, in Canada, we do not share as individuals, a common history. We share Canada's history, a story of immigration and a changing environment. We share values of freedom, respect and belonging. Our linguistic duality, regional and cultural diversity, challenging geography and proximity to the United States make us unique.

Integration fosters relationships of trust that enable Canadians to take joint and collective action and peacefully resolve conflicts. Canada's integration policies build mutual respect amongst

immigrants, refugees and native-born Canadians. Integration is the basis of our social cohesion.

### Overview

Our experience shows that an effective and efficient immigration program works best when supported by a comprehensive legal framework, a liberal democratic tradition and programming to ensure immigrants have a level playing field with native born Canadians. Canada has been and continues to be built by immigrants who represent a significant and growing part of the Canadian population and labour market. Highly skilled immigrants are essential to meeting the Canadian Government's skills and innovation priorities. But Canada's immigration program is more than just a quest for highly skilled workers. It is a balanced program that takes into account economic, family and humanitarian issues and that promotes social inclusion. Integration is achieved over a long period of time, perhaps generations. For immigrants the first step to integration is when they feel that they belong and become full citizens of Canada.

This article describes our integration framework and presents

some employment-related challenges that remain to be overcome. For example, Toronto is one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the world. It has a very low crime rate, a vibrant economy and a high degree of social harmony. On the surface, it is a good example of integration. However, Toronto also faces absorption or capacity challenges daily.

Our system is not perfect – it continues to evolve and will, I hope, be able to overcome faults in the Canadian social fabric that appear with time.

### Our legal framework

Immigration has always played a central role in Canada's history. However, immigration was not always open to everyone. In the early 1900s, Canada's legal framework supported a shared identity, based on ethnic or community kinship that excluded diversity. Pre-1960, immigration policies favoured Britons and other Europeans. Whenever the majority felt threatened, laws were adjusted to limit access to the country. For example, because there was a concern that Chinese would not assimilate to "Anglo conformity", Chinese immigration was curtailed in 1902.

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***This article was presented to the Institute of Migration, Turku, by Ambassador Adele Dion, April 29, 2003.***



In response, business leaders brought in Japanese and Indian labourers. This led to the 1907 anti-immigration riots in Vancouver followed by a further curtailment of non-white immigration through the 1910 Immigration Act.


There was always a tension between the need for labour and fears that immigrants would undermine the "British character" of Canada. In Quebec, immigration was seen as a potential threat to the already tenuous status of the French in Canada.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the launch of the modern phase of Canada's immigration policies. Several factors came together to push Canada toward the creation of a non-racial immigration system:

- Canada's wish to play a more prominent role in international affairs, especially at the United Nations and within the Commonwealth;
- Quebec's desire to play a more active role in the recruitment of immigrants;
- passage of a Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960;
- a new Immigration Act in 1976;
- the beginnings of Canada's current policies on bilingualism and biculturalism;
- and the recognition of the multicultural fact of Canada.

In 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted. It is a crucial element to our non-racial legal system. And on June 28, 2002, Canada promulgated a new modern immigration law, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

But the legal framework is not enough, we still have to achieve a



level playing field for true social and economic inclusion.

### Changing immigration flows

With non-discriminatory policies, immigration has been drastically different from what it had been prior to 1960. Immigration levels rose dramatically in the 1990s. Over 2.4 million immigrants arrived between 1991 and 2001. Now 5.4 million, or 18.4% of Canada's population of 30 million are foreign-born. The mix of immigrants has also changed from family class predomination to more people being admitted under the economic category. And, about two-thirds of immigrants now come from so-called non-traditional source countries primarily in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2001, out of a total of about 250,000 immigrants, 62% were admitted under the economic category, 27% family class and 11% refugees.

While there is no probability

that the "traditional" European residents of Canada will be outnumbered, it is projected that "visible minorities" will constitute 20% of the Canadian population by 2016. "Canada's 'mosaic' now includes most races, religions and cultures. It is expected to become more diverse with time.

### Definition of integration in Canada

So how does one celebrate diversity, promote social inclusion, and live in respect and peace. This is not an easy objective. In Canada, our integration policies are intended to help us attain this goal.

The term "integration" is defined as "a two-way process of accommodation between newcomers and Canadians". It encourages newcomers to adapt to Canadian society without requiring them to abandon their cultures or to con-

form to the values and practices of the dominant group, as long as adherence to their cultures does not contravene Canadian laws. While at the same time, Canadian society and its institutions are expected to change over time to reflect the new Canada that is constantly in evolution.

Canadian integration policy promotes the acquisition of citizenship. It consciously welcomes all immigrants into the Canadian family and strives to ensure their full participation across the important economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of our country.

### **Managing in partnerships**

Integration in Canada is managed in partnership with all levels of government, non-governmental associations and the public. Through bilateral agreements some provinces design, deliver and administer selection and settlement programs. These agreements vary considerably. The provinces' interests differ depending on the levels of immigration to their regions. Those receiving smaller numbers want more immigrants and focus on dispersion issues, while those receiving larger numbers seek more funding of integration programs. A major integration issue of provinces is the cost associated with second language training of children.

The voluntary or not-for-profit sector would like more control over program design and more services for refugee claimants. The regulatory and licensing bodies want to ensure standards are met and are leery of losing control. The employers are not well enough in-

formed about foreign work experience and bridging programs are insufficient or non-existent.

Municipalities would like to be more involved in policy decisions on immigration levels that impact on their infrastructure, especially housing and community services.

To complicate matters even more, the public has to be accepting of immigration. This requires a high level of confidence in the integrity of the immigration program. September 11, 2001 shook that confidence and placed much of the blame wrongly on our refugee asylum system. We must ensure that overall confidence in our immigration system is strong if our integration model is to continue to be successful.

### **The integration model**

The model is a continuum beginning with information provided to immigrants overseas, orientation and adaptation services in Canada, to the acquisition of citizenship after a relatively short period of time. All three categories of immigrants – skilled, family class and refugees – are eligible for settlement services. Skilled immigrants integrate more quickly and are seen as immediately helping to build the nation. Immigrants who come under family reunification criteria take longer to integrate economically but form the core needed for social integration. Refugees are admitted for protection and it is accepted that they may need additional assistance to settle and integrate. As long as the public feels that the immigration program is well managed, the cost of integration is viewed positively.

### ***Information overseas and on arrival:***

Immigrants and refugees when asked what can be done better have told us that more information on life in Canada is needed before they come to Canada. "Canadian Orientation Abroad" was developed to do this. Orientation sessions are delivered by non-governmental organizations in Kenya (with outreach to surrounding countries), Pakistan, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and soon expanding to Syria. Information is provided on topics such as education, climate, housing, cost of living, and employment.

### ***Other sources of information include:***

- "A Newcomer's Introduction to Canada" distributed by visa offices at time of visa issuance;
- a "Welcome to Canada Kit" provided to newcomers at five major entry airports that includes information on how to access services and resources in local communities; and
- In-person reception services provided by 'service-provider organizations' to government-assisted refugees arriving at major airports (Ports of Entry).

### **Programs in Canada**

As stated earlier, program delivery is mostly done by the not-for-profit sector. Programs are in place to help immigrants and refugees to orient and adapt to life in Canada. These programs also seek to battle xenophobia by dispelling myths. Integration programs in Canada attempt to address cultural awareness, foreign credential recogni-

tion, prior work and learning experience, and other factors that would lead to better understanding and respect.

For example, upon arrival government assisted refugees are met at the airport to ensure they have proper clothing and that they are able to travel to a reception house. There, they will receive temporary accommodation and basic orientation services for up to 6 weeks. This allows them to find more permanent housing, enroll their children in schools and start a new life. Government assisted refugees receive income support for a specified period, usually one year, through the "Resettlement Assistance Program".

"Private Sponsorship" is another avenue for refugees to gain access to Canada. Groups in Canada provide the necessary financial and emotional support for resettling refugees from abroad. These groups promote respect of immigrants by learning about their cultures and helping refugees to learn about Canadian values.

All immigrants and refugees are eligible for services under the "Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program", the "Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada" and the "Host Program". These programs provide social and economic bridging through orientation sessions to local community services, trauma counseling, job hunting clubs, translation and interpretation services, language instruction for adult newcomers in English or French, transportation and child-minding to participate in language courses, and a Buddy-type program which matches newcomers with an in-Canada host to sup-

port settlement and integration. This Host program is a good candidate for expansion into schools and with employers. Host exemplifies the two-way exchange to build respect and trust that is at the core of integration.

### **Dispersion**

Segregation and ghettos are signs that tell us that integration may not be occurring. There are no such signs in Canada at present. Immigrants are free to settle anywhere in Canada. And clearly, Canada's immigrant and refugee populations prefer large urban centres. Immigration today is a largely urban phenomenon with more than 85% of immigrants settling in cities compared with 57% of the Canadian-born. Over three-quarters of all immigrants go to three major cities: Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal.

Canada destines resettled refugees. They are for the most part sent to medium and large communities across the country taking into account such elements, as special service needs, family connections, skills, and presence of similar ethnic community. Some communities in Canada receive only refugees resettled from abroad, as this is the only group for whom Canada plays a role in selecting a community of final destination. In spite of all good planning, many refugees leave their original destination for the major urban centres that provide more employment, educational and cultural opportunities.

First generation immigrants tend to settle together initially but integrate into the broader communities with time. Issues related to

access to housing, health care, schools, and other infrastructure inadequacies sometimes exacerbate discrimination or expressions of intolerance. Whenever absorption capacity is exceeded, the majority has a tendency to fear the pressures of immigration.

Many communities and provinces seek a more even distribution of immigrants across Canada. To achieve such a goal will take enhanced community involvement to ensure employment opportunities and a welcoming environment.

### **Population on the decline**


All developed countries, including Canada, are facing slowing population growth and aging workforces. By 2031, all population growth in Canada will be due to immigration. We are not in danger of a population explosion through managed migration.

It is important to be aware of our context because it points out how important immigration is to Canada and therefore the significance of effective integration.

### **Labour market**

The level of importance of immigration to the labour market is growing. In 2001, immigrants accounted for 20% of the Canadian labour force and almost 70% of Canada's net labour force growth since 1991. By 2011, labour force growth is likely to depend solely on immigration.

Occupations requiring post-secondary education accounted for three-quarters of labour force growth between 1991 and 2001. By 2004, it is projected that over 70% of new jobs created are expected to



require at least some post-secondary education. Immigrants are particularly well set to meet those requirements. In 2001, 53% of the Canadian working age population (ages 25-64) had post-secondary level education while 61% of working age immigrants 25 to 64 had post-secondary qualifications.

