Migration and the City: Social Cohesion and Integration Policies

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Introduction: stating the problem

One of the dominant features of the postwar era is the phenomenon of globalization and internationalization. This development is manifested in a number of areas. The financial world was one of the first to emancipate from national borders and authorities and to go worldwide. Following the free movement of capital, economic activities and products are now also much less restricted by national boundaries than they used to be. The development of technology in information, communication and transport has evidently contributed to this new economic and financial world order. And in its wake it has assisted internationalization in cultural and political matters. The coming into ex-

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istence of the European Union is a manifestation of the latter. These developments in itself have brought more external influences and diversity particularly to larger cities that are the local spaces of internationalization.

Two specific consequences of this general process do have in practice a great influence on larger cities. The first is that this globalization in all those domains has inevitably consequences for the movement of human beings: a growing number of people linked to the internationalization move across borders. There is a substantial migration *directly linked* to multinational companies. In general one might say that the labour market of the highly skilled has become increasingly international. This kind of migration – which often is temporary – is generally not seen as problematic, although it contributes clearly to growing diversity.

However, these are not the only people who move. A far greater number of people move as an *indirect* consequence of globalization: the increased reach of communication and transport, the higher density of networks globally and thus the increase of intermediary structures that facili-

tate migration, have significantly contributed to the growth of immigration of workers and refugees and their family members. Until 1974 their arrival was welcomed and even stimulated by recruitment because of the demand for their labour, but after the restructuring of European economy in the seventies they kept coming unasked for. It is particularly this category of newcomers that is perceived as problematic in the eyes of the societies of settlement.

Since both kinds of these newcomers tend to concentrate heavily in larger urban areas, they have become the directly visible face of globalization. They have rapidly changed the composition of the population of these cities.

To complicate things we note that not only the intensity of migration, but also the form that migration takes, differs from the ones that we are used to. Scientists talk about transnational communities and transnational migrants, indicating those forms of migration in which migrants are not only embedded in the national or local society of settlement, but retain strong and intensive bonds across borders. This may lead to new forms of incorporation of immigrants. It surely has conse-

quences for the kind of integration policies that national and local authorities implement[2].

A second consequence of globalization that is relevant for our discussions, is the shift in political structures and responsibilities. In our field for example, migration and admission policies are mainly national and European Union policies, but the concrete consequences have to be dealt with by local governments, particularly large cities that are attraction poles of immigrants (see: Doomernik et al. 1997).

What does all this mean in practice for large cities? First of all, these cities are confronted with great and fast changes. General changes as a consequence of globalization that create new diversity within the settled, native population; and at the same time specific changes embodied in the arrival of large numbers of newcomers that contribute to more diversity. Let me be clear about the message I want to convey: I do not want to suggest that there was homogeneity and uniformity before: most larger cities always had diversity of all kinds that they had to cope with, such as class divisions and religious, cultural and language minorities. Particularly in larger cities heterogeneity has in general been the rule and thus the often-made distinction between the 'native culture' and that of newcomers is illusionary, and false. The difference is that what I would call 'the old diversity' has been accommodated more or less and is reflected in political structures and processes of decision making: 'we are used to it'. The crucial question for cities seems to

be whether they are able to accommodate the new diversity, both the general and the specific one. How to create and enhance unity, loyalty and social cohesion? How to rearrange structures and institutions within these cities in such a way that they are able to reflect the new composition of the population and its diversity. How to enable and stimulate newcomers to find a fair and accepted place and participate in the new social and political environment and develop thereby their loyalty to it and contribute to it. How to find a new balance of a political community that shares basic values and rules that are necessary for any political unity to survive, while at the same time taking into account and respecting diversity and reap the potential fruits of this diversity.

Cities and municipalities do have a special responsibility here, apart from that of national authorities. I remind you here that the word citizen is derived from 'city'; the local political community of the city is from the point of view of the individual the place where the important things happen that affect his life, his position and his future. Let us start from this original meaning and call all inhabitants of the city citizens, irrespective of their formal legal status.

The basic paradox of the present situation seems to be that we try to handle the migration phenomenon that is rooted in global developments in a framework that is still essentially based on the nation-state premises that has divided the world into separate political communities and territo-

ries, in which migration is an anomaly, as Zolberg stated once.

In this contribution I will demonstrate that paradox particularly for the European case. First I will briefly look back at European migration policies as a general context. Secondly I will turn to integration policies of European countries. And thirdly, I will address the need for changes in these policies and the principles upon which these could be based.