### Employment rates

One of the measures we use to monitor economic integration is labour market performance. Labour market performance includes factors such as attachment to the labour market, wage scales, recruitment, retention and promotion rates. Where effective economic integration is occurring we would expect to find rates of employment that match the Canadian-born and rates of remuneration that match

levels of experience and training. We would also expect to find that newcomers are hired, retained and promoted at rates that match the Canadian-born.

Evolving gender differences in employment rates. Employment rates are discouraging for women:

Gap between Canadian-born men and very recent immigrant men between 25 and 54 years of age grew from 10% in 1990 to 13% in 1995 but returned to 10% in 2000.

Gap between very recent immigrant women and Canadian-born women between 25 and 54 years grew from 11% in 1990 to 22% in 1995 and remained at 21% in 2000.

### Employment earnings

Research has shown that, in spite of higher average education than the Canadian-born, recent immi-

grants are taking longer to catch up to the wages of their Canadian educational and experiential peers than previous immigrant groups. Researchers have also detected significant underemployment and wage inequity in the Canadian labour market as they affect newcomers:

- Immigrants with university degrees take approximately 9-10 years to catch up to the earnings of Canadians with university degrees;
- Immigrants with university degrees earn less than half of the amount earned by the average Canadian with a university degree one year after landing;
- Family immigrants and refugees take 15 years to catch up to the Canadian earnings average; and
- Immigrants with no knowledge of either official language at landing take 15 years to catch up to Canadian earnings average.

### Risk of exclusion

The percentage of recent immigrant families falling below low-income cut-off increased significantly from 1985 to 1997, from 23% to 39%. This increase did not occur for more established immigrants nor for native born Canadians.

### Major issues facing newcomers:

So we know, as illustrated above, that integration is not happening as effectively as we would like. The question is why. Is it due to systemic or structural barriers – is it linked to discrimination? Is it just a result of economic changes, new needs of a knowledge economy and a period of recession? No mat-

ter what the cause, there is broad consensus that certain barriers to integration must be addressed in order for immigrants to make the transition to full participation.

### **Language barriers**

Immigrants must have the necessary skills to find jobs and effectively participate in the labour market in any occupation. Current integration programs provide basic language skills to newcomers. In today's knowledge economy, occupationally specific language training and higher levels of language fluency are essential to maximum performance both in the labour market and in one's community.

### **Labour market access**

The higher their level of education, the better immigrants perform. The issue in Canada today is a fragmented system of foreign credential and experience recognition. There is no one consistent process to ensure that qualified immigrants can practice in regulated or licensed occupations. We need to systematize, across provinces and territories, the recognition of foreign educational and professional qualifications, as well as experience. When credentials and experience are evaluated, it is necessary to have programs in place to fill the educational, qualification and experience gaps. Immigrants should not be required to complete an entire degree program when only one course is missing. Prior learning assessments combined with practical work experience should be available to ensure that, for example, an experienced and

skilled plumber does not have to restart his or her career at the entry level.

Relevant labour market information on the Canadian workplace and employment services is key for immigrants. This allows them to make better choices about where to reside in Canada, as well as to equip themselves prior to arrival in Canada. Although the information and services provided under the Canadian Orientation Abroad program are a good start, this is an area where the level of information could be improved.

### **Public/employer attitudes**

Public and employer attitudes are key to promoting rapid inclusion and integration into the society and economy. Lack of knowledge often results in rejection or fear of the unknown. Expanding the range of our Host program to match more youth, as well as employers with immigrants and creating more bridging type programs would help Canadians to be even more accepting of immigrants. Public education programs may also be required where discrimination is suspected. A good example of our efforts in this area is the development of cultural profiles for sharing with service providers, police officers and university education faculties.

### **Multicultural citizenship**

Whether immigrant or refugee, the ultimate Canadian policy objective is full citizenship within an officially bilingual and multicultural polity. Canada encourages newcomers to adopt Canadian citizenship as an official symbolic act of alle-

giance and attachment. About 85% of immigrants take this step. Accession to official citizenship is not seen as the end of the journey, however. It is recognized that integration may require a lifetime; indeed, research shows that full integration sometimes requires a couple of generations.

### **Becoming a citizen**

I will not go into the details of becoming a citizen of Canada. However, there are some clear requirements including language and knowledge acquisition. The person must learn about rights and responsibilities, voting procedures, the political system and Canada as a nation; be 18 years of age, a permanent resident, and must have lived in Canada for at least three years. The grant of citizenship is normally done during a formal ceremony where the individual swears the oath of citizenship.

Becoming a Canadian citizen means accepting common values and respecting Canadian laws. Becoming a Canadian citizen also means exercising the right to vote. When asked at citizenship ceremonies, the most important aspects of becoming Canadian, most immigrants respond – I am now free to vote, to practice my religion, to express my views, to participate in politics. My children, boys and girls, will grow up to be whatever they would like to be!

### **Canadian values**

As a liberal democracy, Canada espouses certain core values to which it expects all its citizens to

adhere. Values such as mutual respect, the rule of law, equality and the peaceful resolution of disputes are seen as non-negotiable minimum expectations. In return, Canada guarantees such basic human rights as individual autonomy, freedom of association, freedom of religion, etc. It is clear that there are some things that Canadian society will not tolerate, such as the subjugation and abuse of women and children. Changes to fundamental values can only occur through the democratic process.

To be part of that process, one must vote and some must be more politically active. Running for elected office is a valid index of integration. Here we find that immigrants tend to participate in governments at rates slightly below or equal to the levels of the Canadian-born. In federal politics, power is still firmly in the hands of politicians of British or French origins. However, about 33% of federally elected politicians can claim some minority background and many of these politicians are immigrants.

A stable multicultural society depends upon the cultivation of a "common sense of belonging" among all citizens, not just those who govern. This sense of belonging cannot be ethnically based

since Canada is such a diverse society. Instead it must be political and "based on a shared commitment to the political community." Such a commitment to Canada's continuing existence and well being, implies that one cares enough for our country and its system of government not to harm its interests or undermine its integrity.

The sense of belonging must be fostered by according equal citizenship to both newcomers and the Canadian-born. This means that all citizens must know that there is a real chance that they can influence the evolution of Canadian society; in a sense, they must feel not only that they belong to Canada, but that Canada belongs to them.

### **A sense of belonging**

In addition to targeted settlement programs, Canada depends on its educational system to impart citizenship values to newcomers as well as the Canadian-born, because if substantive citizenship is our goal, then all Canadians must be "integrated" in a real sense. Labour market ministries also develop programs to assist Canadians to develop an attachment to the labour market while ministries of citizenship and heritage conduct

public education campaigns and support initiatives that foster pride and respect for Canadian institutions and cultural products. Special programs are also in place to encourage new Canadians to vote.

We attempt to create a welcoming attitude toward diversity by teaching the value of diversity in our schools, through public campaigns such as the Federal Government's "Canada: We All Belong" initiative and through diversity promotion and anti-racism campaigns conducted by our sister department of Canadian Heritage.

### **Our success**

Canada remains a cohesive society with low rates of inter-ethnic conflict and low rates of crime. Our long history of integrating immigrants and our recent history of welcoming immigrants without regard to race or ethnicity has been a successful experiment. Canadians are not complacent, however. We recognize that societal stability is ensured only by constant vigilance and sensitivity to the potential fault lines that might divide us. Canada's multicultural experiment remains a work in progress.

# Australia's immigration policy



James Jupp

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Australia has been an immigrant society since the British established a convict colony at Sydney in 1788. There have been few periods in which there has not been a steady stream of immigrants, the longest being between 1930 and 1947 due to the world depression and the Second World War. Even then Australia agreed to receive 7 000 Jewish refugees from the Nazis at the Evian conference of 1938. The outbreak of war a year later limited the effect of this agreement. At other times of economic depression, such as the 1840s and the 1890s, immigration has been very limited but continued to some part of Australia.

Immigration policy has gone through several historic phases, each of which has influenced subsequent practice. The period of convict transportation lasted from 1788 to 1840 in New South Wales, from 1804 to 1853 in Tasmania and from 1850 to 1868 in Western Australia. This system created methods of contracting ships to transport convicts across the world on

voyages, which could last up to six months. It also created systems of rationing, accommodation and allocation to work which were to be modified for free immigrants. An example of the transfer of facilities still exists in the Macquarie Street barracks in Sydney, which were built in 1819 for convicts but then converted to house free immigrants. Another example is the use of ships, which had transported convicts to move free immigrants. Sailing ships were used into the 1870s, being replaced by steamships until the 1960s and then by air.

## Assisted immigration

The next and longest period of immigration policy began in 1831 and lasted until 1982. This was the assistance of emigrants with their fares. Australia was unique in bringing in immigrants by state action and subsidy. From the 1790s free immigrants had been allowed to settle. But most were agricultural workers, brought by rich farmers from England who had been granted land. This was the normal method in Western Australia, which was founded in 1829. But it did not work very well because it was very expensive and Western Australia did not have much good agricul-

tural land – hence the adoption of a convict system when the other Australian colonies were departing from this practice. An alternative was developed in South Australia from 1836. This was to sell off public land and use the proceeds to bring out labourers who could otherwise not afford the fares. This method was combined with one in which the Poor Law system created in 1834 could also subsidise paupers in rural areas. The whole system was supervised from London, initially by the Poor Law Commission and then by the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission (1841–1870).

As the convict system was abandoned the other colonies took up the assisted passages system and modified it to suit their needs. The ultimate control rested in London and assistance was only given to British subjects – English, Irish and Scots. A few grants were given for German settlement but this was not generally approved. So that the main aim of the assisted passages system was to bring out agricultural labourers, to bring out women to remedy a serious gender imbalance, and to keep Australia British by limiting assistance to United Kingdom subjects. Those few who came from elsewhere were not prohibit-

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ed at this stage but were not an important element except for Germans in South Australia.

Assistance with fares continued for 150 years, which is unique in the history of immigration policy. One objective was to encourage immigrants to come to Australia rather than to the United States. This worked well for the English and Scots but not for the Irish, who greatly preferred America. Three major systems operated during the colonial period up until 1870, all of them supervised from London. These were: Government emigrants, who came in ships chartered by the Land and Emigration Commission; bounty immigrants, who were selected on behalf of established settlers needing labour who were paid for on arrival; and remittance immigrants who were paid for by relatives already in Australia.

After 1870 the colonial governments and then the Australian government created by federation in 1901, gained control of the system. However they still largely insisted on British subjects, except for Queensland which assisted significant numbers from Germany and Scandinavia. The colonies were also able to modify the occupations desired away from agricultural labourers and domestic servants. The largest intake of assisted immigrants during the colonial period was in Queensland in the 1880s. More immigrants arrived there than in any decade before or since. The colonies kept control of the systems until 1920 when full control passed to the Commonwealth of Australia under the 1901 constitution, where it remains. However the former colonies, now

States, kept a strong interest into the 1960s and often had additional schemes of their own.

For most of the nineteenth century anyone could enter Australia who could raise the fare. Many came out from Britain at their own expense. There was a common citizenship between Britain and Australia as a distinct Australian citizenship was not created until 1949. About half the British immigrants came with public assistance while the other half paid their own fares or were supported by employers, charities or trade unions. Most middle class occupations were not eligible for assistance. Essentially assistance involved transferring working class people from Britain to work in similar occupations in Australia. This continued to be the case right through into the 1960s. However the preferred occupations changed as the supply and demand for agricultural labourers dropped off. By the 1920s most assisted immigrants were urban workers.

### **White Australia**

While entry to Australia was relatively free the gold rushes of the 1850s to the 1890s attracted large numbers of Chinese. Pacific Island labourers were also brought in to work the growing sugar plantations of Queensland under harsh conditions – though not as slaves. At the same time large numbers of British workers were coming in and competing with the non-European immigrants. This led to a series of legislation and restrictions from the mid-1850s. The White Australia policy was developed in the 1880s and was implemented by the

new national government in 1901 through the Immigration Restriction Act. This allowed the immigration authorities to exclude anyone who was 'undesirable' and was used against non-Europeans until it was modified in the 1960s and finally abandoned in 1972. While the legislation never mentioned race it was administered in a strictly racist manner. The Pacific Islanders were returned to their homelands by 1906 and all other non-Europeans were effectively barred from entry except on a temporary basis.

Australian immigration policy after federation had three major aspects: it still favoured British immigration through the assisted passage system; it prevented non-European immigration for settlement altogether; and it discouraged but did not prohibit European migration. British immigrants who did not qualify for assistance were usually eligible to enter and settle without further restrictions. These policies led to the situation by 1945 where Australia could describe itself as "ninety-nine per cent white and ninety per cent British".

Policy began to change as a result of the fears created by the Japanese advance towards Australia from 1941. Once the war was over Australia sought to continue its policy of paying for immigrants to come in large numbers, but to be employed in public works and manufacturing rather than agriculture. The preference remained for British immigrants and they made half the total allowed in and more than half those assisted into the 1960s. However Australia, like Canada and the United States, also



took in 170 000 Displaced Persons from European camps, mainly from east European states occupied by the Soviet Red Army. This was a major departure and began the process where by Australia moved from being a 'British' to being a 'multicultural' society. Still adhering to White Australia, agreements were signed with various European governments as well as with the United Kingdom. These laid down the terms under which Europeans would be paid their passages and found employment, which included wages at trade union rates to avoid exploitation.

These agreements, which ranged from Malta and Italy in the early stages to Turkey and Yugoslavia towards the end, changed the face of most Australian cities. British predominance in the intake gradually declined, although about 80 per cent of British immigrants did receive assistance, more than for anyone else other than the Displaced Persons and other refugees.

### Post-war policy

Bringing in non-British (but still white) immigrants in large numbers presented several problems, which the state sought actively to solve. These included majority prejudice against foreigners, language difficulties, finding employment and generally integrating a range of ethnic minorities into what had been an overwhelmingly British and Irish society. At first assimilation was sought, which meant virtual disappearance of any distinct traits. This obviously failed and policy gradually shifted towards multiculturalism. Policy also shift-

ed away from racism and the White Australia policy. This finally came together in 1972 with the announcement by the new Labor government of Gough Whitlam that Australia was a multicultural society and that immigration policy would be non-discriminatory. These changes were endorsed by the more conservative Fraser government which replaced Whitlam at the end of 1975. These very major shifts were accepted on a bipartisan basis for the next few years. In the mid-1970s Australia accepted large refugee intakes from Vietnam and Lebanon, the greatest intake of non-Europeans for over a century.

### A state controlled system

Australian immigration policy has always involved a strong element of state control, not just to limit entry but also to attract and settle preferred immigrants. This control did not apply to white British subjects, including New Zealanders. Nor in the post-War period did it prevent many Europeans from coming at their own expense as well as with assistance. However, from the 1970s onwards state control was gradually extended to all immigrants and public assistance was withdrawn except for refugees. Selection eased to be on racist or even national grounds but also became stricter and was eventually extended to the British and New Zealanders. Australia became one of the few developed countries which requires a visa for all entrants, whether permanent settlers or temporary arrivals. New Zealanders, who were excluded from this requirement, are now

visaed on entry. All others must secure a visa in advance. This allows the Australian state to pick and choose precisely who it wants to admit and under what circumstances. The intake is planned in predominantly economic terms, with allowance for family reunion and refugees. Australia has had a specialist Immigration Department since 1945, which is normally represented in the Cabinet by its Minister. This Department develops and modifies the immigration programme on an annual basis, taking into account the state of the economy and likely costs involved in general.

This process of detailed planning began to some extent in 1947 but was progressively strengthened between 1979 and 1988. It has become even stricter under the conservative Howard government elected in 1996. Essentially there are three major categories for permanent settlement. These are: family reunion, 'skills', and humanitarian. Since 1966 the skilled category has replaced the family reunion as the major element. The refugee intake has remained at about 12 000 per annum for many years. Family reunion stands at about 34 000 and the skilled intake at 40 000. New Zealanders are not included as part of the planned intake and now form the largest numbers from any one country, replacing the British in 1996. The intake has shifted quite markedly in recent years towards Asia, with a major element being Chinese from the Peoples Republic, Malaysia and Singapore.

The humanitarian intake has come from Indochina, Yugoslavia and Lebanon, but also from a wide range of non-European countries.

Only 4 000 within this category are strictly refugees within the UN High Commissioner for Refugees definitions under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.

Another recent shift has been from permanent to temporary residence. For the first time, in 2001, temporary entrants exceeded permanent. This included growing numbers of overseas students, mainly from Asia; temporary business visitors; and working youth under a series of agreements the largest of which is with the United Kingdom. Tourists are not included in this total but they too, mainly come from Asia and especially Japan. This great increase in non-Europeans as settlers, refugees and temporary visitors revived fears of other races during the 1980s. This led to the rise (and rapid collapse) of the One Nation Party in 1998 and to public debates about the meaning of multiculturalism in a more racially diverse society.

### **Current issues and problems**

By the end of the twentieth century on-quarter of Australians had been born overseas and another quarter were the children of immigrants. The great majority of these were also citizens, as naturalisation was available after residence of two years. This often led politicians to declare that Australia was "the most multicultural country in the world". This was, however, scarcely true. The 2001 Census showed that 80 per cent normally spoke English and that two-thirds gave their ancestry as Australia,

English, Scottish or Irish. About ten per cent were of non-European origin, including Aborigines. Less than two per cent were Muslims. This was certainly quite different from the ethnic makeup in 1947 but less ethnically and racially diverse than Canada or the United States. It was however, enough of a change to raise the profile of racial issues in local politics for a while.

Because Australian immigrants have usually been carefully selected they do not suffer the same levels of disadvantage or exploitation as are often found in other situations. The non-British intake between 1947 and 1972 were largely chosen for factory work but within a full employment economy and with equal access to trade union wages and conditions under the industrial arbitration system. The still constitute an important element of the working class in the major cities. But European immigration of this type has now almost ended, as has the intake from the British working class. With the ending of assisted passages in 1983 British numbers dropped rapidly to below ten per cent of the total. Moreover those coming were much more likely to be from the professional and managerial classes as they were often paid for by their employers. The main entrants to manual work in recent years have been from the humanitarian and family reunion streams. But they have been coming into an economy with a consistent level of over six per cent unemployment. This level is greatly exceeded, for example, among Vietnamese and Lebanese. This creates a disadvantaged minority with corresponding settlement problems.

Because Australian governments have accepted the need to provide settlement assistance such as English teaching, there are few large pockets of serious disadvantage comparable to those suffered by the small Aboriginal minority. But a rundown of manufacturing has certainly had an impact on less skilled non-English-speaking immigrants and their children. Official policy, by shifting towards a skilled intake, has tried to avoid these problems. This has meant that Asians, other than refugees, are generally better educated and have higher incomes than the national average. This is particularly true for those from countries such as India, Singapore, Malaysia or Sri Lanka, which have inherited English-language education systems. The fear that non-Europeans would lower standards, which was strong in the past, is simply unfounded.

The recent crisis over asylum seekers has shown up some of the continuing problems in managing a strict and rigid intake system, which aims to maximise skilled intakes. Fear of boat people coming down from Asia has been an undercurrent in popular Australian thinking for a century. Reacting to this those attempting to seek asylum in Australia by this method have been treated with great severity since 1991. They have been subject to mandatory and irrevocable internment in remote desert camps, run by private prison companies since 1997. A further refinement came in 2001 with the "pacific solution". This involved sending asylum seekers rescued at sea to the independent states of Papua New Guinea and Nauru, where many still re-

main. Australia thus avoided its obligations under the UN Convention and has taken only some those found to be refugees within that Convention, with New Zealand taking many others. Almost all those concerned were from Iraq or Afghanistan, in both of which countries Australian troops have been involved in the overthrow of the governments from which the asylum seekers were fleeing.

The 'burden' of asylum seekers coming towards Australia by boat has been quite small. The United Kingdom, with three times the population, has taken in more than twenty times as many in recent

years. The Australian government has, however, taken advantage of the distant asylum seeker crises in Europe to make it almost impossible to use this avenue of escape. Australia's long tradition of taking in refugees, extending back at least to the Evian agreement of 1938, have been seriously restricted. While highly controversial, Australian policy has been endorsed at the 2001 election. It was shown that deliberate manipulation of public fears was electorally productive. While the One Nation party disintegrated, the conservative majority took over some of its policies and appeals.