European immigration policies in comparative perspective

When it comes to immigration policies in Europe we see first of all that phenomena of globalization take place in large cities everywhere in the world, particular in metropoles in the first world and so does immigration. Immigration in some Northwestern European countries that deliberately do not call themselves immigration countries is, measured simply by the percentage of foreign born within the total population, higher than in countries that do regard themselves as immigration countries. For example, Switzerland and the FRG have higher percentages than Canada, the United States or Australia.. Only in Southern European countries it is still lower, but clearly on the increase.

So the *facts* of immigration are to a greater or lesser extent the same in these countries, but *perception* is *not*. Classical immigration countries like the US and Canada have a history in which immigration is a crucial element

and they are aware of that. There is a basic acceptance of immigration and an elaborate institutional setting to handle it. Of course, immigration is discussed continuously there too, and it changes over time, but still... The common feature of Europe, on the contrary, is one of a basic non-acceptance of immigration. Admittedly, there are variations in non-acceptance: the Netherlands could be an example of 'accepting immigration grudgingly'; Austria and Switzerland are more clearly non-acceptant. Notwithstanding these variations the basic difference remains.

Developments within the new context of the European Union has changed things, but in the domain of immigration not yet for the better. *Migration policies* of the EU are essentially ambivalent. On the one hand the EU created a sort of fundamental right to migrate within the EU-area for citizens of member states, and furthermore a lenient policy is practised in all states for highly skilled and company linked migrants from outside the EU. On the other hand the EU has developed a common, restrictive and very defensive immigration policy to keep out all other unasked for migrants. I am not talking now about the effectiveness of these policies, but about their aims. Fortress Europe is indeed a designation that is not far off the mark.

European Integration policies: diversity of policies instead of policies of diversity

European immigration policies are thus communautarian policies

– competence of the European Commission – but integration policies are not. Integration policies have remained in the so-called 'Third Pillar', which means essentially that these are national policies. Any common initiative can only be implemented by a unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers.

The combination of non-acceptance of immigration and very restrictive and defensive admission policies has severe consequences for integration policies. It is a Janus-face: you cannot easily put off the severe side of restrictive admission to change it for the benevolent and seducing face of integration policies. The negative effects of the first are furthermore anchored within all European countries in political movements of varying size and face: large and visible in some countries like France (Le Pen), Austria (Haider) and Belgium (Flemish Blok), more disguised under mostly conservative labels in other countries like the UK, Germany etc.

In order to describe and analyse systematically the present European integration policies and their differences, I will first develop a basic typology as a tool.

Citizenship and a typology of policies

I propose to start from a simple analytical framework that centers on the concept of 'citizenship'. Recently political theorists have contributed significantly to our thinking on citizenship, particularly when they have tried to answer the question how basic democratic values can and should be

combined with cultural and religious diversity on the one hand and socio-economic equality on the other (Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Soysal 1994; Young 1990).

I propose to bring in the most important elements of these discussions in a rather practical way: let us distinguish three different aspects or dimensions of citizenship.

The first is the *juridical/political dimension*: it refers to the basic question whether immigrants are regarded as fullfledged member of the political community. In practice the question is in how far immigrants and ethnic minorities do have formal rights and duties that differ from those of natives in relation to opportunities for political participation. This also includes the question whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; it evidently also includes the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals.

The second is the *socio-economic dimension* of citizenship: this pertains to social and economic rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do they have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work related benefits, like unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the state-provided social security facilities,

like social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities, et cetera.

The third dimension pertains to the domain of *cultural and religious rights* of immigrants and minorities: do they have equal rights to organize and manifest themselves as ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

These dimensions of citizenship can be reformulated for the purpose of analysis of policies of national and local governments as 'spheres of integration' and used as yardsticks to typologize the kind and partiality of integration policies.

If we attribute for the sake of simplicity only two qualities to each of the dimensions defined above, one positive quality meaning the explicit support in policy for the dimension concerned, and one negative meaning that that same dimension is denied support in policies, we have created a typology space of possible forms of policies:

The first and most important divide between policies is based on the juridical-political dimension: if migrants or immigrants are not regarded as (potentially) part of the political community of the country or city of settlement and if the juridical position is defined as essentially different, I will call these exclusionist policies.