The strength of the Australian immigration policy has always been that isolation made it possible to determine who would settle. This is still the case despite the greater ease of travel. Economic imperatives have recently tended to submerge humanitarian considerations. Australia has been free from most of the social and economic problems associated with mass migration elsewhere. But this is often due to deliberate exclusion or discouragement of those who most need to seek a new life in a very prosperous and thinly inhabited society.




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# Mitä voimme oppia Kanadan ja Uuden-Seelannin onnistuneista työvoiman maahanmuuttopolitiikoista?



Arno Tanner

## English abstract

Finland may need a large pool of foreign workforce in the near future. Thus, the experiences of the more developed immigration countries such as Canada and New Zealand are valuable for a successful Finnish policy and practice. Although the point systems of these countries are not applicable in the Finnish system yet, the constantly developing systems bring valuable information about the right stressings: The importance of integrative adaptability and networks,

sufficient language skills upon entry, and a reliable and elastic system for estimating the current needs of the labour market are all essential in labour immigrant selection, both for the success of the host country and for the labour immigrant himself/herself.

Länsi-Eurooppaa kohtaa YK:n arvion (2001) mukaan oleellisia demografisia muutoksia tulevien kymmenen vuoden aikana; Mikäli korvaaviin toimenpiteisiin ei ryhdytä, monen länsieurooppalaisen maan väestö vanhenee ja alkaa pian vähetä. Suomen kaltaisissa pienemmissä maissa yhä pienenevä työikäinen väestö joutuu vastaamaan esimerkiksi eläkkeelle siirtyvien suurten ikäluokkien hoitotarpeisiin. Myös muilla aloilla työvoiman tarve saattaa lisääntyä.

Jää nähtäväksi, kuinka paljon a) poliittiset pyrkimykset nykyisten kotimaisten resurssien kehittämiseen, aktivoimiseen ja uudelleenjakamiseen, b) tehtävien ja työympäristöjen edelleen jatkuva rationalisointi sekä c), muilla aloilla kuin palveluissa, työprosessien ja resurssien siirto kehitysmaihin, vähentävät Länsi-Euroopan maiden

rajojen ulkopuolelta hankittavan työvoiman tarvetta lähitulevaisuudessa.

Huolimatta näistä vasta-aiheista, jotka saattavat vähentää todellista työvoiman tarvetta, on hyödyllistä valmistautua tilanteeseen, jossa länsieurooppalaisten maiden tulee olla valmiita vastaanottamaan suurempia määriä koulutettuja maahanmuuttajia. Tarvitaan lisää tietoa maahanmuuttajien valinnasta; parhaita kokemuksia pitkästä työvoiman maahanmuuton traditiosta on löydettävissä vanhoista anglosaksisista asuttajamaista Yhdysvalloista, Kanadasta, Australiasta ja Uudesta-Seelannista. Kiinnostavaa on myös kysyä, mitä voisimme Suomessa ottaa opiksi näiden maiden kehittyneistä maahanmuuttopolitiikoista.

On tärkeää pitää mielessä, että käsitteellä työvoiman maahanmuutto tarkoitetaan tässä eksplisiittisesti vapaaehtoista, laillista työvoiman muuttoliikettä ja tällaiseen liikkeeseen vastaavia kansallisia työvoiman maahanmuuttopolitiikkoja. Huolimatta osittain samoista kaikkeen maahanmuuttoon liittyvistä positiivisista tavoitteista (esim. saapumismaaintegraatio

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*Kirjoittaja on yhteiskuntatieteiden tohtori ja tutkija Ulkomaalaisvirastossa, jossa hänen vastuullaan on mm. muuttoliikkeen, maahanmuuttopolitiikkojen, rasmin ja etnisten suhteiden kansainvälisen tutkimuksen analyysi. Tannerin Tampereen yliopiston politiikan laitokselle kirjoittama väitöskirja "Siirtolaisuus, valtio ja politiikka – Kanadan, Sveitsin ja Uuden-Seelannin työvoiman maahanmuutto ja politiikka 1975–2001" julkaistiin äskettäin Ulkomaalaisviraston julkaisuja -sarjassa.*

ja maahanmuuttajan työllistymisen), muut tärkeät maahanmuuton ja maahanmuuttopolitiikan lajit, kuten pakolaisuus, ovat käsitellyn ulkopuolella.

## **Kanada ja Uusi-Seelanti luottavat pistelaskujärjestelmiin**

Suurien työvoiman maahanmuuttajamäärien hallintaan, arviointiin ja valintaan Kanadan ja Uuden-Seelannin kaltaiset suuret maahanmuuttajamaat ovat jo vuosikymmeniä käyttäneet erilaisia, korostetun yksilökeskeisiä pistelaskujärjestelmiä: vapaaehtoisen muutto liikkeen seurauksena laillisesti maahan pyrkivä henkilö arvioidaan ominaisuuksiensa ja työmarkkinoille soveltuvuutensa perusteella, ja laitetaan sen jälkeen muiden samankaltaisten maahanpyrkijöiden kanssa järjestykseen.

Pistelaskujärjestelmillä on siis kolme funktiota; soveltuvuuden arviointi, tasapuolinen järjestykseen laittaminen ja lopulta valinta. Tyypillisesti vuosittain asetetaan ensin poliittinen katto, kiintiö, sille määrälle, joka maahan työvoimaa halutaan. Kiintiö perustellaan mm. maan kulloisellakin työvoima- ja poliittisella tilanteella. Sitten arvioidaan aikaisempien vuosien perusteella se pistelaskujärjestelmän minimipistemäärä, jonka ylittäjä olisi tuon kiintiön verran.

Itse pistelaskujärjestelmä arvioi mm. seuraavia seikkoja: Kuinka hyvin kyseinen työvoimamaahanmuuttajakandidaatti voi hyödyttää saapumismaan työmarkkinoita? Mitkä ovat hänen mahdollisuutensa saada töitä ja/tai pysyä työelämässä onnistuneesti? Mitkä ovat

hänen edellytyksenä integroitua saapumismaahansa tyydyttävästi? Tarkastelen seuraavaksi Kanadan ja Uuden-Seelannin järjestelmiä.

## **Kanadassa tärkeintä ovat integroituvuus ja valmiit verkostot**

Kanadalla on vuosikymmeniä pitkä työvoiman maahanmuuttotraditio; pääministeri King esitti jo vuonna 1947 korkean profiilin puheessaan yksiselitteisesti: ”Without labour immigration we cannot grow”. Yli 200.000 vuosittaisella maahanmuuttajalla, samanaikaisella jatkuvalla talouskasvulla, varsin matalalla maahanmuuttajien työttömyysprosentilla ja vähäisillä rasismiluvuilla tänään, Kanada on onnistunut verrattain hyvin työvoiman maahanmuuttopolitiikassaan.

Vuodesta 1967 lähtien maassa on käytetty pistelaskujärjestelmää. Vaikka tätä ensimmäistä politiikkaa lähtökohtaisesti kiitettiin – etnisten perusteiden korvaamisesta henkilökohtaisilla ominaisuuksilla – painotukset olivat väärä: Hyvin matala ikä ja korkea muodollinen koulutus muodostivat maksimissaan 30 prosenttia kokonaispistemäärästä. Koska työmarkkinoiden tarpeita ei arvioitu, maahan sekä pyrki että pääsi liikaa nuoria maistereita ja tohtoreita, jotka joutuivat ottamaan vastaan mitä tahansa työtä. Lisäksi koska pistelaskujärjestelmässä ei annettu lisäpisteitä syrjemmälle asettumisesta, Toronton, Montrealin ja Vancouverin alueet vetivät enemmän maahanmuuttajia kuin pystyivät integroidaan. Tämä oli johtaa vakavaan ghettoutumiseen.

Myöhemmät pistelaskujärjestelmät ovat kuitenkin tarkastelleet yhä paremmin työmarkkinoiden tarpeita ja maahanmuuttajien tasaisempaa demografista jakautumista. Myös maahanmuuttajien koulunkin tarvittavat erityistaidot ja kyky integroitua lisäsivät pistelaskujärjestelmissä merkittävyyttään, sekä muodollisen koulutuksen että liian nuoren iän kustannuksella. Lisäksi 1990-luvulla maahanmuuttoviranomaisen antamat subjektiiviset soveltuvuus pisteet vähenivät. Tämä toi luonnollisesti pistelaskujärjestelmään vielä läpinäkyvää ennustettavuutta, niin poliitikantekijöille kuin maahanmuuttajakandidaateillekin.

Vuoden 1998 pistelaskujärjestelmässä (ks. kuvio 1.) oltiin päästy siihen, että työmarkkinatarpeet, henkilön erityistaidot, kielitaito ja integroituvuus toivat jo suuren osan pisteistä. Ikä ja muodollinenkin koulutus olivat vielä järjestelmässä, nyt kuitenkin siten, että täydet pisteet on mahdollista saada vielä 44-vuotiaana, ja toisaalta ylioppilastutkinnostakin (13/110 max.) sai vain 3 pistettä vähemmän kuin tohtorinhatusta (16/110 max.). Näin 44-vuotias pelkän ylioppilastutkinnon suorittaja sai vain kolme pistettä vähemmän kuin 25-vuotias tohtorinhatun suorittaja. Tärkeämmäksi nousivat muut seikat; henkilön todellinen kyky menestyä ja integroitua Kanadan yhteiskunnassa ja työelämässä. 2000-luvulla kehitys on suunnannut vielä voimakkaampaan kielitaidon ja henkilön saapumismaassa jo olemassa olevien verkostojen arvostamiseen.

Kanadan pistelaskujärjestelmälle on ominaista se, että pistelaskun käyttöönottoa itseään ei

**Kuvio 1. Vuoden 1998 ehdotus vapaaehtoisten maahanmuuttajien kategorisoimiseksi**

|                                |                  |                             |            |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|------------|
| <b>KOULUTUS</b>                |                  | <b>IKÄ</b>                  |            |
| peruskoulu                     | 5                | 18 vuotta                   | 4          |
| ylioppilas                     | 10               | 19 vuotta                   | 6          |
| ammattikoulu                   | 10               | 20 vuotta                   | 8          |
| suor. korkeakoulu              | 13               | 21–44 vuotta                | 10         |
| yliopistotutkinto              | 15               | 45 vuotta                   | 8          |
| maisteri tai tohtori           | 16               | 46 vuotta                   | 6          |
|                                |                  | 47 vuotta                   | 4          |
| <b>TYÖKOKEMUS</b>              |                  | 48 vuotta                   | 2          |
| <b>(ETF-tekijän mukaan)</b>    |                  | 49 vuotta                   | 0          |
| 1 vuosi                        | 2                | <b>KOULUTUSTEKIJÄ ETF</b>   |            |
| 2 vuotta                       | 2 tai 4          | max.                        | 18         |
| 3 vuotta                       | 2 t. 4 t. 6      | <b>VALMIS TYÖPAIKKA</b>     |            |
| 4 vuotta                       | 2 t. 4 t. 6 t. 8 |                             | 10         |
| <b>ko. työkokemuksen tarve</b> |                  | <b>KIELITAITO (E J A R)</b> |            |
| <b>Kanadassa</b>               |                  | max.                        | 15         |
| min.                           |                  | 1. kieli                    |            |
| max.                           |                  | lukeminen                   | max. 3     |
|                                |                  | kirjoittaminen              | max. 3     |
| <b>DEMOGRAFINEN TEKIJÄ</b>     |                  | puhuminen                   | max. 3     |
| kaikille vuonna 1999           |                  | 2. kieli                    |            |
|                                |                  | lukeminen                   | max. 2     |
| <b>HENKILÖKOHTAINEN</b>        |                  | kirjoittaminen              | max. 2     |
| <b>SOPIVUUS</b>                |                  | puhuminen                   | max. 2     |
| max.                           | 10               | <b>TEOREETTINEN</b>         |            |
|                                |                  | <b>MAKSIMI</b>              | <b>110</b> |
| <b>LÄHISUKULAINEN</b>          |                  | <b>HENKILÖKOHTAINEN</b>     |            |
| <b>KANADASSA</b>               |                  | <b>MINIMI</b>               | <b>70</b>  |
| vain kerran                    | 5                |                             |            |

ole juurikaan kritisoitu; järjestelmää on pidetty läpinäkyvänä, oikeudenmukaisena ja hyvin ennakoitavana, varsinkin Kanadan tilanteessa, jossa ulkomaisen työvoiman tarve on suuri ja tarjonta tätäkin suurempi. Kritiikki on kohdistunut lähinnä pistelaskujärjestelmän sisäisiin painotuksiin; järjestelmää on korjattu tyydyttävästi kritiikin osoittamaan suuntaan siten, että vastalauseet ovat viime aikoina hiljentyneet.

Myös Kanadan vuosikymmeniä pitkä vakaa, positiivinen ta-

louskehitys viittaa siihen, etteivät noin 200.000 maahanmuuttajaa vuosittain ole painolasti: Maan talous on vuosien 1982 ja 1991 pysähtymisiä lukuunottamatta kasvanut viimeiset 40 vuotta, ja pääosin yli 2 prosentin vuosivauhtia, huolimatta noin 200.000 maahanmuuttajasta vuosittain. Koko 1990-luvun kokonaistyöttömyys on vähentynyt.

Työmarkkinatarpeiden paremman huomioimisen jälkeen, vuoden 1978 politiikassa, maahanmuuttajatyövoima on Kanadassa

työllistynyt hyvin, eikä ole osaltaan ollut taloutta heikentämässä. Päinvastoin, hyvin valikoitu työvoimamaahanmuuttaja nähtiin vuoden 1995 politiikassa jo niin kiistattomana talouskasvun välineenä, että hakijan työmarkkinatiedot syrjäyttivät perinteisesti tärkeän integraatiokyvyn pistelaskujärjestelmässä. Ammattitaitoinen ulkomainen työvoima on nähty suoranaisena nousun moottorina kaikissa suhdanteissa.

### Uusi-Seelanti on oivaltanut kielitaidon merkityksen

Uuden-Seelannin pistelaskujärjestelmä on oleellisesti samanlainen, joskin poikkeaa kolmessa mielessä Kanadan järjestelmästä; Ensinnäkin se rakennettiin vasta 1980-luvun lopulla, jolloin työväenpuolue tuli valtaan, ja sai lopulta myös oikeistoposition työvoiman systematisoidun maahanmuuton taakse.

Toiseksi, Uuden-Seelannin ensimmäinen pistelaskujärjestelmä ei korostanut riittävästi tulijan kielitaitoa, mikä kumuloitui 1990-luvun puolessavälissä tilanteeseen, jossa aasialaisten maahanmuutto kielitaidottomine perheineen oli joutaa vakavaan eristäytymiseen. (ks. kuvio 2.)

Hyvän integraation kannalta painotukset olivat aluksi puutteellisia: Uuteen-Seelantiin pääsi 1990-luvun alussa henkilö, jolla oli pitkä työkokemus, mikä oli sinänsä hyvä. Vahvoilla olivat kuitenkin myös koulutetut, mutta kielitaidottomat (kielitaitoa ei ollut pisteytetty), nuoret henkilöt (25–29-vuotiaat), joilla oli runsaasti rahaa ja perhe mukana. Monet nuoret (10 lisäpistettä) ja koulutetut (10–12 lisä-

pistettä) aasialaiset liikemiehet, joilla ei ollut aikomustakaan tehdä maassa töitä, sijoittivat maahan 200 000 Uuden-Seelannin dollaria (2 lisäpistettä) toivat perheensä maahan (3 lisäpistettä) ja lapset Aucklandin ja Wellingtonin kova-tasoisin kouluihin, ja lähtivät sitten itse takaisin Bangkokiin tai Singaporeen. Pistelaskujärjestelmä ei siis palvellut työvoiman maahanmuuttoa, vaan lähtömaihinsa jo palanneiden henkilöiden – politiikan alkuperäisten kohteiden – eristyviä, varakkaita perheitä.

Tällaisten maahanmuuttajien integraatiolle uusiseelantilaiseen yhteiskuntaan ei ollut edellytyksiä. Sittemmin maahanmuuttajan ja myös hänen perheensä kielitaitoon on kuitenkin ryhdytty kiinnittämään enemmän huomiota. Vuonna 1995 politiikkaa muutettiin odotetusti niin, että englannin kielen osaamiskriteerejä tiukennettiin ja hyväksytyjen hakemusten määrää alennettiin. Ensisijaisen oleskeluluvan hakijan tuli aina osallistua englannin kielen kokeeseen, samoin yli 16-vuotiaiden perheenjäsenten. Mikäli kielitestiä ei läpäisty, hakijan tuli maksaa 20 000 Uuden-Seelannin dollarin arvoinen vakuus, joka palautettiin kokonaisuudessaan, mikäli hakija läpäisi kielitestin kolmessa kuukaudessa oleskeluluvan saamisesta. Mikäli hakija läpäisi testin vuoden sisällä, palautettiin 14 000 dollaria, ja mikäli ei, mitään ei palautettu.

1990-luvun puoleenväliin asti tapahtuneesta eristäytymiskehityksestä johtuu myös Kanadaan nähden suurempi rasismi, jota ei, huolimatta kielitaitovaatimusten ja integraatiokyvyn vaatimusten kiristämisestä, ole edelleenkään saatu täysin kuriin.

**Kuvio 2. Pistelaskujärjestelmä vuonna 1991**

| <b>KOULUTUS</b>         |    | <b>KOTOUTUMISTEKIJÄT</b><br>(max. 7 pistettä) |   |
|-------------------------|----|---|---|
| Peruskoulu              | 10 |   |   |
| Keskiasteen tutkinto    | 11 |   |   |
| Korkeakoulututkinto     | 12 |   |   |
| <b>TYÖLLISTETTÄVYYS</b> |    | <b>Uuteen-Seelantiin sijoitettavat varat</b>  |   |
| <b>Työkokemus</b>       |    | NZ\$ 100 000                                  | 1 |
| 2 vuotta                | 1  | NZ\$ 200 000                                  | 2 |
| 4 vuotta                | 2  |   |   |
| 6 vuotta                | 3  |   |   |
| 8 vuotta                | 4  |   |   |
| 10 vuotta               | 5  |   |   |
| 12 vuotta               | 6  |   |   |
| 14 vuotta               | 7  |   |   |
| 16 vuotta               | 8  |   |   |
| 18 vuotta               | 9  |   |   |
| 20 vuotta               | 10 |   |   |
| Työtarjous              | 5  |   |   |
| <b>Ikä (max. 55)</b>    |    | <b>Kumppanin koulutus</b>                     |   |
| 18–24 vuotta            | 8  | Perustutkinto                                 | 1 |
| 25–29 vuotta            | 10 | Keskiasteen tutkinto                          | 2 |
| 30–34 vuotta            | 8  |   |   |
| 35–39 vuotta            | 6  |   |   |
| 40–44 vuotta            | 4  |   |   |
| 45–49 vuotta            | 2  |   |   |
|                         |    | <b>Työkokemus Uudessa-Seelannissa</b>         |   |
|                         |    | 1 vuosi                                       | 1 |
|                         |    | 2 vuotta                                      | 2 |
|                         |    | Perhe oleskelee jo                            | 3 |
|                         |    | <b>TEOREETTINEN MAKSIMI 38</b>                |   |
|                         |    | <b>OPTIMAALIMAKSIMI 36</b>                    |   |
|                         |    | <b>HENKILÖKOHTAINEN MINIMI 25</b>             |   |

Uuden-Seelannin pistelaskujärjestelmää ei lopulta instituutiona ole laajasti kritisoitu. Ongelmana on pikemminkin nähty järjestelmän muutosta edeltävän poliittisen prosessin hitaus: noususuhdanne on jo ehtinyt muuttua laskusuhdanteeksi ennen kuin kiintiöitä on saatu kasvatettua, pistelaskua höllytettyä ja maahanmuuttoa edistettyä.

Pitkän tähtäimen myönteisistä talousvaikutuksista on kuitenkin raportoitu. Jacques Pootin mukaan maahanmuutto on saanut Uudessa-Seelannissa aikaan dynaamisen prosessin, joka lisää sijoituksia, innovaatioita ja erilaistumista, mikä

tekee talouskasvun mahdolliseksi. Korkean nettomuuton aikana kokonaistyöttömyys ei ole lisääntynyt, ja kansantuotteen on todettu kasvavan nopeammin kuin matalan nettomuuton aikana. Uusi-Seelanti on siis hyötynyt tällaisesta valikoivasta työvoimamaahanmuutosta, mistä kertoo sekin, että 1980- ja 1990-luvun vaihteessa oikeisto-oppositiokin siirtyi rekrytoivan maahanmuuton kannalle. Tänäkin päivänä työvoiman maahanmuuttoa pidetään arvokkaana tapana korvata Uuden-Seelannin omaa aivovuotoa sekä lisäarvon antajana maan inhimilliselle pääomalle.