On this point we observe significant historical differences between Northwest European countries: a number of countries have started so called 'guest worker policies' after the Second World War. By definition such migration was temporary, and thus exclusionist: types 4, 5 and 6. Dutch policies until 1980, for example, fitted perfectly type 4, since it combined political exclusion and a special juridical position of these alien guests with in principle equal rights in the socio-economic sphere and a policy of 'retaining cultural and religious identity' in view of their anticipated return. Austrian and Swiss policies have fitted, and still do to a great extent, to types 5 or 6 in the sense

pean countries, such as The Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden[3], have explicitly acknowledged that most of the (former) labour migrants would be settling for good and that more inclusionist policies were necessary (Vermeulen 1997, Lindo 1997). These countries have changed their naturalization laws and/or practices in order to facilitate access to formal citizenship, most prominently for the children of immigrants. Sometimes they have added opportunities for formal political participation of legally residing aliens at the local level or have devised group-specific forms of consultation and participation.

Not all European countries, however, have made such a change in definitions and policies, or at least not to the same extent. Austrian and Swiss national policies, for example, still reflect to a large extent the premises of guestworker policies. Germany made a first step towards a more inclusionist policy in 1991 with a relative easing of the tough naturalization regulations.

Against this background of continental Europe, the United Kingdom represents a different case: there is no such tradition as a 'guest worker scheme' and the great majority of those who immigrated to the UK was entitled to or possessed already a British passport on their arrival. Alienness and nationality are not significant characteristics: it was and is the racial or ethnic origin or descent that is the relevant paradigm. The British case, being one that is inclusionist in the formal sense from the beginning, makes us aware of

Typology space of migrant/ethnic minorities policies:

	Inclusion			Exclusion		
Type	1	2	3	4	5	6
Juridical/political dimension	+	+	+	-	-	-
Socio-economic dimension	+	+	-	+	-	-
Cultural-religious dimension	+	-	-	+	+	-

Policies of diversity or diversity of policies?

From this simple typology a number of things become clear.

that they combine political exclusion with unequal industrial and social rights of foreign workers.

In the beginning of the 1980s, however, a number of these Euro-

the distinction between formal inclusion and inclusion in practice. Inclusion in the political-juridical domain turns out to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to attain equality.

Although there is thus some convergence in national migrant policies in Europe pertaining to the juridical/political dimension, quite substantial differences remain[4]. Such differences are related to basic ideas about membership of the political community in different countries: Germany, for example, defines its national community in ethnic terms, in terms of ancestry, and thus welcomes resettlers (Aussiedler) as Germans returning to the fatherland, but regards settled foreigners as Ausländer, as 'alien elements'. The French republican conception, in contradistinction, is based on a political contract between individual citizens and the state, a contract that anyone who subscribes the principles of that political system may enter into. The fact that such principles in the French case are strongly embedded in culturally defined institutions, however, makes things complicated for those immigrants that have different cultural and religious backgrounds. Also here the political-juridical inclusion seems to be a necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient condition.

And of course a different terminology goes with such different conceptions: more exclusionist policies talk about 'aliens', 'Ausländer', 'guest workers' and other designations that accentuate the (supposed) temporal stay or the belonging of a person to another political unity. Terminology and content of such policies reflect basically the non-acceptance of immigration as a phenomenon and of newcomers as permanent immigrants. In inclusionist policies on the contrary, 'immigrant' is an accepted term like in France, or the term ethnic minorities is adopted as in the case of the UK and the Netherlands, the term reflecting on the one hand the fact that a group (of immigrants) is part of the political community, but has on the other hand a vulnerable place in that community.

Let us now turn to the second and third dimension and look particularly at inclusionist policies[5]. The first remark is that type 3 does not exist in theory in Western Europe at this moment: liberal democracies principally do not allow for inequality and unequal rights for those who are regarded as members of the political community. Type 3 may, however, exist in practice, as far as racism and discrimination is given space to overthrow such high principles.

In terms of official policies, however, we find the second important divide within inclusionist policies in Europe: between type 1 that stands for multiculturalist policies on the one hand and type 2, that pertains to those forms of 'integration' policies that are mainly based on assimilationist premises.

Multicultural policies of type 1 presuppose not only political inclusion and equality in the socio-economic domain, but also aim at cultural and religious equity. The basic premise of multiculturalism, defined as a set of normative notions on how to shape a multicultural society politically, is that immigrants cannot become equal citizens unless state and society accept that both individuals and groups have the right to cultural difference. According to multiculturalists, the prevailing institutions and rules in society are historical and cultural products that are not neutral for newcomers and thus may need revision in order to accommodate newcomers.

Integration policies of type 2, in contradistinction, take the state and society of settlement as 'given', also in the cultural and normative sense. Newcomers are supposed to adapt at least to the public institutions of that society. This may lead to strong assimilation pressure.

Convergence of policies?

The definitions of the different types of policy described above are ideal types. As I said earlier, I have given only two extreme qualities on each dimension: positive or negative. In practice the divides between them are much fuzzier. Let us then pose the question whether positions have been moving and whether there is convergence in European integration policies.

Taking back again the distinction between the three domains, we have to conclude that the extent of convergence that has occurred is not equally strong in each of these domains. There has been some convergence in the political-juridical domain: for example, in all member states, EU rules will apply to large groups of 'third-country nationals'. Also the wide disparities between French and German naturalization legislation have narrowed somewhat. In recent years there have been in-

creasing appeals in Germany to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily. The *jus sanguinis* principle is thus being relaxed and the *jus soli* principle is being considered, while in France the opposite is happening.

The clearest pressure for convergence, however, is in the socio-economic domain. Uniform rules of the EU from above, assisted by trade union pressure within national contexts, have contributed to much more uniformity than before.

The largest disparities still exist in the cultural-religious domain. Policies related to the two most important elements in this domain, those of language and religion, show little evidence of convergence. Awareness of the need to have such policies varies significantly and pressure of European institutions is not strong here. One of the basic problems here is that language and religion are often tightly bound up with notions of national identity. More divers policies are then easily perceived as threatening that national identity. Nevertheless some signs of convergence can be seen, often at the local level, for example in the recognition of muslims as negotiating partners and rudimentary institutionalization of so called 'new' religions. But at the same time there are still wide disparities with regard to religious instruction in state schools and opportunities for religiously based schools.

Principles for integration policies of cities

If the foregoing brief assessment of present immigration and inte-gration policies in European countries is essentially correct, what can be expected under conditions of unchanged policies? First of all we will see (and we see it already) a spiral movement of negative consequences of defensive immigration policies: admission policies, and particularly asylum procedures, will be increasingly jammed; the present legal instruments, starting only when candidates have already reached the territory, will turn out to be unable to steer migration processes in any significant way. Such defensive policies and its failure to control migration will have negative consequences for legally residing immigrants and integration policies. They are also not able to solve or regulate the migration pressure from outside on the one hand and the increasing demand for (often specific categories of) migrants within European countries on the other hand. I will not dwell here on the basic principles of a badly needed comprehensive and pro-active migration policy: I have formulated these principles already some years ago (Doomernik/Penninx/ Van Amersfoort 1997) and they have been reiterated recently in similar form by others[6].

For cities, and particularly for the larger metropoles in Europe, unchanged policies will lead to growing tensions between national governments and these large cities. These cities are confronted with fast and thorough changes in their population. Admission of these newcomers, however, is 'steered' by national en European policies; the consequences are for these cities. Furthermore these newcomers are migrants of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is luring. There is a danger of loss of the social cohesion in these cities, a threat that may be enhanced by the new phenomenon of transnational 'foot loose' individuals or groups.

There is thus a special problematic and a specific responsibility for these cities, different from that of the national authorities. And there is a need for intensive and pro-active integration policies on this local level, where the citizen should regain its original meaning: an active and accepted participant in the daily life of these cities and thus both profiting from and contributing to the health of that city. How to organize such a local integration policy? What should be the basic principles of such policy?

I will formulate three basic points for the development of such a pro-active local integration policy. The first is that such a integration should be based on a broad and *comprehensive concept of integration*. In the above analysis of present European integration policies I have distinguished three basic dimensions of the concept: the political/juridical, the socio-economic, and the cultural/ religious dimension. Integration policies then should actively challenge the participation of immigrants by including and balancing these three dimensions.

In realizing an inclusive policy on the *political/juridical dimension* cities will often be confronted with barriers and limitations that come from national legislation: access to national citizenship, access to the formal political system on different levels. Apart from trying to change such national barriers cities may be quite creative by establishing alternative local participation systems, whether that pertains to advisory functions for immigrants and their organizations or their participation in implementing policies.