## Moderni pistelaskujärjestelmä on läpinäkyvä ja oikeudenmukainen apuväline

Tilanteessa, jossa vauraalla ja demokraattisella länsimaalla on vahva maahanmuuttotraditio ja vähintään tyydyttävästi toimivat etniset suhteet, voidaan perustellusti käyttää kehittynyttä pistelaskujärjestelmää tyydyttämään suurta työvoiman kysyntää vielä suuremmasta ulkomaisesta tarjonnasta. Tällaisissa olosuhteissa pistelaskujärjestelmä asettaa maahan pyrkivän työvoiman järjestyksen oikeudenmukaisella, läpinäkyvällä ja ennakoitavalla tavalla. Käytettävät pistelaskujärjestelmät ovat julkisessa tiedossa, ja maahanpyrkijä voi ennalta arvioida mahdollisuutensa maahanpääsyyn.

Työvoimamaahanmuuttoon käytetty moderni pistelaskujärjestelmä on eettisesti kestävä. Se ei päästä tai ole päästämättä maahan henkilön kansallisuuden, etnisyyden, uskonnon tai muun irrelevantin seikan perusteella – toisin kuin ennen järjestelmän käyttöönottoa, Kanadassa ennen vuotta 1967 ja Uudessa-Seelannissa ennen vuotta 1986. Päinvastoin, systeemi korostaa sellaisia yksilön ominaisuuksia, jotka tekevät todennäköisemmäksi henkilön inklusion saapumismaan yhteiskuntaan ja työmarkkinoille.

Toisin sanoen, päinvastoin kuin eettisesti arveluttavaan kollektiiviseen poissulkuun (collective exclusion), onnistunut pistelaskujärjestelmä voi parhaimmillaan johtaa yksilön ”sisäytymiseen” (individual inclusion) yhteiskuntaan. Päivitetyn ja modernin järjestelmän pohjalta maahan päässeellä

henkilöllä on hyvät edellytykset parempiin henkilökohtaisiin kontakteihin saapumismaassa niin työ- kuin yksityiselämässään. Hän todennäköisesti integroituu paremmin.

Eettisesti ottaen poistettavaa tai muutettavaa ei siis ole. Pikemminkin pistelaskujärjestelmään voisi näissä maissa lisätä kiellon rekrytoida maasta, johon jo valmiiksi kohdistuu voimakas aivo-voiton paine. Yhden maan kiello ei tietenkään riitä, mutta vaikkapa arvostetun Kanadan aloite asiassa saattaisi parhaimmillaan johtaa siihen, että pienemmät maat seuraisivat esimerkkiä.

## Oppia Suomelle?

Vaikka pistelaskujärjestelmää ei syystä tai toisesta voitaisikaan suurten ikäluokkien eläköityessä ottaa käyttöön, Kanadan ja Uuden-Seelannin järjestelmien kehityksestä on kuitenkin ammennettavissa hyvin paljon oppia siitä, mitkä ominaisuudet ovat maahanmuuttajan antaman taloushyödyn ja integraatiokyvyn kannalta oleellisia.

Tärkeää ovat riittävä kielitaito ja eriytymisen, ghettoutumisen estäminen. Maahanmuuttajien kasautumista ilman valtaväestökontakteja pienelle alueelle on ehdottomasti vältettävä. Nämä tavoitteet toimivat vuorovaikutuksessa toistensa kanssa. Perheen lasten koulukontaktit ja kielitaidon kohentaminen antavat lupauksia paremmasta tulevast, vaikka vanhemman kielitaito ja kontaktit jäisivätkin aivan alussa vähäisemmiksi. Kuitenkin on vaadittava heti myös pähäkijan hyvää kielitaitoa, tai mikäli kielitaidossa on puutteita haki-

jalla, jonka erityistaitoja muuten tarvitaan, voitaisiin ottaa käyttöön yllä esitelty Uuden-Seelannin panttijärjestelmä. Suomen kielen oppiminen on tunnetusti vaikeaa, joten Uuden-Seelannin ajat voisi kolminkertaistaa. Mikäli ala/työpaikka on englanninkielinen, voisi englannin kielikin riittää, ainakin Helsingin, Salon ja Turun kaltaisissa kaupungeissa.

Kielitaitoon osittain liittyen vielä tärkeämpää on sopeutumiskyky. Sellaista työvoiman maahanmuuttoa tulee suosia, jossa perhe matkustaa yhdessä, ja maassa on jo sukulaisia. Tällaisen maahanmuuton on todettu integroituvan parhaiten. Globaalitasolla tällaisen muuton vaarana on vastikkeeton aivovuoto, mikäli ei katsota, että henkilö tulee aivovuotovapaalta alueelta.

Ylivoimaisesti tärkeintä on kuitenkin katsoa jollain systematisoidulla (Suomesta vielä puuttuvalla) tavalla, mitkä kunkin ajan työvoimatarpeet ovat, ja listata ne läpinäkyvään ja hyvin (jopa kansainvälisesti) mediassa olevaan muotoon. Yksilötasolla valmis työpaikka on hyvä vakuutus, samoin maahanmuuttajan laaja ja monipuolinen ammatillinen osaaminen. Nämä edesauttavat mahdollisimman nopeaa pääsyä omaa koulutusta vastaavaan työhön, mitä on pidettävä tärkeänä tavoitteena.

Suomen kaltaiselle, edelleen melko muukalaisvastaiselle maalle, jota harva potentiaalinen maahanmuuttaja tuntee, on vielä enenaikaista ehdottaa tällaista systematisoitua järjestelmää maahanmuuttajakandidaattien yksimitalliseksi arvioimiseksi. Poliittisen tahdon, virallisen kysynnän ja laajan ulkomaalaisen työvoiman



tarjonnan puute ruokkivat toinen toisiaan. Tämä noidankehä aiheuttaa sen, että huolimatta mahdollisista suuristakin tarpeista lähivuosina, ulkomaisen työvoiman kysynnästä puhuvat Suomessa tänä päivänä lähinnä tiedemiehet, tutkijat, työnantajajärjestöt ja ajoittain media – harvemmin äänestäjistään huolestuneet poliitikot. Mitä tulee ulkomaiseen tarjontaan, se saadaan toistaiseksi tyydyttävästi sijoitettua tarvitseville aloille ja yrityksiin työ- ja lupaviranomaisten ad hoc -toimin-

nalla, vaikka lupa-asiat saattavatkin joskus viedä kauan.

Vähäisen tahdon, kysynnän ja tarjonnan kehä on murettava; ensin on erotettava käsitteet pakolaisuus ja siirtolaisuus kokonaan ja selkeästi toisistaan. Sitten on pohdittava omia asenteitamme ja työmarkkinoille soveltuvien ulkomaa-laisten muassaan tuomia haittoja ja hyötyjä. Jos liian myöhään todetaan, että ihmisiä tarvitaan, eikä oma väki riitä, on peli menetetty. Osaajat siirtyvät maahanmuutolle valmiimpiin maihin, joissa resurssit

otetaan ilomielin vastaan. Siksi asennemuutoksen on alettava tänään, ja sen peruspilari on tieto muista Suomen kaltaisista maista.

### Lähteistä

Artikkeli perustuu YTT Arno Tannerin väitöskirjaan: ”Siirtolaisuus, valtio ja politiikka – Kanadan, Sveitsin ja Uuden-Seelannin työvoiman maahanmuutto ja politiikka 1975–2001”, 226 s. Helsinki, 2003. Tilaukset: arno.tanner@kolumbus.fi

## Maahanmuuttajat, kansainvälinen siirtolaisuus ja etniset suhteet -työryhmä

kokoontuu Sosiologipäivillä Jyväskylässä 26.–27.3.2004.

Työryhmään ovat tervetulleita kaikki, joiden mielenkiinnon kohteena ovat siirtolaisuus, maahanmuuttajat ja etniset vähemmistöt niin Suomessa kuin kansainvälisestikin. Erityishuomio kohdistuu etnisten ryhmien välisiin suhteisiin ja siihen, miten ja miksi etnisyys on yhä tänäkin päivänä keskeinen erilaisuutta ja yhteenkuuluvuutta konstituiva tekijä huolimatta siitä, että se on menettänyt paikkasidonnaisuutensa ihmisten liikkuvuuden lisääntymisen myötä. Työryhmän kiinnostuksen kohteisiin kuuluvat myös maahanmuuttajien ja etnisten vähemmistöjen järjestäytyneet yhteisöt (uskonnolliset, kulttuuriset, poliittiset yms. yhdistykset) ja niihin liittyvät kysymykset.

Työryhmässä etsitään vastauksia muun muassa seuraaviin kysymyksiin: Miten maahanmuuttajien, muiden etnisten vähemmistöjen ja toisaalta nk. valtaväestön edustajat ymmärtävät, kokevat, merkityksellistävät ja toiminnallistavat oman ja muiden saman elinpiirin jakavien etnisyyden? Millaisia ovat ”me” ja ”muut” -asetelmat sekä tällaisten binaaristen kategorioiden ylityk-

set nykypäivänä? Millaisia neuvotteluja etnisyyksistä käydään ja minkälaisia sosiaalisia mekanismeja, käytäntöjä ja toimintatapoja etnisten ryhmien kohtaamisiin liittyy? Millä tavoin ihmisten ja informaation transnationaali liike vaikuttaa etnisyyksiin?

Työryhmän tarkoitus on edistää aihealueen tutkijoiden monitieteistä vuorovaikutusta. Pyrkimys on myös kannustaa tieteenalojen rajojen ylittämiseen liittyvien metodologisten ja käsitteellisten haasteiden pohtimiseen ja niistä keskustelemiseen. Työryhmään ovat tervetulleita sekä teoreettisesti että empiirisesti aihepiiriä lähestyvät esitykset.

### Koordinaattorit:

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**Lähetä abstraktisi sähköpostitse koordinaattoreille mielellään 15.1.2004 mennessä!**

# "Immigrant crisis" of 1999–2001 in Slovenia: Fabula, Plebs and Lex



Ana Kralj

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Slovenia is a small country covering an area of a bit more than 20.000 square kilometres. The population is nearly 2 million. Over 90 % are Slovenes and the others are mostly of Croatian, Serbian, Moslem, Italian and Hungarian origin. Slovenia is situated at the edge of central and Western Europe. Its neighbouring countries are Italy to the West, Austria to the north, Hungary to the north-east and Croatia to the east and south. As the main route from the Balkan states and the middle east to the European community passes through Slovenia the country is quite interesting when it comes to the migration studies.

In the nineties, Slovenia experienced two "crisis periods", both related to migration problems. Both crises, the so called "refugee crisis" in the period between 1992 and 1993, and the "immigrant crisis", which culminated at the beginning of the year 2000, were marked by the fact that they caught the state and its institutions completely off guard. I will

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concentrate on the second "crisis period", between the years of 1999 and 2001, when the migration turbulence divided the official policy and the Slovenian public into advocates of solidarity with the immigrants on one side and those, who purposely spread the desire for the removal of the immigrants on the other side.

During the first years of Slovenian independence, the number of registered illegal border crossings was around 4000 to 5000 cases per year. In 1993, the first significant increase was registered in the police statistical data, when the number almost doubled, which was mostly due to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the following years, the number of illegal border crossings again dropped and leveled at approximately 4000 cases per year. In the second half of the nineties the number began to rise steadily. In the year of 1997, the number of registered illegal border crossings doubled in comparison to the year before; in 1998, the number was already four times higher than in 1996 (General police directorate, Sector for borders and foreigners. <http://www.policija.si/si>).

The so called second "immigrant crisis", which was marked

mainly by illegal immigrants and political asylum seekers, originated in the year of 1999, when the police registered 18695 illegal border crossings, while 744 people submitted an application for political asylum (until then the average number of applications per year has been 110 people). The Slovenian policy on political asylum approval has always been very restrictive. In the year of 2000, the police statistical data registered the largest number of illegal border crossings, since the number of illegal immigrants increased to 35914; furthermore, the number of political asylum applications also increased substantially (9244). Only 13 of them were approved. In the following year, the police adjusted its protection of the state border to the "state of threat" level, and immediately began to perform additional actions in order to prevent illegal migrations; therefore, the number of illegal immigrants decreased by almost 50% in comparison to the previous year (20.871). In 2002 the police statistics registered 6926 illegal border crossings (General police directorate, Sector for borders and foreigners. <http://www.policija.si/si>).

The animated public discussion of the immigrant issue in Slovenia

was stirred in the fall of 2000, when the number of "illegals" and asylum applicants reached the highest level until then. In the mass media, except from rare exceptions, a distinctly stigmatic and discriminative discourse was formed, which presented a new dimension of the immigration problem to the Slovenian public: the so called "immigrant crisis" was invented. The media discourse was really only a summary of other discourses – the institutional, which was displayed in the public statements of some state officials – as also the so called "voice of the people", which was presented by the initiatives of some locals who were opposed the settlement of the immigrants in their communities. This resulted in many public xenophobic statements and records of hate speech (e.g. Kuzmanija, A. T., 1999).

In the beginning of February, several major changes occurred in the high tension and distinctively anti-immigrant atmosphere. The xenophobic and racist discourse, which permeated the Slovene public, called to action the group of citizens with a leftist-anarchist political orientation, which presented itself to the public as the Office for Interventions. The public appeals of the Office for Interventions and other non-governmental offices for tolerance and solidarity toward illegal immigrants and asylum seekers were soon joined by the intellectuals, some political parties, the highest level state representatives, and thereafter, also the broader public. On February 21<sup>st</sup>, the Office for Interventions and the Italian movement for a more just globalization process "Tute bianche" together organized a

"Manifestation against intolerance – for solidarity with immigrants of all kinds" in the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, which was attended by the largest amount of people since Slovenian independence in 1990.

The change in the "anti-runaway atmosphere" was also displayed in a noticeable media turnout; the daily newspapers started to publish articles, which condemned the immigrant criminalization and attempted to view the immigrant problem in a more reflective fashion. This was followed by a calmness in the media, when it seemed that the "immigrant crisis" never occurred. Due to appendices to the existing asylum law, which additionally tightened the procedure for asylum approval, and also due to tightened border security, the number of asylum seekers and illegal migrants significantly decreased in the year 2001; at the same time, the attention of the media was redirected towards other issues such as preparations for the execution of upcoming referendums regarding the entrance of Slovenia into the European Union and NATO alliance.

In our opinion, the study of the "immigrant crisis" in Slovenia in the period from 1999 to 2001, shows quite clearly, that the state agencies and institutions were not prepared for it, since the response was either too late or inappropriate. The institutional policy towards immigrants in Slovenia was and still is following the guidelines of the emerging common European immigration policy, which is mainly restrictive; nevertheless Slovenian policy was quite successful at capturing the "spirit of the times"

displayed by the emerging European migration policy. Slovenia therefore responded by establishing supervisory policy measures with a tighter external (visas, entrance restrictions, databases of unwanted and dangerous persons, stricter legislation...) and internal control (repatriations, deportations, movement restrictions, setup of collection centers, restriction of access to personal documents and restriction in healthcare, social and educational care). In the nineties, the restrictive orientation was encouraged and approved by those political forces that doesn't care about otherwise – in the Europe -fashionable "politically correctness", and are openly expressing their intolerance towards "others and those that are different". The Slovenian "voice of the people" was not much different in this period: the local public initiatives were mainly twofold, either openly hostile toward foreigners, (who are supposed to be thieves, liars and cheaters and are threatening the weak and feeble local population), or speculative and manipulative by bargaining and blackmailing the state to achieve their local and political interests.

Slovenia experienced the "immigrant crisis" in the nineties due to the fact, that it was not prepared for it. The Slovenian laws, which deal with the field of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers, undoubtedly contain the controversial issues. Both, the civil-society and non-governmental organizations, and also some of the experts, were calling the attention to those issues. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the above-mentioned

laws assured a certain level of rights and protection to asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. Thus the problem is not the inappropriateness of the laws dealing with the mentioned problem, but more so, the actual execution of the procedures, and mainly, the fact that illegal immigrants and asylum seekers are not properly informed in regard to their lawful rights or the fact that the realization of these rights was hindered.

Another important characteristic of public speech and political rhetoric in Slovenia is the low level of reflective and analytical thinking. The latter is true for the majority of journalistic texts and public positions of professional politicians. Most often, they asserted that Slovenian legislation and

practice in this field, are completely compliant with European standards and demands, but they never wondered whether the European standards and the fundamental migration policies are appropriate. Again, “Europe” acted as a conspiring form that puts an end to all critical thinking.

The so called developed countries created contemporary consumer societies and are now surprised and scared, because the uninvited immigrants from the south and east are trying to share their wellbeing. The immigrants are a part of the global migration flows, and were made illegal by the developed countries with their restrictive laws. In the periphery of the world, the passports became contemporary bibles; on the other

hand having a passport doesn’t necessary mean their owners can travel freely around the globe. The customs officers and border police on the state borders of the world center (to use Immanuel Wallerstein’s term) became the contemporary St. Peters, guarding the gates of the apparent heaven. Nevertheless, more and more signs suggest that in the eyes of the migrants enchantment or fascination with the West is diminishing and their big expectations are replaced by caution and uncertainty. (Illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers in Slovenia have been exposed to this “de-fascination” much more than to solidarity and support.

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# Immigration and integration – the global challenge



Elli Heikkilä

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Among demographic events, immigration is gaining more and more political importance according to Poulain and Herm (2003). They point out that at the international level, flows of people between countries, even if only a limited number of persons are concerned, play a major role when dealing with political equilibrium between states and cross-cultural transfers. Nowadays everything that concerns international mobility has taken a huge political dimension: this is linked to the problems of immigration from developing countries, problems related to the integration of the foreign population already living in the host countries and also to the xenophobic tendencies. A key issue in building tomorrow's Europe, whatever its size is reaching an agreement on a common European policy in the field of international migration.

About 17 percent of all 160 million immigrants on earth are residing in the EU area. It is estimated that nearly 6 million European citizens reside in an EU country other than their own. In most OECD countries the number of foreigners or immigrants has risen during the

past five years. During the 1990s the foreign population grew very considerably in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, mainly because of increased inflows from Central and Eastern Europe. In the United States, the number of foreign-born persons rose by more than 40 % during 1990-2000 (Sopemi 2003; Widgren 2003).

According to Sopemi (2003) every type of migration policy has been implemented during the past two years. OECD countries have adopted a more restrictive attitude towards the entry and residence of foreigners and some countries have tightened requirements for family reunification procedures (e.g. Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands). These policies were enacted in parallel with those giving more importance to selection procedures for new immigrants, especially to those for skilled workers. The fight against illegal immigration and the illegal employment of foreigners has been reinforced on two fronts: firstly, with tighter border controls, workplace inspections and identity checks within countries. Secondly, measures involving international cooperation with sending countries

were undertaken to provide for their readmission of illegal immigrants. The integration of immigrants and foreigners remains a major issue for most OECD countries.

Joseph Marko et al. (2003) point out that integration expresses a complex concept whose meaning can differ according to a specific time, space and country, as well as political and historical circumstances. Generally, integration refers to the broader context of legal access to resources, rights, goods and services, whereas social inclusion also incorporates the foreigner's individual choice to be part of the host community's social life. The purpose of a comprehensive, long-term integration policy should be to ensure that immigrants can take an equal part in the life of society: participation and equal opportunities are, thus the key elements in such policies. From a cultural viewpoint, integration policies strive to bring immigrants into the mainstream society while simultaneously protecting minorities' ability to develop and express their socio-cultural features.

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## FINN FORUM VII

**An Interdisciplinary Conference in Finnish and Finnish-North American Studies  
Cultural Encounters: Migration, Ethnicity, and Identities  
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities  
October 28–30, 2004**

### CALL FOR PAPERS

The Finn Forum Planning Committee and the University of Minnesota are pleased to announce Finn Forum VII, an Interdisciplinary Conference in Finnish and Finnish-North American Studies, to be held October 28-30, 2004, at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.

The following University of Minnesota departments and centers are collaborating with the Planning Committee on Finn Forum VII: the College of Liberal Arts, the European Studies Consortium, the Finnish Studies Program in the Department of German, Scandinavian & Dutch and the Department of Geography, and the Immigration History Research Center.

Proposals for papers relating to all aspects of Finnish and Finnish-North American society, history, and culture are welcome.

We especially invite proposals in the following areas:

- Cultural Representations and the Arts
- Landscapes and Built Environments
- Folklore and Folklife

- Economics of Intercultural Exchange and Labor Languages and Linguistics; and
- Regional and Social Change.