In promoting equality and participation in the *socio-economic domain* local authorities are much less dependent on, or hindered by limitations on other levels. In this domain city authorities can formulate and implement policies to combat socio-economic arrears of immigrants in fields like the labour market, housing en education within the city, and introduce soft or hard instruments for implementation: from stimulating migrants to strong forms of (temporary) positive action. They may also promote active anti-discrimination policies and effective instruments to implement these.

Equity in the *cultural and religious domain* is often the most problematic, although large cities – that always had the combination of greater anonimity and greater diversity in their population – do have more practical experience and possibilities here. Here the lesson from cities that did experiment with 'multicultural policies' of some sort is that new forms of diversity are most easily introduced in areas where there have been historically forms of diversi-

ty. Dutch policies, including the ones of big cities, for example show that the tradition of recognizing different religious denominations – that was politically anchored in the past in the religious pillarization of the political system – may be used to recognize institutionally 'new immigrant religions' such as Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism on an equal level, using existing legislation and old traditions (Rath et al. 1996, 1999, 2000; Lucassen/Penninx 1997). In the same vain, it is easier for countries that recognize a multilingual system of old to institutionalize to a certain extent 'new immigrant languages' (Vermeulen 1997, Lindo 1998).

Whatever the difficulties of introducing such multicultural policies and have these accepted, it is important to realize that in large globalized cities the recognition of different cultures, religions and life styles, and the ensuing multiple identities and loyalties do exist. And at the same time one should try to sollicit allegiance of all these different inhabitants to the local social order to build new forms of cohesion. Recognition often turns out to be a necessary start for such a process, that can be stimulated further by engaging these groups somehow in common decision making.

This brings me to the second principle of new comprehensive local integration policies: these should be conceptualized and implemented on three levels at the same time. The first is the level of *institutions*. For our purpose here we should distinguish between two kinds of institutions. The first are general public institutions of a

society or city, such as the educational system or the political system. These general institutions should reflect the new composition of the population, simply because they are supposed to serve all inhabitants, and equally. Since such institutions have developed certain – culturally determined – ways of operating that in practice hinder access and/or equal outcome for newcomers, there is a need to adjust their practices. The second kind are specific institutions of immigrant groups themselves, such as religious or cultural institutions. They have an important functions for these groups. It is important that such specific institutions should be recognized on the same level as comparable institutions of native groups.

The second level is that of *organisations*. These organisations are in fact the concrete (but partial) manifestation of institutions: mosks associations, for example, are one of the manifestations of the institutionalization of islam. That means also that these organizations can be the concrete vehicle for promoting integration. Recognition of and mobilization of social and cultural ressources of these organizations in the framework of integration policies facilitates and legitimates these policies. They may also become important partners in decision making and even in implementing integration policies.

Finally, the third level is that of *individual* migrants. Actually, in most cases integration is defined and narrowed down to this level only. However, if the above mentioned levels are not included and the reciprocal nature of integration is not explicitly recognized,

such a narrow conceptualisation approaches in practice a kind of 'forced assimilation'. On the other hand, if it is combined with integration on the institutional and organisational level, it demands from individual immigrants a readiness to live up to a limited number of basic rules that are necessary to ensure cohesion: rules of democracy, of equity and equality of all individuals, and of tolerance. Rules that give newcomers at the same time the liberty, within such basic rules, to organize their lives according to their preferences and liking. In such a conception of integration policy at the individual level it is of great importance that newcomers get the practical means and instruments to participate and in doing so develop allegiance to the local society: language courses and informative courses that give an insight in the structures and possibilities of the society and city of settlement and in the basic rules of it, are necessary building stones of any integration policy.

The third point for a new integration policy is a *strategic principle*. Starting from the concept of citizenship as defined above, policies should look analytically at citizenship and participation from two different perspectives and try to combine them in practice. These two perspectives are simply based on the assumption that you need two partners to tango: the immigrants ánd the receiving society or city.

The first perspective than is the *'top-down-approach'*. Here the institutional framework of the society of settlement is taken as a starting point and the question is put in how far that institutional framework is open for participation by immigrants and ethnic minorities, or is opened and activated in the course of time. In this approach the terms of inclusion/exclusion and 'opportunity structure' are key-concepts pertaining to openness of the existing system. As far as measures are taken to stimulate participation, among others by adapting that existing system, *activation* seems to be the appropriate term in two senses: activation of the existing system and of immigrants.