Proposals should not be longer than 350 words in length and should be submitted by 26 March 2004.

Papers must be based on original, unpublished research. Presentations should be no longer than 20–25 minutes, allowing for discussion.

Selected papers will be published in a Finn Forum VII proceedings.

Please send the abstract to  
The Finn Forum Program Committee  
c/o European Studies Consortium  
214 Social Sciences  
University of Minnesota  
267-19th Avenue South  
Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA

Abstracts can also be sent in an email and/or as an attachment in MSWord to [esc@umn.edu](mailto:esc@umn.edu).




Dosentti Kimmo Lehtimäki (vas.) Tampereelta avasi Verner Lehtimäen elämää kuvaavan näyttelyn 12.3.



Davis Helberg (oik.) Eskosta, Minnesotasta, vieraili vaimonsa Karenin ja Suomessa asuvan poikansa Billin kanssa 23.6.



Taiteilija Graeme Storm (vas.) on toisen polven suomalainen uudesta Seelannista. Hän vieraili vaimonsa Jacquinin kanssa 10.7.



Lake Worthissa Floridassa asuva Suomen kunniakonsuli Peter Mäkilä (oik.) vieraili kesällä parikin kertaa.



Toimittaja Ron Erikson (vas.) Vancouverista, Kanadasta, tutustui Siirtolaisuusinstituutin näyttelyihin 31.7.



Floridassa asuvaa entistä merimiestä Kalle Nikulaa (oik.) haastateltiin Siirtolaisuusinstituutin merimiesnäyttelyn avajaisissa 31.7.

## Pohjalainen siirtolaisuus – valokuvat kertovat



Pohjalaisen siirtolaisuuden näyttely avattiin Siirtolaisuusinstituutin Pohjanmaan aluekeskuksessa 10.11. Kuvassa instituutin johtaja, professori Olavi Koivukangas ja v.s. aluepäällikkö Tuula Koskimies-Hautaniemi.



## Seminaarijulkaisu



**The Second Workshop on Demographic and Cultural Specificity and Integration of Migrants; March 21–23, 2002, Helsinki, Finland. Solicited Papers. Working Papers E 16/2003. The Family Federation of Finland/Väestöliitto, Helsinki 2003, 140 p. ISBN 952-9605-96-X.**

Väestöliiton Väestöntutkimuslaitos kuului vuosina 1999–2002 EU:n komission rahoittamaan 13 maan yhteistyöorganisaatioon NIEPS:iin (*Network for Integrated European Population Studies*). Yhteistyössä kartoitettiin kolmea teema-alueita: muuttoliikettä, ikääntymistä ja perheen muodostamista. Yhteistyön tavoitteena oli myös luoda uusia tutkimusteemoja jatkotyöskentelyä varten. Vuodesta 2003 lähtien jäsenmaat ovatkin aloittaneet laajan DIALOG-tutkimushankkeen, jossa selvitetään NIEPS-yhteistyössä esiin tulleita tutkimusteemoja.

NIEPS-konferensseja pidettiin kaksi vuodessa. Keskustelun aktivoimiseksi osallistujamäärät rajoitettiin yleensä 40:ään. Sekä esitelmien että keskustelujen tason osalta tavoitteet saavutettiin erinomaisesti.

Helsingissä maaliskuussa 2002 pidetyn Väestöliiton Väestöpoliittisen seminaarin esitelmistä koostuu julkaisu *"The Second Workshop on Demographic and Cultural Specificity and Integration of Migrants"*. Tapaamisen teemana olivat integroitumiseen ja muuttoliikkeeseen liittyvät kulttuuriset erityispiirteet. Tilaisuuteen oli kutsuttu neljä pääalustajaa ja heille kullekin henkilökohtaiset diskussantit.

Professori *Michel Poulain* (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgia) ja tohtori *Anne Herm Viron* tilastokeskuksesta tarkastelivat tilastoaineistojen perusteella nykyisissä EU-maissa (EU<sub>15</sub>-alue) tapahtuneen muuton suuntautumista ja rakennetta (*"An overview and comparison of the state of migration in EU countries: what the data reveal?"*). Tekijät tarkastelivat myös ansiokkaasti eri maiden muuttoliiketilastotietojen rakennetta ja luotettavuutta. Tässä suhteessa meidän suomalaisten ei tarvitse olla huolissamme, sillä tilastomme kestävät tiukankin vertailun. Artikkelin yhteenvetoon tekijät olivat listanneet 22 kohtaa, jotka hyvin toivat esille EU-maiden siirtolaisuuden erityispiirteet. Kirjoittajat osoittivat selvästi, miten jäsenmaat ovat erilaisten muuttopaineiden ja -prosessien kohteena sijainnistaan ja muuttohistoriansaan riippuen.

Professori *Youssef Courbage* (Institut National D'Etudes Demo-

graphiques, INED, Ranska) tarkasteli esitelmässään pohjoisesta Afrikasta muuttaneiden muutttoa ja kulttuurista sopeutumista (*"Immigration and Integration of Migrants from the Maghreb in some European countries – challenges for future research"*). Maghreb-alueelta on Eurooppaan muuttanut jo useita miljoonia siirtolaisia. Prof. Courbage keskittyi lähinnä Ranskaan, Belgiaan ja Norjaan suuntautuneeseen muuttoon. Afrikassa siirtolaisten lähtöalueella syntyvyys on huomattavan korkea. Hän totesi, että maahanmuuttajien hedelmällisyys laskee nopeasti uudessa asuinmaassa. Toisaalta hedelmällisyys säilyy kuitenkin eurooppalaisittain korkeana. Edelliseen liittyen ranskalaisen onkin paljolti kiittäminen nykyisestä *baby boomistaan* maassa asuvia afrikkalaisia siirtolaisia. Courbage otti voimakkaasti kantaa myös maahanmuuttajien tiettyihin kulttuurisiin erityispiirteisiin. Esimerkiksi sukupuolten väliseen epätasa-arvoon ja sukuelinten silpomiseen hänellä oli yksiselitteisen kielteinen kanta. Courbagen mielestä siirtolaisten kotoutumista edistäisi se, jos yhä useampi maahanmuuttajajuuri pääsisi jatkokoulutukseen. Näin siirtolaisille syntyisi aikaa myöten oma keskiluokka, joka omalta osaltaan edesauttaisi tulijoiden integroitumista. Edellisen kääntökohtana kirjoittaja toteaa, että maahanmuuttajien alhainen lähtökoulutus voi olla syrjäytymistä edistävä tekijä. Tilannetta ei paranna ollenkaan se, että lähtijöiksi valikoituu selvästi heikoimmin koulutettu väestönosa: noin 80 % Algeriasta Ranskaan tulleista miehistä on luku- ja kirjoitustaidottomia, kun vastaava suh-

deluku Algeriassa asuvien miesten keskuudessa on 42 %.

Johtaja **Jonas Widgren** (International Centre for Migration Policy, ICMPD, Itävalta) tarkasteli esitelmässään Euroopan itälaajentamisen vaikutuksia nykyisten jäsenmaiden muuttoliikkeeseen (*“Future immigration to the EU in the context of eastern enlargement and Mediterranean cooperation”*). Widgren aloitti integraatio-tarkastelunsa mielenkiintoisella viittauksella: hän otti erityistarasteluun Suomesta Ruotsiin tapahtuneen muuton, jonka seurauksena Ruotsissa oleva suomalaisvähemmistö kasvoi huomattavasti 1960- ja 1970-luvuilla. Widgren totesi, että suomalaisten integroituminen Ruotsiin on tapahtunut sangen heikosti. Yhtenä syynä hän näki sen, että ruotsin-suomalaiset olivat itse kovin haluttomia ”tulemaan” Ruotsin suurimmaksi vähemmistöksi: monella oli paluu mielessä. Toisaalta suomalaiset olivat keskittyneet muutamille alueille, joilla selvisi mainiosti suomen kielellä. Toki Widgren tunnusti, etteivät itse ruotsalaisetkaan olleet turhan aktiivisia vähemmistöpolitiikkansa toteuttamisessa. Kaiken kaikkiaan Widgren näki Euroopan yhä tiukempänä

osana globaalia taloutta ja siihen liittyvää väestön liikkumista. Siirtolaisuudesta on tulossa yhä enustamattomampaa. Widgren tuntee hyvin Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioiden ikääntymisproblematiikan, eikä hän näe pessimismissään valoa edes muuttoliikkeen kautta: *“Without at least a five or ten doubling of present intake levels, Europe will slowly but surely succumb into an archaic non-productive elderly landscape”*.

Viimeinen esiintyjä tuli naapurimaastamme Virosta. Vastaitseenäistyneen maan optimismi heijastui johtaja **Raivo Vetikin** (Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn Pedagogical University) mielenkiintoisessa esitelmässä. (*“National Integration in Estonia in the Context of the Ongoing EU Accession”*). Hän esitteli lyhyesti Virossa asuvan väestön etnistä rakennetta, jossa edelleen voimakkaasti heijastuu Neuvostoliiton aikainen yhteiskuntapolitiikka. Niinpä vuonna 2000 Viron väestöstä 2/3 laskettiin virolaisiksi ja loput ei-virolaisiksi (non-Estonians). Viro aloitti 1990-luvulla voimakkaan integraatio-ohjelman, jonka sisältö ja tavoitteet herättivät konferenssissa laajaa keskustelua. Virossa ei juuri monikulttuu-

risuuden autuudesta keskustella. Integraatio siellä tarkoittaa paljolti virolaisen (siis etnisten virolaisten määrittämän) valtio- ja yhteiskuntakäsityksen hyväksymistä: *“One of the main purposes of the integration of Estonian society is to build up a common political identity for all people leaving in Estonia. This is the core part of the whole integration programme, which implies efforts not only from non-Estonians but also, and in some sense even foremost, from the Estonians. It appears that the ethnic conceptualization of statehood is still very close to the Estonian mentality”*. Koko integraatio-ohjelman yhtenä kulmakivenä on myös se, että Viron valtion tehtävänä on säilyttää virolaista kulttuuriperintöä: *“Estonian society is multicultural and due to that state has to create conditions for the cultural development of ethnic minorities, but in the sense of a common cultural space, Estonia is and will remain Estonian”*. Puhuja itsekin oletti, että aikaa myöten etninen monimuotoisuus tulee Viron poliittiselle agendalle. Useat kuuntelijat toivoivat tämän tapahtuvan mahdollisimman pian.

*Ismo Söderling*



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