The second is the *'bottom-up-approach'*. Here the central focus is on the initiatives taken by immigrants, ethnic minorities and their organizations to stand up for their (political, social and cultural) interests irrespective of institutional structures, alone or in coalition with other actors. The basic concept here is *mobilization*. The analytical distinction top-down and bottom-up, and activation and mobilization makes it possible to look at the possible mismatch and at the interaction between the two.

Focussing on local situations and the role of immigrants and local authorities in such situations one can thus identify on the one hand *channels of mobilization* for immigrants and ethnic minorities for each of the domains of citizenship mentioned above. In the cultural sphere one can think for example of mobilization through religious or cultural organizations of immigrants and their efforts to establish places of worship, religious courses or courses in immigrant languages, through parents' participation in the educational system of their children to introduce such elements in the school

system, et cetera. In the socio-economic domain immigrants may mobilize themselves also in many ways: as interest organizations defending or trying to gain social rights; by taking initiatives as enterpreneurs or self help groups. In the political-juridical domain immigrants may mobilize themselves, depending on the opportunity structure, as pressure groups outside or within existing political parties, by establishing 'immigrant parties' or action groups, or to call for consultative bodies.

On the other hand one can identify the opportunity structure for such action, or the *channels of activation*. Parallel institutions and policies can be created to function as liaisons between local authorities and immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as Contact and Co-ordination Groups, created for the inclusion of all majority and minority groups with a broad remit to improve relations; Working and Co-ordination Groups, comprised of government departments dealing with immigrants and ethnic minorities for the purpose of sharing information and coordinating programmes and activities; Parliaments or Forums of Migrant Workers or Ethnic Minorities which have the function of articulating their interests and pressing for the implementation of policies; or Advisory Councils with broad scope for sharing information, expressing concerns, distributing resources, and lobbying for interests.

Conclusion

As stated earlier, the world is confronted with the basic paradox that

states try to handle the migration phenomenon that is rooted in global developments, in a framework that is still essentially based on the nation-state premise. This premise divides the world into separate political communities and territories, in which migration is an anomaly. States have and use their souvereignty to develop immigration policies in which they decide on admission or refusal of migrants. In recent times, however, such policies have lost much of their regulatory power and have more and more become 'symbolic' policies.

Large metropoles in Western Europe and elsewhere have become the concrete locus where consequences are visible. These cities have changed considerably and swiftly. I have argued that there is a need for new concepts of integration policies and new strategies for its implementation in order to retain, and sometimes regain viability and social cohesion in these cities. In my view large cities are in principle in a better position than national goverments to develop and implement such new policies. Out of the rich

and divers laboratory of these cities new remedies for viable and cohesive local communities may emerge, if local authorities have the courage to coin integration policies based on a comprehensive and reciprocal concept of integration and use strategies that enable them to use the social and cultural ressources that newcomers bring with them, and thus acquiring allegiance of newcomers to the local community.

Notes

1 International Metropolis is global network of research, governmental and NGO-partners that acts as a forum for discussion on ways of improving policies and programmes for effectively magaging the impact of immigration and diversity in large cities. Rinus Penninx is the European co-chair of Metropolis. He is also one of the co-ordinators of a UNESCO-sponsored international research programme called '*Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC)*'. This contribution draws and builds on work done in these contexts. Penninx is also director of the Research Programme of the IMES at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. For further information consult the website of Metropolis (http:// www.international.metropolis.net), UNESCO (http:// www.unesco.org) and IMES (http://www.pscw. uva.nl/imes/).

2 For a recent overview of this literature see the special issue of *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 22 (1999) 2, particularly the introduction and conclusion by Portes et al.

3 Sweden was in fact the first country to change its policies already in the 1970s.

4 Policies of cities are to a great extent dependent on positions that have been taken and policies that have been adopted at the national level. Nevertheless, local policies within national contexts may vary significantly: cities may on the one hand circumvent or compensate restrictions of national policies, for example by creating special structures for political participation such as Advisory Councils; on the other hand cities may neglect or refuse to implement inclusionist national policies in other cases.

5 Variations in the right part of the scheme reflect differences in

soft and harder kinds of 'temporary migration': the types of column 5 and 6 represent policies that contest essential notions of equality and equal rights in liberal democracies in relation to these migrants, such as equal wages, provisions, right to benefits.

6 See Patrick Weil's contribution to this conference. Also the contribution of the European Commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs reflects some of these new principles. See also the recent publication of the Bertelsmann Foundation et al. (Guetersloh, 2000).

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